

























war-torn	 Third	 Reich	 into	 a	 peaceable	 nation	 through	 a	 series	 of	 far-reaching	
political,	economic,	and	social	reforms.	But	amid	the	growing	tensions	between	East	
and	 West	 these	 radical	 plans	 would	 be	 significantly	 altered,	 culminating	 in	 the	
formation	 of	 two	 German	 states	 in	 1949.	 Historians	 have	 tended	 to	 view	 the	
occupation	as	a	backdrop	 to	 the	nascent	Cold	War	or	a	 transitional	period	 in	 the	
history	of	modern	Germany.	Yet	this	thesis	suggests	that	British	participation	in	the	
Allied	 occupation	 was,	 in	 fact,	 much	 more	 than	 simply	 an	 exercise	 in	 political	










of	 official	 policy,	 beginning	 in	 the	 summer	 of	 1945	 when	 British	 policymakers	
responded	 to	 popular	 demands	 for	 a	 ‘hard	 peace’	 and	 approved	 a	 rigorous	
programme	 of	 denazification,	 re-education,	 and	 demilitarisation.	 In	 the	 coming	
years,	 scandals	 engulfed	 the	public	 image	of	 the	British	occupiers,	 threatening	 to	
	
	
undermine	Britain’s	 claims	on	 ‘winning	 the	peace’	and	even	prompting	an	official	
public	relations	campaign.	The	mass	market	press	led	calls	for	an	abrupt	end	to	the	
occupation,	 fearing	 it	 was	 undermining	 the	 nation’s	 prestige	 while	 failing	 to	
adequately	 address	 the	 threat	 still	 posed	by	Germany.	At	 around	 the	 same	 time,	
Britain’s	political	and	military	leaders	reassessed	their	position	in	the	face	of	the	Cold	
War,	turning	towards	the	reconstruction	and	rehabilitation	of	western	Germany.	By	
1949,	 a	 clear	 dichotomy	had	emerged,	with	 implications	 reaching	 far	 beyond	 the	











































outcome	 of	 work	 done	 in	 collaboration	 except	 as	 declared	 in	 the	 Preface	 and	
specified	in	the	text.	
It	 is	 not	 substantially	 the	 same	 as	 any	 that	 I	 have	 submitted,	 or,	 is	 being	
concurrently	 submitted	 for	 a	 degree	 or	 diploma	 or	 other	 qualification	 at	 the	
University	 of	 Cambridge	 or	 any	 other	 University	 or	 similar	 institution	 except	 as	
declared	in	the	Preface	and	specified	in	the	text.	I	further	state	that	no	substantial	
part	 of	 my	 dissertation	 has	 already	 been	 submitted,	 or,	 is	 being	 concurrently	
submitted	for	any	such	degree,	diploma	or	other	qualification	at	the	University	of	
Cambridge	or	any	other	University	of	 similar	 institution	except	as	declared	 in	 the	
Preface	and	specified	in	the	text.	






































































































Map	 1:	 The	 Occupation	 Zones	 of	 Germany,	 1945.	 Source:	 Christopher	 Knowles,	















In	 the	 face	 of	 growing	 tensions	 between	 East	 and	West,	 these	 radical	 plans	 for	
‘winning	the	peace’	would	be	drastically	moderated,	culminating	in	the	formation	of	
two	 sovereign	German	 states	 in	 1949.	 Yet	 as	 this	 thesis	will	 demonstrate,	 British	







As	 the	 war	 in	 Europe	 came	 to	 a	 close,	 the	 victorious	 powers	 set	 about	
resolving	the	so-called	‘German	Problem’,	an	ambiguous	short-hand	for	all	manner	
of	 diagnoses	 and	 prescriptions	 of	 Nazism	 and	 its	 antecedents.	 At	 the	 Potsdam	
Conference	(17	July	–	2	August	1945),	 they	agreed	to	 implement	a	programme	of	
denazification,	 demilitarisation,	 disarmament,	 dismantling,	 democratisation,	 re-
education,	and	decartelisation.	These	drastic	reforms	would	be	facilitated	through	a	
protracted	 period	 of	 Allied	 military	 rule,	 during	 which	 time	 the	 occupation	









(ACC),	 a	 central	 inter-Allied	 governing	 body	 which	 would	 oversee	 the	 laws	 and	






of	 Occupation	 (BAFO),	 and	 its	 civilian	 counterpart,	 the	 Control	 Commission	 for	
Germany	(British	Element)	(CCG	(BE)).	These	organisations	worked	under	the	direct	
authority	 of	 the	 Military	 Governor1,	 first	 Bernard	 Montgomery	 (1945-46),	 then	
William	‘Sholto’	Douglas	(1946-47),	and	finally	Brian	Robertson	(1947-49).	The	British	
authorities	also	had	political	chiefs	back	in	London,	with	the	Chancellor	of	the	Duchy	




the	 industrial	 heartlands	 of	 the	 Ruhr,	 lay	 in	 a	 disorderly	 state.	 In	 the	 face	 of	
widespread	 destruction	 and	 dislocation,	 the	 British	 occupiers	 began	work	 on	 the	
ambitious	programme	laid	out	at	Potsdam.	Yet	in	the	first	months	of	the	occupation,	
crippling	shortages	of	clothing,	housing,	and,	above	all,	food	threatened	the	outbreak	










the	 ground,	 that	 the	 programme	 set	 out	 in	 the	 summer	 of	 1945	 was	 highly	
impractical.	 In	 London,	 senior	 government	 officials,	 now	 confronting	 Britain’s	
growing	financial	limitations	amid	the	perceived	intransigence	of	the	Soviet	Union,	






the	 summer	 of	 1946,	 Foreign	 Secretary	 Ernest	 Bevin,	 anxious	 to	 lessen	 Britain’s	
overseas	 obligations,	 embraced	 the	opportunity	 to	 fuse	 the	British	 and	American	
Zones.	 The	 Bizone,	 which	 came	 into	 being	 in	 January	 1947,	 was	 seemingly	 in	
contravention	of	the	Potsdam	Agreement	and	provoked	much	opposition	from	the	
Soviet	 Union.	 Later	 that	 year,	 the	 announcement	 of	 the	 Truman	 Doctrine	 and	
Marshall	 Plan	 further	 demonstrated	 the	 anti-Soviet	 direction	 of	 American	 official	
thinking.	 Subsequent	months	 and	 years	would	 see	 communications	 between	 the	
wartime	 Allies	 break	 down,	 with	 the	 Allied	 Control	 Council	 failing	 to	 function	
effectively.	 In	 June	 1948,	 inter-Allied	 tensions	 peaked	 when	 Soviet	 authorities	
restricted	 access	 to	 the	 divided	 city	 of	 Berlin.	 The	 ensuing	 airlift	 heralded	 the	
beginning	of	a	new	era	of	Cold	War	diplomacy,	with	various	economic	and	political	
reforms	in	the	eastern	and	western	segments	of	Germany	culminating	in	a	two-state	












postwar	 Britain	 and	 the	 Anglo-German	 relationship.	 My	 research	 illustrates	 the	
emergence	of	a	discord	in	British	relations	with	Germany,	as	Cold	War-era	political	
rapprochement	 diverged	 from	 the	 residual	 Germanophobia	 of	 popular	 and	 press	
portrayals.	 The	 study	also	makes	 significant	empirical	 contributions,	 revealing	 the	
role	of	public	relations	in	postwar	Germany	and	further	exploring	the	social	history	
of	 the	 British	 Zone	 of	 occupation.	 Finally,	 this	 work	 complements	 our	 existing	






considered	within	 the	 framework	 of	 international	 relations,	 and	more	 specifically	
within	the	grand	historiography	concerning	the	origins	of	the	Cold	War.	As	of	the	late	
1970s	there	was	still	a	 relative	scarcity	of	scholarship	on	Britain’s	 role	 in	 the	Cold	
War,	 not	 least	 because	 much	 of	 the	 relevant	 archival	 material	 had,	 until	 then,	
remained	inaccessible	under	the	thirty-year	rule.2	As	this	changed	in	the	following	










the	 role	 of	 the	 two	 superpowers	 and	 incorporated	 the	 previously	 underexposed	
European	 dimension.	 British	 historians	 were	 keen	 to	 adjust	 the	 prevailing	
historiography,	 demonstrating	 the	 persistence	 of	 Britain	 as	 a	world	 power	 in	 the	
immediate	 postwar	 era.	 In	 Alan	 Bullock’s	 three-volume	 study	 of	 Britain’s	 Foreign	
Secretary,	 Ernest	 Bevin,	 it	 was	 shown	 how	 British	 policymakers	 maintained	 a	
powerful	 influence	 upon	 policy	 in	 Germany,	 even	 if	 constrained	 by	 financial	



































The	 first	 attempts	 to	 historicise	 the	 occupation	 came	 in	 the	 1940s	 and	 1950s,	





Yet	 there	 were	 more	 comprehensive	 studies,	 including	 Barbara	 Marshall’s	 The	
Origins	 of	 Post-War	 German	 Politics	which	 outlined	 some	 of	 the	 more	 enduring	

































substantial	amount	of	work	on	America’s	 involvement	 in	Europe	after	 the	Second	





































K.	Olick’s	 In	 the	House	of	 the	Hangman	 is	 notable	 for	 considering	 the	occupation	
within	the	context	of	the	history	of	memory,	suggesting	that	this	period	was	a	vessel	
through	which	 the	Third	Reich	came	 to	be	understood	 in	West	Germany.13	Susan	
Carruthers’s	2016	work,	The	Good	Occupation	–	American	Soldiers	and	the	Hazards	
of	 Peace,	 utilises	 first-hand	 accounts	 and	 media	 reporting	 to	 explore	 the	
mythologizing	of	the	German	and	Japanese	occupations.14	The	most	recent	work	on	
the	Allied	occupation,	Transforming	Occupation	in	the	Western	Zones	of	Germany	-	
Politics,	 Everyday	 Life	 and	 Social	 Interactions,	 1945-55,	 considers	 the	 occupation	
from	a	variety	of	perspectives,	 including	 legal,	political,	economic,	 social,	 cultural,	
and	gender	history.15	





























can	be	discerned.	That	 said,	Britain’s	 contribution	 to	 the	occupation	has	 received	
relatively	limited	attention,	with	no	comprehensive	single	volume	history	unlike	its	
American,	 French,	 and	 Soviet	 counterparts.16	 Most	 of	 the	 earliest	 studies	 of	 the	




1950s	 and	 1960s	 saw	 the	 publication	 of	 the	 first	 academic	 study	 of	 the	 British	
occupation,	Michael	Balfour	 and	 John	Mair’s	Four	Power	Control	 in	Germany	and	
Austria	 1945-1946,	 as	 well	 as	 Frank	 Donnison’s	 official	 history,	 Civil	 Affairs	 and	
Military	 Government,	 North-West	 Europe	 1944-1946.18	 But	 it	 was	 not	 until	 the	
release	of	the	official	papers	 in	the	mid-to-late	1970s	that	more	extensive	and	 in-
depth	 studies	 appeared,	 with	 substantial	 interest	 from	 both	 German	 and	 British	
historians.19	A	majority	 of	 these	 studies	 focused	on	British	 foreign	policy	 vis-à-vis	

































British	 occupation,	 including	 a	 number	 of	 micro-studies	 on	 particular	 themes	 or	


































term	 repercussions	 of	 decisions	 made	 by	 twelve	 individuals.25	 There	 is	 also	 a	
substantial	 amount	 of	 scholarship	 on	 British	 wartime	 planning	 for	 the	 postwar	
occupation.26	






































British	 perceptions	 of	 Germany	 for	 Britain’s	 postwar	 national	 identity	 –	 most	
obviously	amid	German	reunification,	which	invoked	a	spate	of	anti-German	feeling	
across	the	mass	media	and	political	establishment.28	But	there	remains	much	work	






































it	 is	 impossible	 ‘to	 understand	 their	 national	 identity	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	
twentieth	century.’30	
In	 fact,	 most	 work	 on	 the	 occupation	 period	 has	 failed	 to	 adequately	
interrogate	 the	 precise	 implications	 of	 Britain’s	 endeavours	 in	 postwar	 Germany,	
remaining	primarily	tied	to	the	multipolar	context	of	the	Cold	War.	The	history	of	the	
Allied	 occupation	 has	 seldom	 been	 integrated	 into	 the	 broader	 historiography	 of	
postwar	Britain	and,	 in	particular,	 that	 relating	 to	Anglo-German	 relations.	 This	 is	









work	 of	 Jan	 Rüger,	 Dominik	 Geppert,	 and	 Panikos	 Panayi	 amongst	 others	 has	
exposed	the	transnationality	of	Anglo-German	interactions,	the	influence	of	mutual	
perceptions	 and	 press	 opinion	 upon	 political	 relations,	 and	 the	 breadth	 of	 this	















of	 Foreign	 Policy	 outlined	 a	 narrative	 which	 has	 since	 emerged	 as	 the	 general	
consensus,	namely	an	increasingly	close,	if	intermittently	volatile,	alliance.34	Sabine	
Lee’s	 Victory	 in	 Europe:	 Britain	 and	 Germany	 since	 1945	 considers	 the	 postwar	
political	and	economic	relations	between	Britain	and	Germany,	offering	an	insightful	
outline	of	 this	 bilateral	 relationship	within	 the	 context	 of	 superpower	 relations.35	






























Likewise,	Noakes,	Wende,	 and	Wright’s	 edited	 collection,	Britain	 and	Germany	 in	
Europe	1949-1990	and	Klaus	Larres	and	Elizabeth	Meehan’s	Uneasy	Allies:	British-
German	 Relations	 and	 European	 Integration	 since	 1945	 offer	 the	 most	
comprehensive	 overviews	 of	 Anglo-German	 relations	 vis-à-vis	 Europe.36	 In	 these	
studies,	 Britain’s	 participation	 in	 the	 Allied	 occupation	 of	 Germany	 is	 broadly	
characterised	 as	 an	 important	 first-step	 in	 the	 evolution	 of	 a	 more	 proactive	
diplomatic	relationship.	
This	 historiography	 on	 postwar	 Anglo-German	 relations	 has	 also	 come	 to	
acknowledge	the	 importance	of	 incorporating	public	and	media	opinion	alongside	
diplomatic	 relations.37	 It	 is	 widely	 accepted	 that	 popular	 sentiment	 and	 mutual	
perceptions	can	act	as	a	constraint	on	policymakers.	This	is	particularly	germane	in	




























in	 the	 final	 decades	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century	 are	 shown	 to	 have	 remained	







fully	 explain	 why	 anti-German	 feeling	 has	 persisted	 for	 so	 long	 in	 Britain.43	 John	
Ramsden’s	Don’t	Mention	the	War:	 the	British	and	the	Germans	since	1890	offers	
one	 attempt	 through	 a	 wide-ranging	 survey	 of	 cultural	 interactions.44	 Ramsden	
concludes	that	the	bridges	between	the	two	nations	since	1945	were	generally	at	an	
elite	level,	leaving	predominantly	working-class	antagonisms	to	fester.45	But	it	was,	
he	 continues,	 Britain’s	 economic	 and	 imperial	 decline	 in	 the	 1960s	 that	 truly	
hardened	popular	views,	bringing	about	the	widespread	obsession	with	Nazism	that	
has	endured	ever	since.	Yet	the	anecdotal	character	of	this	study	diminishes	its	value	
as	 a	 piece	 of	 comprehensive	 scholarship.	 There	 has	 also	 been	 recognition	 from	


















historians,	 as	 well	 as	 contemporaries,	 that	 the	 media	 has	 played	 a	 particularly	
important	 role	 in	 propagating	 British	 Germanophobia	 –	 Prime	 Minister	 Harold	
Macmillan	remarked	that	nation’s	newspapers	‘specialise	in	working-up	anti-German	
feeling’.46	 This	 has	 led	 Patrick	Major	 to	 suggest	 that	 scholars	 need	 to	 turn	more	


































by	 a	 resurgence	 of	 antagonism	 as	 a	 result	 of	 rearmament	 proposals,	 after	which	
pressures	of	 the	Cold	War	and	a	Neo-Nazi	 resurgence	 in	Lower	Saxony	reinforced	
negative	attitudes;	twenty	years	after	the	Second	World	War,	the	British	had	‘learnt	









Pillars	 of	 Partnership,	 retain	 an	 analytic	 focus	 on	 cultural	 relations	 that	 occurred	
mainly	 at	 an	 elite	 level.52	 This	 includes	 Lothar	 Kettenacker’s	 introductory	 essay,	
which	is	a	disjointed	attempt	to	demonstrate,	again	without	substantive	evidence,	
the	rapid	improvement	of	popular	relations	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Second	World	
War.53	Weber-Newth	 and	 Steinert’s	 study	 of	German	migrants	 in	 postwar	 Britain	
utilises	 oral	 accounts	 and	 gender	 theory	 to	 suggest	 that	 Britons	 distinguished	

















between	Germany,	Germans	en	masse,	and	 individual	Germans	 in	this	period.54	 It	
too	 reiterates	 that	 the	1940s	 saw	 the	British	people	develop	more	positive	views	
towards	Germany,	before	these	were	soured	in	the	1950s	by	economic	competition,	
rearmament,	the	success	of	far-right	parties	in	the	Federal	Republic,	and	the	critical	








This	 is	 a	 study	of	British	 responses	 to	 the	occupation	of	Germany,	 placing	
them	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Anglo-German	 relations	 since	 1945.	 Through	 a	 survey	 of	
media,	public,	and	political	discourses	relating	to	the	occupation	between	1941-49,	
my	study	argues	that	popular	perceptions	of	Germany	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Second	
World	War	 diverged	 sharply	 from	official	 policy.	 This	 approach	 allows	 for	 a	 close	
examination	of	the	complex	nexus	of	policymakers,	public	relations,	popular	opinion,	
mass	media,	opinion	formers,	collective	memory,	and	national	identity	that	has	come	
to	 define	 British	 relations	 with	 Germany.	 My	 research	 suggests	 that	 Britain’s	
participation	 in	 the	 occupation	 was	 a	 vital	 juncture	 in	 the	 history	 of	 the	 Anglo-
German	relationship	and	a	foundational	influence	upon	popular	as	well	as	political	
interactions	with	Germany	since	1945.	







This	work	draws	 from	a	 rich	array	of	original	 source	material,	 including	an	
extensive	 range	 of	 media	 archives.	 As	 Jan	 Rüger	 has	 argued,	 studies	 of	 mutual	
perceptions	 and	 images	 have	 often	 struggled	 to	 reconcile	 themselves	 with	 the	





sophisticated	 search	 functions,	 which	 allow	 for	 a	 wide-ranging	 and	 thorough	
assessment	 of	 contemporary	 media.	 My	 project	 utilises	 the	 records	 of	 a	 broad	
assortment	 of	 national	 newspapers	 and	magazines,	 namely	 the	Daily	Mail,	Daily	
Mirror,	 Daily	 Telegraph,	Manchester	 Guardian	 and	 Observer,	 Times	 and	 Sunday	
Times,	 Daily	 Express,	 London	 Illustrated,	 Economist,	 and	 Picture	 Post,	 while	 the	
British	Newspaper	 Archive	 provides	 access	 to	 an	 exceptionally	 large	 collection	 of	
regional	titles.		
In	 addition,	 the	 study	 consults	 the	 three	 major	 online	 newsreel	 archives:	
British	 Pathé	 Archive	 (Pathé	 News),	 British	 Movietone	 Digital	 Archive	 (British	
Movietone	 News),	 and	 ITN	 Source	 Newsreels	 (Gaumont-British	 News).	 I	 have	
meticulously	searched	these	media	resources	and	compiled	the	first	comprehensive	
archive	 of	 British	media	 coverage	 relating	 to	 the	 occupation	 of	 Germany.	 This	 is	
supplemented	with	 commercially-available	 feature	 films,	 including	 It’s	Not	Cricket	
(1949)	and	A	Foreign	Affair	 (1948),	as	well	as	a	 large	assortment	of	contemporary	














This	 research	 also	 utilises	 material	 from	 a	 number	 of	 physical	 archives,	
including	 the	 National	 Archives	 sizable	 collection	 of	 the	 Control	 Commission	 for	





body	was	 tasked	with	mediating	 the	occupation	back	 to	Britain	and	 their	 records	
offer	 a	 unique	 insight	 into	 the	 relationship	 between	 policymakers,	 independent	
media,	 and	 the	 British	 public.	 These	 documents	 include	 an	 assortment	 of	
miscellaneous	 newspaper	 cuttings,	 official	 responses	 to	 media	 coverage,	 press	






surveys	 and	 reports,	 parliamentary	 debates	 relating	 to	 the	 occupation,	 and	 the	
personal	memoirs,	diaries,	letters,	and	photographs	of	British	occupiers	found	in	the	





















Nor	 does	 this	 study	 proclaim	 to	 present	 a	 comprehensive	 history	 of	 the	 British	
occupation	 of	 Germany	 or	 propose	 any	 sustained	 appraisal	 of	 its	 various	




























popular	 press’	 was	 slowly	 fading,	 the	 dictum	 that	 ‘the	 camera	 cannot	 lie’	
undoubtedly	still	held	great	sway.64	Likewise,	total	national	circulation	of	newspapers	





historical	 accounts	 to	 date	 only	 reached	 seven	 percent	 of	 total	 readers	 in	 1950,	
representing	a	narrow	and	exclusive	strand	of	society.66		
























It	 is	worth	considering	 the	ownership	and	political	outlook	of	 some	of	 the	
main	 organs	 of	 the	 press.	 Lord	 Beaverbrook,	 a	 long-term	 ally	 of	 Churchill,	 was	
proprietor	 of	 the	 Daily	 Express,	 while	 the	 second	 Viscount	 Rothermere	 took	
ownership	of	the	Daily	Mail.	More	to	the	point,	Beaverbrook	was	a	strong	supporter	
of	 the	 Empire	 and	 ferociously	 anti-German.	 These	 papers	 reflected	 the	 political	
leanings	 of	 their	 owners,	 both	 supporters	 of	 the	 Conservative	 Party	 and	 strongly	











publication,	 albeit	with	 a	 national	 reputation,	 and	 presented	 a	more	 liberal,	 left-
orientated	perspective.70	It	remained	a	strong	supporter	of	the	Attlee	government	
throughout	 the	1940s.	The	Daily	Mirror	also	supported	 the	Labour	administration	
and	 was	 aimed	 at	 a	 predominantly	 working-class	 readership,	 having	 been	
transformed	into	a	left-wing	daily	in	the	late	1930s	under	the	administration	of	Lord	
Rothermere’s	nephew,	Cecil	King.71	The	Mirror	saw	a	surge	in	popularity	in	the	1940s	


















suggested,	 to	 popular	 acclaim,	 that	 Germany’s	 ‘black	 record’,	 stretching	 back	
centuries	and	culminating	in	the	Third	Reich,	necessitated	an	uncompromising	peace	
settlement.	Yet	his	principal	opponent,	Victor	Gollancz,	argued	that	Nazism	was	a	
historical	 anomaly	 imposed	 upon	 the	 German	 people,	 advocating	 a	 more	 liberal	











policymakers,	 unable	 to	 tolerate	 the	 spiralling	 costs	 associated	 with	 feeding	 the	







German	people	 and	maintaining	 the	military	 government,	 soon	 sought	 to	modify	
their	commitments.	
In	 the	 coming	 years,	 as	 chapter	 three	 charts,	 scandals	 over	 non-
fraternisation,	pervasive	corruption,	and	rising	costs	engulfed	the	public	image	of	the	
British	 Zone	 of	 occupied	 Germany,	 threatening	 to	 undermine	 Britain’s	 claims	 on	
‘winning	the	peace’.	This	encouraged	an	official	response,	with	the	public	relations	
arm	 of	 the	 Control	 Commission	 seeking	 to	 clean	 up	 the	 image	 of	 their	 staff,	 as	








allies.	 They	 now	 rapidly	 turned	 towards	 reconstruction	 and	 rehabilitation	 of	 the	
western	Zones.	The	final	chapter,	focused	on	the	events	of	1948-49,	builds	upon	my	
previously	 published	 journal	 article,	 ‘Anglo-German	 Relations	 After	 1945’.73	 It	
demonstrates	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 clear	 dichotomy	 between	 public	 and	 political	
responses	to	Germany,	with	implications	reaching	far	beyond	the	immediate	postwar	
period.	By	now,	policymakers	were	 firmly	 set	on	 the	path	 towards	Anglo-German	
reconciliation	and	alliance	and	publicly	declared	their	new	anti-Soviet	outlook	for	the		
	 	






first	 time.	 Yet	 concerns	 that	 the	occupation	had	been	an	abject	 failure	helped	 to	



























could	begin	 to	 tentatively	envisage	 the	prospect	of	eventual	victory	–	even	 if	 this	




















by	Noel	Coward’s	hit	 song	Don’t	 Let’s	Be	Beastly	 to	 the	Germans,	 released	 in	 the	
summer	of	1943.2	This	was	certainly	no	ordinary	pop	song,	incorporating	references	
to	 the	 Anglo-German	 Naval	 Agreement	 of	 1935,	 the	 German	 occupation	 of	 the	
Rhineland	the	following	year,	the	Nazi	occupation	of	Czechoslovakia,	Poland	and	the	
Netherlands,	 and,	most	 strikingly,	 proposals	 for	mass	 sterilization	 of	 the	 German	





















peace	 settlement.	 The	 song	was	 intended,	 Coward	would	 later	 recall,	 as	 ‘a	 satire	
directed	against	a	 small	minority	of	excessive	humanitarians,	who,	 in	my	opinion,	
were	taking	a	rather	too	tolerant	view	of	our	enemies.’6	These	alleged	soft-hearts,	
spearheaded	 by	 the	 publicist	 Victor	 Gollancz,	 favoured	 a	 more	 reconstructive	
approach	to	Germany	after	the	war.	Yet	their	conception	of	the	peace	was	not	born	
entirely	out	of	sympathy,	but	rather	an	assortment	of	liberal	and	socialist	ideals.	They	
characterised	 the	 Third	 Reich	 as	 an	 authoritarian	 dictatorship	 and	 an	 extreme	
iteration	of	 imperialism	and	 capitalism,	whose	 first	 victims	had	been	 the	German	
people	 themselves.	 The	 peace,	 they	 argued,	 should	 be	 about	 reform	 and	
reconciliation,	rather	than	vengeance.	
That	 one	 of	 the	 nation’s	 most	 revered	 entertainers	 chose	 to	 pen	 a	 song	
lampooning	the	intricacies	of	British	foreign	policy	illustrates	just	how	pervasive,	not	
to	mention	divisive,	wartime	anxieties	over	the	prospective	peace	were.	As	historian	
R.	W.	Seton-Watson	remarked	at	 the	end	of	 the	conflict,	 ‘never	has	 the	 future	of	
Europe	been	more	obscure	or	presented	greater	obstacles	to	the	would-be	prophet	
















article	 from	 1945,	 ‘a	 veritable	 avalanche	 of	 materials	 on	 the	 German	 Problem’	
appeared	in	Britain	and	the	United	States	in	which	‘people	from	many	walks	of	life	





discussions	 regarding	Germany	and	 the	postwar	peace,	 including	Stephen	Casey’s	




‘German	 Problem’,	 considering	 how	 they	 shaped	 both	 American	 warfare	 and	
postwar	planning.10	
In	 comparison,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 lack	 of	 scholarly	 interest	 in	 the	 British	
wartime	debate	over	postwar	Germany,	with	only	a	smattering	of	research	on	the	
subject.	 Lord	 Vansittart	 has	 been	 a	 focus	 of	 most	 of	 this	 attention,	 with	




over	 Germany	 stresses	 the	 impassioned	 nature	 of	 the	 furore	 that	 ‘Vansittartism’	











highlights	 how	 his	 ideas	 shaped	 the	 Labour	 Party’s	 wartime	 policy	 regarding	 the	
postwar	peace.13	 This	 suggestion	 is	 reaffirmed	 in	 John	T.	Grantham’s	 appraisal	 of	
Hugh	Dalton’s	proposals	for	dealing	with	the	‘German	Problem’.14	Jörg	Später’s	study	
Vansittart:	Britische	Debatten	über	Deutsche	und	Nazis,	1902–1945	provides	a	more	
differentiated	 picture	 of	 Vansittart,	 distinguishing	 him	 from	 the	 ‘Vansittartist’	 tag	
which,	 it	 is	 shown,	was	primarily	 a	 construct	of	his	opponents.15	 Später	offers	 an	
impressive	 examination	 of	 the	 entire	 debate,	 with	 a	 particular	 focus	 on	 the	
internecine	friction	that	emerged	amongst	the	German	exile	community	of	Britain.	
This	 existing	 scholarship	 has,	 however,	 not	 satisfactorily	 addressed	 the	
enduring	implications	of	Britain’s	wartime	debate	over	the	‘German	Problem’,	often	
interpreted	 as	 simply	 a	 short-lived	 consequence	 of	 inflamed	 wartime	 passions.16	
These	 pervasive	 public	 interactions	 with	 the	 German	 past	 were,	 in	 fact,	 a	 vital	
juncture	 in	 the	 longer	 history	 of	 the	 Anglo-German	 relationship.	 This	 is	
acknowledged	 in	 Später’s	 study,	 which	 locates	 Vansittart’s	 viewpoint	 within	 the	
history	of	this	bilateral	relationship	since	1900.	Yet	he	only	cursorily	considers	the	
importance	of	Vansittart	after	the	war,	with	an	emphasis	on	his	intellectual	legacy	
amongst	 historians	 including	 A.	 J.	 P.	 Taylor	 and	 Lewis	Namier.17	While,	 as	 Später	
concludes,	the	wartime	debate	was	the	climax	of	Anglo-German	antagonism,	it	was	
evidently	not	the	endpoint.18		












The	 following	 chapter	 seeks	 to	 recontextualise	 Britain’s	 wartime	 debate	
regarding	the	‘German	Problem’,	examining	these	discussions	in	the	context	of	public	
and	 political	 expectations	 of	 the	 postwar	 occupation.	 It	 considers	 the	 prevailing	
narratives	about	Germany	which	appeared	in	the	Britain	during	the	Second	World	
War,	presenting	a	more	comprehensive	survey	of	mass	media	and	popular	culture	
alongside	 elite	 discourses	 and	 official	 policy	 proclamations.	 This	 research	
demonstrates	 that	 while	 the	 debate	 was	 primarily	 historicist	 in	 nature,	
commentators	 constructed	 narratives	 of	 the	 German	 past	 as	 to	 vindicate	 their	
bespoke	solutions	for	the	future	peace.19	These	wartime	assessments	of	the	Third	




At	 the	 core	 of	 the	 debate	 over	 the	 ‘German	 Problem’	 lay	 a	 figure	 firmly	
ensconced	within	the	country’s	political	establishment.	Sir	Robert	Vansittart	was	a	
career	 diplomat	 who	 had	 risen	 to	 the	 role	 of	 Permanent-Under-Secretary	 at	 the	
Foreign	 Office	 by	 the	 late	 1930s.	 During	 his	 tenure,	 he	 had	 maintained	 a	
characteristically	 steadfast	 opposition	 to	 the	 policy	 of	 appeasement	 and	 often	
warned	 of	Germany’s	 aggressive	 intentions.	 It	was	 a	 contentious	 stance	 and	 one	
which	would	ultimately	lead	to	his	de	facto	demotion:	in	1938	he	was	reassigned	to	
the	 ambiguously-defined	 role	 of	 inaugural	 Chief	 Diplomatic	 Adviser	 to	 the	 British	
Government.	The	outbreak	of	war	only	a	year	later	imbued	Vansittart	with	a	sense	
of	 righteousness	 and	 helped	 to	 craft	 his	 public	 reputation	 as	 a	 prescient	 anti-













the	 apparently	 age-old	 authoritarian	 and	 militaristic	 culture	 of	 Germany	 and	 its	














stretched	 as	 far	 back	 as	 the	 first	 century	 AD.	 The	 German	 ‘butcher-bird’	 had	





















cunningly	 upon	 its	 kind.	 Since	 Tacitus	 wrote	 of	 the	 Germans	 that	 ‘they	 hate	




The	 ultimate	 explanation	 for	 this	 injurious	 record	 of	war	 and	 pillage	was,	











The	battle	 still	 rages	 round	 the	question:	are	we	 fighting	 the	Germans	or	 the	
Nazis?	 One	 day	 historians	 will	 rub	 their	 eyes,	 and	 wonder	 how	 such	 silly	
questions	could	be	discussed	at	 the	end	of	1941.	No	one	was	 fool	enough	 to	
pretend	 that	we	were	 fighting	 anything	but	 the	Germans	 in	1914.	 Indeed,	 all	











324,910	copies	had	been	sold.27	By	 the	end	of	 the	year,	 it	was	estimated	to	have	
surpassed	 500,000	 sales.28	 Victor	 Gollancz	 estimated	 that	 ‘at	 least	 three	 million	
people	 have	 read	 the	 pamphlet	 […],	 a	 very	 high	 percentage	 of	 the	 adult	 reading	
public	of	this	country’.29		






his	 new	 official	 role.	 The	 publication	 of	 Black	 Record	 inspired	 members	 of	 both	
Houses	 of	 Parliament	 to	 protest	 Vansittart’s	 apparent	 violation	 of	 his	 avowed	
responsibilities,	accusations	repeated	 in	 the	editorial	column	of	 the	Times.31	A.	H.	





















Dodd,	 a	 distinguished	 academic,	 pointed	 out	 numerous	 flaws	 in	 Vansittart’s	
narrative,	concerned	that	‘foreign	listeners	should	be	left	with	the	impression	that	
the	versions	of	history	given	in	these	reports	are	a	sample	of	the	historical	scholarship	












people.34	 In	 September	 1939,	 as	 Wehrmacht	 forces	 invaded	 Poland,	 Neville	
Chamberlain	spoke	in	the	House	of	Commons	of	how	‘we	have	no	quarrel	with	the	
German	 people,	 except	 that	 they	 allow	 themselves	 to	 be	 governed	 by	 a	 Nazi	






















Vansittart’s	explosive	 rhetoric	was	hardly	 likely	 to	encourage	underground	
opposition	to	the	Nazis	and	it	is	perhaps	no	surprise	that	Vansittart	was	castigated	as	
a	‘gift	to	Goebbels’.38	Indeed,	the	Reich	Minister	of	Propaganda	would	describe	him	
in	his	diary	as	 ‘the	Englishman	who	 rendered	 the	greatest	 service	 to	 the	German	
cause	during	the	war’.39	To	Vansittart,	of	course,	the	idea	that	the	German	people	
could	be	coaxed	into	supporting	the	regime	was	bunk	–	for	him,	their	total	devotion	
to	Hitler	had	never	been	 in	doubt.	Nevertheless,	 in	 the	spring	of	1941,	with	open	
disagreement	amongst	members	of	the	cabinet	over	the	desirability	of	Black	Record	




suggested	 that	 Vansittart	 ‘writes	 as	 if	 he	 had	 never	 studied	 the	 history	 of	 other	

















countries	 […].	 Sir	 Robert	 evidently	 believes	 that	 the	 case	 of	 Germany	 is	 unique.	
Unfortunately,	it	is	not.’41	In	March	1943,	George	Bell,	Bishop	of	Chichester,	spoke	in	
the	House	of	Lords	to	condemn	Vansittart’s	allegations	of	the	peculiarity,	inherent	
wickedness,	 and	 collective	 guilt	 of	 the	 German	 people.42	 Harold	 Laski,	 a	 noted	
socialist	theorist	and	academic,	argued	that	Vansittart,	 in	his	‘indictment	against	a	
whole	people’,	had	wrongly	assumed	 ‘that	 the	national	character	of	a	people	 is	a	




notion	 that	 German	 history	 had	 taken	 a	 peculiar	 route	 by	 deliberating	 upon	 the	
history	of	Britain	or	other	Allied	nations.45	Douglas	Brown	wrote	a	pamphlet	under	
the	auspices	of	the	Labour	Party	entitled	Commonsense	versus	Vansittartism,	arguing	
that	Black	Record	was	 ‘historical	distortion’	and	 ‘the	 ideological	expression	of	 the	
economic	policy	which	the	British	ruling	class	will	endeavour	to	pursue	in	the	post-
war	years’.46	Likewise,	left-wing	members	of	the	German	exile	community	rejected	




























Likewise,	 the	 rank-and-file	of	 the	Labour	Party	was	at	 the	 forefront	of	 the	
‘Vansittartist’	movement,	with	a	majority	of	the	party’s	membership	advocating	an	
anti-German	 interpretation	of	 the	Third	Reich.52	Left-wing	support	 for	Vansittart’s	
ideas	even	extended	to	members	of	the	German	exile	community,	most	notably	the	
socialist	membership	of	The	Fight	for	Freedom	(FFF)	organization.	This	group	vowed	
to	 ‘publish	 the	 Truth	 about	Germany’,	writing	what	 they	described	as	 a	 ‘rigorous	
investigation	 of	 the	 facts	 of	 history’	 in	 which	 Germany’s	 political	 culture	 was	
admonished	as	distinctively	nationalistic.53	Moreover,	 it	was	 the	 left-leaning	Daily	
Mirror	 that	 offered	 Vansittart	 the	 warmest	 reception	 amongst	 the	 national	
newspapers.	Columnist	Bill	Greig	described	him	as	‘perhaps	the	wisest	and	most	far-

















the	 barbarian	 whose	 mentality	 time	 cannot	 change.’54	 In	 addition,	 the	 paper’s	









Vansittart,	 freed	from	the	constraints	of	 life	as	a	civil	 servant	 following	his	
retirement,	 enthusiastically	 embraced	 his	 newfound	 status	 as	 an	 eminent	 public	
intellectual.	In	1941,	recognising	his	long	career	as	a	diplomat,	he	was	raised	to	the	
peerage	as	Baron	Vansittart	of	Denham.	This	presented	him	with	an	official	channel	
through	which	 he	 could	 voice	 his	 partisan	 opinions,	 leading	 to	 fiery	 clashes	with	
several	of	his	fellow	members	of	the	House	of	Lords.57	In	addition,	he	would	continue	





















scarcely	 wavering	 from	 the	 historical	 diagnosis	 that	 he	 had	 sketched	 in	 Black	
Record.58		
Yet	 it	 was	 his	 dynamic	 commitment	 to	 addressing	 a	 popular	 audience,	
primarily	through	the	mass	media	and	public	oratory,	that	sustained	the	prominence	
of	 these	 ideas.	 Vansittart,	 an	 Eton-educated	 Baron	 with	 decidedly	 Edwardian	
sensibilities	who	resided	in	a	grand	seventeenth-century	Buckinghamshire	mansion,	
can	 hardly	 be	 described	 as	 a	 man	 of	 the	 people.	 Yet	 for	 all	 his	 vanity	 and	












more	 direct	 manner	 –	 setting	 up	 a	 political	 lobby	 group,	 the	 Win	 the	 Peace	












Movement.62	 He	 installed	 himself	 as	 president	 and	 took	 to	 the	 country,	 hosting	
luncheons	and	meetings	with	all	manner	of	audiences,	putting	forth	his	ideas	about	
Germany	and	how	to	 ‘win	 the	peace’.63	Vansittart	gave	 rousing	speeches,	on	one	
occasion	even	inspiring	a	Cardiff	audience	to	chant	‘For	He’s	a	Jolly	Good	Fellow’.64	
These	were,	moreover,	well	attended	events	–	The	Scotsman	estimated	3,000	people	

































Vansittart	 to	 adapt	 his	 message	 as	 the	 events	 of	 the	 war	 unfolded,	 showing	 an	










became	a	vibrant	part	of	Britain’s	wartime	 lexicon,	an	oppositional	 shorthand	 for	
allegedly	intolerant,	xenophobic,	or	racist	views	about	Germany.	The	term	soon	took	
on	a	meaning	beyond	anything	specific	 to	 the	writing	and	speeches	of	Vansittart,	



















of	 his	 following.73	 Nevertheless,	 the	 ideas	 put	 forth	 by	 these	 allies	 and	 fellow	
travellers	also	had	a	profound	influence	upon	British	considerations	of	Germany	and	
the	future	peace.	
Thus	Spake	Germany	was	published	 in	 the	 same	year	as	Black	Record	 and	
included	an	admiring	foreword	from	Vansittart	himself.74	The	book	was	an	extensive	
anthology	of	decontextualized	quotations	attributed	to	Germans	over	the	centuries,	






of	 expressions	 of	 complete	 cynicism	 towards	 the	 rights	 of	 others,	 amazing	 racial	
arrogance	and	presumption,	envy	of	those	who	are	in	possession	of	what	Germany	
covets,	contempt	of	virtue	and	decency,	and	bitter	hatred	of	all	who	stand	 in	her	
way’.76	 Cassandra’s	 column	 in	 the	 Daily	 Mirror	 regarded	 it	 as	 ‘a	 mournful	 and	






















its	 fair	 share	 of	 anti-German	 thinkers.79	 Butler’s	 book	 is	 a	 particularly	 revealing	
example,	locating	the	Nazi	movement	within	the	longue	durée	of	German	history	and	






A	 particularly	 prominent	 strand	 of	 the	 debate	 took	 aim	 at	 Prussia	 and	 its	
Junker	elites,	who	were	repeatedly	pinpointed	as	the	root	of	German	militarism	and	
authoritarianism.	Their	influence	was	said	to	have	stunted	Germany’s	natural	growth	




















Belief	 in	 militarism,	 inherent	 and	 almost	 ineradicable	 in	 Prussia	 proper,	 has	
strongly	infected	the	rest,	and	especially	the	youth,	of	Germany.	Although	other	
parts	 of	 Germany	 may	 evolve	 evil	 ideas,	 Prussia	 is	 the	 actual	 prime	 mover	
actuating	aggression.83		




‘the	 source	 of	 the	 recurring	 pestilence’.85	 It	 would	 remain	 prominent	 feature	 of	
political	discussions	of	 the	 ‘German	Problem’,	 culminating	 in	1947	with	 the	Allied	
Control	Council’s	Law	No.46.	This	formally	abolished	the	Prussian	State,	said	to	be	a	
long-standing	 ‘bearer	 of	 militarism	 and	 reaction’.86	 This	 was	 all	 in	 spite	 of	 the	
democratic	traditions	which	had	seemingly	emerged	in	Prussia	during	the	interwar	
period,	a	realisation	which	prompted	Rohan	Butler	 to	describe	such	 ideas	as	 little	
more	than	‘facile	assumption’.87	
The	 notion	 of	 a	 schism	 between	 good	 and	 evil	 in	 Germany	 was	 another	
particularly	common	trope	amongst	the	anti-German	lobby,	who	often	contrasted	














political	 immaturity	 and	militaristic	 elites.	 Germany	 was	 regularly	 described	 as	 a	
‘Jekyll	and	Hyde	nation’,	whose	merciless	streak	of	evil	was	surreptitiously	concealed	
behind	a	veneer	of	civilisation	and	decency.88	This	pseudo-psychoanalytical	approach	




Likewise,	 The	 German	Mentality,	 written	 under	 the	 pseudonym	 Verrina	 (a	 name	
taken	from	Schiller’s	Fiesco),	contended	that	the	German	regarded	‘himself	to	be	a	
superior	nobleman’,	a	member	of	the	Herrenvolk.90	This	book	questioned	the	moral	
and	psychological	 integrity	of	 the	Germans,	alleging	 that	 they	were	caught	 in	 the	
‘mass	psychosis	of	Hitlerism’,	with	‘all	ethical	sentiments’	having	‘completely	fallen	
out	of	balance’	and	their	‘comprehension	of	good	and	evil’	now	‘topsy-turvy’.91	These	






which	 a	 naturalist	 would	 recognise	 as	 due	 to	 the	 evolution	 of	 a	 new	 sub-
species.92	























German	 movement,	 most	 notably	 the	 irascible	 Eleonora	 Tennant.96	 Tennant,	 an	
enthusiastic	 supporter	 of	 Franco	 and	 member	 of	 the	 Nazi-allied	 Anglo-German	
Fellowship	before	the	war,	had	even	attended	a	Nazi	 rally	 in	Nuremberg	and	met	
Hitler	personally	several	times.97	She	nevertheless	became	a	fervent	advocate	of	the	
anti-German	 movement	 and	 a	 leading	 figure	 in	 the	 Never	 Again	 Association.	
Vansittart,	who	had	previously	been	offered	the	chair	of	the	organisation,	was	now	






















Germans.98	 The	 charge	generated	an	acrimonious	quarrel	over	 the	purity	of	 their	
respective	convictions,	ultimately	 leading	 to	 the	collapse	of	Never	Again.	 It	was	a	








and	 memorable	 quality.	 His	 pamphlet,	 while	 sensationalist	 and	 intentionally	
provocative,	had	succinctly	and	emphatically	defined	an	original	but	familiar	British	




inspired	 a	 ‘base	 propaganda	 of	 hatred	 and	 revenge	 against	 the	 German	 people’	
across	 Britain.100	 Gollancz	 labelled	 the	 Sunday	 Times	 as	 ‘the	 chief	 organ	 of	























cause	 trouble	 –	 that	 so	 long	 as	 Germany	 remains,	 there	 will	 always	 be	 wars’.103	
Correspondingly,	 43%	of	 respondents	 to	 a	Mass-Observation	poll	 in	 the	 spring	of	
1943	claimed	they	 ‘hated	or	had	no	sympathy	 for	 the	German	people’,	a	number	
which	had	increased	to	54%	by	February	1945.104	
This	transformation	of	British	conceptions	of	the	‘German	Problem’	extended	





























elevated	 Vansittart	 to	 a	 singular	 position:	 British	 public	 and	 political	 discussions	
about	Germany	would,	from	this	point	on,	be	held	in	light	of	his	ideas.	Vansittart’s	
ideas	had	permeated	all	sections	of	British	society,	politics,	media,	military,	and	civil	
service,	 influencing	conceptions	of	 the	Germany	and	the	future	peace.107	 In	1945,	





Vansittart’s	 radical	 anti-German	 rhetoric	 was,	 however,	 far	 from	 the	 only	
interpretation	 of	 the	 ‘German	 Problem’	 to	 emerge	 in	 wartime	 Britain.	 Victor	
Gollancz,	one	of	Black	Record’s	fiercest	critics,	outlined	a	radically	contrasting	image	
of	 Germany	 and	 the	 origins	 of	 the	 Third	 Reich.	 The	 Nazis,	 he	 argued,	 were	 a	
dictatorial	cabal,	exploiting	their	own	people	in	order	to	wage	war:	any	accusations	
of	collective	guilt	were	a	vengeful	delusion	that	should	be	rejected	on	moral	grounds.	
Gollancz	 was	 a	 devoted	 humanitarian,	 with	 political	 sympathies	 that	 wandered	



















had	been	 left	with	great	 industrial	power	 in	a	 ‘world	already	divided	up’	between	
nations	such	as	Britain	and	France.112	This	resulted	 in	a	relative	 impotence	on	the	
world	market,	leading	to	the	First	World	War,	which	had	been	further	aggravated	by	
the	 economic	 constraints	 of	 the	 Treaty	 of	 Versailles.113	 The	 peace	 of	 1919	 was,	
Gollancz	 suggested,	 unnecessarily	 severe,	 imposing	 exacting	 reparations	 and	
territorial	 changes	 that	 shook	 the	 fragile	 foundations	 of	 the	 Weimar	 Republic’s	
fledgling	democracy.	The	‘appalling	unemployment	and	under-employment’	which	
transpired	 amid	 economic	 downturn	 and	 the	 ‘disastrous	 split	 in	 the	 progressive	
forces’	 gave	 rise	 to	 an	 extreme	 political	 reaction:	 Nazism.114	 Yet	 this	 was	 not	 a	
peculiar	German	trait,	but	rather	a	symptom	of	modern	capitalism’s	inherent	frailty	























of	 Germany’s	 supposed	 cultural	 or	 psychological	 peculiarity.119	 Gollancz	
characterised	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 Third	 Reich	 as	 a	 deadly	 alliance	 between	
traditional	bases	of	power	and	monopoly	capitalism,	resulting	from	long-term	trends	
in	German	history.120	The	nation’s	past	was	‘one	of	progressive	coalescence,	into	a	





























maker	of	Nuernberg	or	 the	steel-worker	of	 the	Ruhr	–	 for	something	the	roots	of	
which	lie	deep	in	history’.124	Rather,	Nazism	was	a	tyrannical	and	extreme	iteration	
of	 modern	 capitalism,	 its	 crimes	 the	 shared	 responsibility	 of	 the	 system’s	
representatives	throughout	the	world:	
Every	 one	 of	 us	 […]	 is	 ‘guilty’:	 every	 Englishman,	 every	 German,	 every	









power	 through	 a	 combination	of	 terror	 and	 intimidation.126	 This	 analysis	 fed	 into	
another	 of	 Gollancz’s	 wartime	 campaigns,	 namely	 his	 work,	 alongside	 Eleanor	












persecution	of	Europe’s	 Jews.127	Gollancz,	himself	 from	a	 Jewish	background,	had	
published	books	in	the	1930s	that	documented	the	rising	the	tide	of	anti-Semitism,	
including	The	Brown	Book	of	the	Hitler	Terror	and	the	Burning	of	the	Reichstag.128	In	
the	course	of	 the	war,	he	displayed	exceptional	 foresight	 regarding	 the	genocidal	
capacity	of	the	Nazi	regime,	even	warning	in	his	1943	pamphlet	Let	My	People	Go	
that	a	Nazi	programme	to	exterminate	the	Jews	risked	6,000,000	deaths.129	
In	 Shall	 Our	 Children	 live	 or	 Die?,	 Gollancz	 articulated	 a	more	 intellectual,	
socialist,	 and	 humanitarian	 interpretation	 of	 the	 ‘German	 Problem’,	 rejecting	 the	
Germanophobic	 rhetoric	 of	 Black	 Record	 and	 admonishing	 capitalism	 and	
imperialism.	 It	 established	 Gollancz	 as	 the	 de	 facto	 head	 of	 an	 anti-Vansittart	
movement	that	would	find	support	primarily	amongst	liberals,	socialists,	and	church	
leaders.	His	work	was	particularly	warmly	received	by	the	Manchester	Guardian,	who	
applauded	 its	 moral	 stance	 and	 focus	 on	 the	 inherent	 violence	 of	 the	 capitalist	
system.130	Yet	Shall	Our	Children	live	or	Die?’s	appeal	was	not	entirely	an	elite	one,	
playing	into	a	broader	‘anti-Vansittartist’	sentiment.	It	found	favour	amongst	anyone	
who	 rejected	 the	 bombastic	 rhetoric	 of	 Vansittart	 and	 his	 followers,	 eventually	
selling	over	50,000	 copies	 –	 an	 impressive	 figure,	 even	 if	 only	one	 tenth	of	Black	
Record’s	sales.	
The	 influence	 of	 Gollancz’s	 historical	 materialist	 analysis	 was	 amplified	
through	its	revision	and	reiteration	by	a	number	of	sympathetic	commentators.	In	















































ignoring	 the	 need	 for	 stringent	 controls	 on	 German	 ambitions,	 which	 risked	 the	

















































army.144	 This	 underground	 resistance	 offered	 a	 symbol	 of	 hope	 for	 the	 future:	 a	
popular	uprising	could	resolve	the	‘German	Problem’	once-and-for-all.		













Bell	 and	 Gollancz	 urged	 for	 official	 cooperation	 with	 Germany’s	 anti-Nazi	
resistance	movement,	suggesting	that	the	Allied	governments	should	encourage	a	
German	revolution.	Bell’s	long-term	commitment	to	ecumenical	ideals	had	led	to	a	
close	 association	 with	 the	 renowned	 anti-Nazi	 pastor	 Dietrich	 Bonhoeffer,	 now	
resident	in	Germany	after	his	time	in	London	prior	to	the	war.	In	the	summer	of	June	
1942,	 Bell	met	with	 Bonhoeffer	 in	 neutral	 Sweden,	 acquiring	 precise	 information	
about	a	planned	assassination	attempt	on	Hitler.145	He	passed	this	on	to	the	Anthony	
Eden,	with	the	intention	of	ascertaining	if	the	Allied	governments	would	be	willing	to	
negotiate	with	 a	 new	German	 leadership	 and,	 if	 so,	whether	 they	would	make	 a	





























struggle,	 representing	 a	 provocative	 fringe	 movement	 at	 a	 moment	 when	 anti-
German	 sentiments	 were	 crystallising	 themselves	 in	 the	 political	 and	 public	













vindication	 of	 his	 inability	 to	 gain	 official	 support	 for	 the	 potent	 anti-Nazi	 forces	
working	underground	 in	Germany.153	Yet	to	Vansittart,	who	by	1944	had	taken	to	
writing	a	regular	column	in	the	Daily	Mail,	the	bomb	plot	was	interpreted	as	a	ploy	

























of	 the	 most	 significant	 questions	 of	 contemporary	 political	 philosophy,	 human	
psychology,	and	historical	analysis:	how	could	a	country’s	past,	or	for	that	matter	its	
people’s	 character,	 be	 rationalised	 and	 understood?	 The	 wide	 array	 of	 answers	





and	 their	 associates	 were	 actively	 engaged	 with	 left-wing	 and	 liberal	 politics,	
ecumenical	 ideas,	 socialist	 internationalism,	 and	 notions	 of	 ‘Europeanness’,	while	







Vansittart	 and	 his	 supporters	 seemed	 distinctly	 nationalistic	 and	 isolationist.	
Likewise,	their	means	of	interrogating	the	‘German	Problem’	were	wholly	opposed:	
was	 this	 a	 socio-economic	 phenomenon	or	 a	 cultural	 one?	 In	 time,	 as	 vitriol	 and	
mutual	 contempt	 took	 centre	 stage,	 the	 respective	 positions	 of	 opposing	 sides	
became	 increasingly	 mythologised	 and	 misconstrued.	 Britain’s	 Feindbild	 of	 Nazi	
Germany	was	not	 a	 source	of	unity	or	 accord,	 but	 rather	 the	 root	of	 a	deep	and	
increasingly	 antagonistic	 division	 across	 British	 society,	 with	 long-lasting	
repercussions.157		
Black	 Record	 had	 ushered	 in	 a	 bellicose	 tone,	 its	 polemical	 style	 inspiring	
supporters	and	opponents	with	an	equal	ferocity.	In	December	1941,	the	Economist	
lamented	 ‘the	rise	of	brutality’	which	had	begun	to	accompany	discussions	of	 the	
postwar	peace	–	 it	was	a	 trend	set	 to	continue	 for	years	 to	come.158	 	Vansittart’s	
rhetorical	axe	fell	fiercely	upon	those	who	challenged	him	or	his	ideas.	In	the	various	
editions	of	Black	Record,	the	forewords	of	newer	publications,	and	in	the	letter	pages	
of	 the	 national	 and	 regional	 press,	 he	 countered	 perceived	 slights	 with	 a	
characteristically	 unforgiving	 swagger.	 His	 predominantly	 left-wing	 and	 liberal	
opponents	 were	 labelled,	 amongst	 other	 things,	 as	 the	 ‘Suckers’	 Chorus’,	
‘illusionists’,	 ‘Innocents	 at	 Home’,	 ‘Wishful	 Thinkers’,	 ‘intellectual	 dove-cotes’,	
‘confident	amateurs’,	and	the	‘invincibly	 ignorant’.159	Vansittart	felt	his	opponents	


















condemning	 the	 ‘Germanophiles	 at	 Westminster’	 who	 had	 ‘believed	 blindly	 in	
Germany’	before	the	First	World	War.161	Gollancz	and	his	supporters	were	regarded	
as	proof	of	 ‘the	depth	to	which	German	propaganda	has	penetrated	this	country,	







play	 host	 to	 a	 feud	 over	 conflicting	 ideas	 about	 Germany	 and	 the	 Third	 Reich.	
Vansittart’s	 opponents	 most	 often	 characterised	 him	 as	 a	 callous	 and	 vindictive	
character,	 pursuing	 a	 personal	 vendetta	 against	 the	 German	 people.	 Vansittart	
openly	acknowledged	his	troubled	experiences	as	a	youth	in	Germany,	noting	that	as	


















the	 German	 people	 were	 racist.	 To	 quote	 Driberg	 again,	 Black	 Record	 was	
‘uncharitable,	 unhistorical,	 ungentlemanly’	 and	 echoed	 ‘the	 Nazi	 habit	 of	 racial	
generalisation’	–	while	his	advocates	were,	‘the	simple-minded	folk	who	regard	all	












instead	of	 the	Nazis’	and	 ‘refusing	entirely	 to	 forget	our	800,000	dead	of	 the	 last	
German	war’.171	As	Jörg	Später	and	Michael	Roi	have	both	argued,	while	Vansittart’s	
rhetoric	 was	 aggressive	 and	 belligerent,	 he	 had	 every	 right	 to	 feel	 somewhat	
aggrieved	at	these	particular	accusations.172	He	maintained	that	the	distinct	qualities	


















There	 was,	 in	 sum,	 a	 harsh	 intensity	 to	 the	 debate	 over	 Germany	 that	
regularly	descended	into	an	acrimonious	and	malicious	slanging	match.	The	ultimate	
outcome	of	 this	unguarded	rancour	was	the	obfuscation	of	an	 incredibly	complex	
and	 nuanced	 dialogue	 regarding	 the	 history	 of	 Germany.	 It	 would	 give	 rise	 to	
pervasive	 misapprehensions	 which	 further	 polarised	 opinion,	 not	 least	 the	
‘Vansittartist’	tag	that	obscured	the	precise	ideas	put	forth	by	Lord	Vansittart	under	
a	more	 vague	 anti-German	umbrella.	 In	 August	 1943,	Picture	 Post’s	 vast	 array	 of	









Britain’s	 wartime	 discussions	 regarding	 Germany	 had	 utilised	 history	 as	 a	
means	of	interrogating	the	foundations	and	defining	characteristics	of	Nazism.	At	the	
heart	of	 this	 scrutiny	 lay	an	 implicit	 (and	at	 times	explicit)	 aspiration,	namely	 the	
treatment	and	categorical	resolution	of	the	‘German	Problem’.	In	the	pursuit	of	this	
goal,	there	was	growing	expectation	that	the	future	peace	settlement	would	have	to	



























and	 a	 Ministerial	 Committee	 on	 Armistice	 Terms	 (with	 Clement	 Attlee	 as	 its	
chairman)	signalled	an	acceleration	of	Britain’s	official	planning	for	the	peace.178	This	
was,	 in	 part,	 a	 response	 to	 Roosevelt’s	 formation	 of	 an	 Advisory	 Committee	 on	
Postwar	Foreign	Policy.	In	the	coming	months,	British	ministers	discussed	a	number	
of	 official	 reports	 on	 various	 aspects	 of	 the	 forthcoming	 peace,	 but	 remained	










zone	 military	 occupation	 of	 Germany,	 with	 the	 British	 in	 the	 north	 west,	 was	
approved	by	the	British	Chiefs	of	Staff.180	There	was	also	general	agreement	amongst	
Britain’s	military	and	civilian	planners	for	total	disarmament	of	defeated	Germany.181	
But	 outstanding	 questions	 remained,	 including	 the	 length	 and	 administrative	






expansive	 social	 and	 economic	 reform	 to	 break	 the	 alliance	 of	 Junkers	 and	
industrialists.	Churchill	also	remained	keen	on	some	form	of	European	integration,	
although	 the	 specific	 form	 this	 might	 take	 remained	 far	 from	 clear.183	 Their	
disagreements	 rejuvenated	 some	of	 the	 diverging	 interpretations	 of	 Britain’s	war	





policy	 regarding	 Germany	 was	 increasingly	 inseparable	 from	 diplomatic	 relations	


















people	 concerned’;	 there	 would	 be	 a	 right	 to	 self-determination,	 lower	 trade	




deals	 with	 Nazi	 Germany.	 This	 was	 a	 precursor	 to	 the	 policy	 of	 unconditional	
surrender,	formally	announced	at	the	Casablanca	Conference	of	1943	at	the	bequest	
of	President	Roosevelt.186		The	decision	to	pursue	the	complete	defeat	of	the	Third	





1943	 that	 inter-Allied	 deliberations	 on	 the	 future	 shape	 of	 Germany	 began	 in	
earnest.187	 Here,	 the	 British	 and	 American	 delegations	 pushed	 for	 the	 ‘minimum	










necessary’	 safeguards	 to	be	enforced,	namely	 comprehensive	disarmament,	 as	 to	
allow	a	reformed	Germany	to	take	a	full	place	in	Europe’s	recovery.188	A	few	months	
later,	 at	 the	 Teheran	Conference	 there	 remained	 a	 striking	 level	 of	 disagreement	
amongst	the	Allied	leaders,	whose	fluctuating	and,	at	times,	contradictory	policies	
for	postwar	Germany	caused	a	great	deal	of	tension.	 It	was	at	Teheran	that	Stalin	
infamously	 ‘joked’	 about	 the	 possible	 execution	 of	 50,000	 to	 100,000	 German	
officers,	 inspiring	 Roosevelt	 to	 retort	 facetiously	 that	 ‘maybe	 49,000	 would	 be	
enough’	while	Churchill,	exasperated,	 left	 the	room.189	The	British,	uncertain	over	
the	 long-term	 commitment	 of	 the	USA	 to	 Europe	 and	 divided	 over	 the	 potential	
threat	posed	by	 the	Soviet	Union,	were	unwilling	 to	publicly	 commit	 to	a	precise	
programme.	In	fact,	inter-Allied	hesitations	and	disputes	meant	that,	apart	from	the	






London	 Protocol	 of	 1944	 confirming	 a	 three-power	 zonal	 occupation	 and	 the	
partition	 of	 Berlin,	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 an	 Allied	 Control	 Council,	 an	 inter-zonal	
organisation	 that	 would	 govern	 Germany	 as	 a	 single	 economic	 unit.	 Yet	 while	






















Victor	 Gollancz,	 along	 with	 many	 of	 his	 allies,	 had	 already	 established	 a	
solution	to	the	‘German	Problem’:	revolution.	Nazism,	they	believed,	had	emerged	
from	 its	 socio-economic	 context	 and	 it	was	 this,	 above	 all	 else,	which	 needed	 to	
change.	In	Shall	Our	Children	Live	or	Die?,	Gollancz	contended	that	the	end	of	Nazism	
must	 be	 accomplished	 from	 within,	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 democratic	 socialist	
revolution.194	It	was	‘Other	Germany’,	especially	Germany’s	oppressed	workers	and	
left-wing	 political	 organisations,	 that	 would	 lead	 the	 way	 for	 such	 revolutionary	
change.	Yet	there	was,	as	Gollancz	outlined	in	a	four-point	programme	for	solving	
the	 ‘German	 Problem’,	 little	 use	 in	 focusing	 too	 closely	 on	 Germany	 itself.	 The	
problem	 was	 monopoly	 capitalism,	 which	 ought	 to	 be	 abolished	 in	 favour	 of	
collective	planning	and	international	socialism	in	the	 interests	of	 ‘common	people	
everywhere’.195	It	was	a	partisan	and	radical	proposition	and	one	which	was	never	























proved	 the	German	people	were	 not	 suited	 to	 democratic	 parliamentarianism	or	
even	 liberal	Socialism.200	Yet	 the	exact	nature	of	 the	 ‘coming	German	Revolution’	
was,	he	insisted,	much	less	important	than	its	realisation:	
The	vital	thing	is	to	make	sure	of	a	successful	revolution	in	Germany	–	successful	
Socialist	Revolution	 […].	 It	matters	much	 less	what	 form	that	 revolution	takes	
whether	‘liberal’	or	totalitarian.201	
In	addition,	numerous	left-wing	German	exiles	put	forth	their	own	plans	for	
building	 a	 socialist	 Germany,	 most	 notably	 Mary	 Saran,	 Willi	 Eichler,	 Wilhelm	
Heidorn,	 and	Minna	 Specht,	whose	Re-making	Germany	 included	 a	 preface	 from	















the	 second	 major	 conflict	 in	 as	 many	 decades	 called	 for	 a	 more	 comprehensive	
approach	 to	 the	 peace.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 prospect	 of	 radically	 transforming	 the	
political,	economic,	or	social	structures	of	Europe	or	perhaps	even	the	entire	world	
had	consistently	figured	in	discussions	of	the	war’s	end.	Long-standing	suggestions	





























Yet	while	 these	proposals	 for	European	 integration	or	a	 renewed	body	 for	
resolving	international	disputes	remained	a	distinct	possibility,	the	hopes	of	Gollancz	
and	others	for	a	German	revolution	seemed	increasingly	forlorn.	There	was	little	sign	
that	 an	 uprising	 of	 German	workers	was	 imminent.	Moreover,	 as	we	 have	 seen,	
British	and	Allied	policymakers	had	by	1943	discarded	any	possibility	of	embracing	
the	overtures	of	an	alternative	German	government.	Those	who	placed	their	faith	in	
the	 ‘Other	Germany’	were	 forced	to	 face	the	prospect	 that	no	such	revolutionary	









Victor	 Gollancz,	 increasingly	 consumed	 with	 both	 his	 professional	
responsibilities	 and	 the	 campaign	 to	 raise	 awareness	 of	 the	 Nazi	 persecution	 of	






















larders,	 empty	 arsenals’,	 but	 it	 comprised	 an	 extensive	 list	 of	 demands	 including	
unconditional	 surrender;	 a	 ‘prolonged’	military	 occupation,	 lasting	 for	 ‘at	 least	 a	
generation’;	punishment	 for	 those	guilty	of	war	crimes;	 complete	and	permanent	
disarmament;	decentralization	and	demilitarisation	of	the	German	police;	abolition	
of	 all	 forms	 of	 military	 training;	 reparation	 for	 damages;	 the	 destruction	 of	
Germany’s	military	industrial	potential;	a	ban	on	financial	aid	to	Germany	without	
Allied	agreement;	re-education;	and	supervision	of	all	forms	of	media.215	In	his	1945	
book	 Bones	 of	 Contention,	 Vansittart	 stressed	 that	 only	 his	 ‘simple	 truths’	 could	
forestall	a	third	world	war	and	described	the	forthcoming	peace	as	‘civilization’s	last	
chance’:	




















and	 vengeful	 manifestation	 of	 wartime	 hostility.	 Julius	 Braunthal	 described	 the	
proposals	as	 ‘eyeless	 in	hate’	and	 ‘bent	to	mete	out	to	the	Germans	the	doom	of	
revenge’.217	Harold	Laski	criticised	what	he	perceived	to	be	nationalistic	malice:	the	
Germans,	he	argued,	were	a	people	‘conditioned	by	a	very	different	history’	from	a	
democratic	 nation	 like	 Britain,	 but	 it	 was	 not	 ‘our	 business	 […]	 to	 punish	 [the	
Germans]	because	that	history	has	been	different’.218		
Yet	 Vansittart’s	 proposals	 found	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 support	 from	 within	 the	
British	 media	 and	 political	 establishment,	 not	 least	 the	 influential	 Conservative	
backbenchers	 who	 made	 up	 the	 Post-War	 Policy	 Group.	 This	 body,	 which	 had	
deliberated	upon	plans	for	the	peace	for	since	1943,	published	its	findings	in	the	final	
months	of	the	war	under	the	title	Germany:	Disease	and	Treatment.219	They	followed	
a	 narrative	 reminiscent	 of	 Black	 Record,	 unveiling	 a	 set	 of	 recommendations	
intended	to	ensure	Germany	was	prevented	from	‘launching	yet	another	war’	and	
plunging	Western	civilization	into	‘the	abyss	of	another	Dark	Age’.220	Their	outlook	
was	 clear:	 the	Germans	 could	not	be	 trusted	and	a	 severe,	 restrictive	occupation	
must	be	rigorously	enforced.221	A	detailed	five-point	programme,	broadly	similar	to	













punishment	 for	 war	 crimes,	 re-education,	 reparations	 (most	 likely	 in-kind),	 and	
territorial	changes	(including	the	removal	of	East	Prussia	from	Germany).222		





described	 ‘realist’	 assessment	 of	 the	 postwar	 peace,	 rejecting	 the	 ‘two	 extreme	
hypotheses	of	total	permanent	domination	over	the	whole	of	German	life,	and	total	
co-operation	 with	 defeated	 Germany	 on	 a	 basis	 of	 equality’.223	 Their	 strawmen	
facilitated	a	position	which	hardly	differed	from	Vansittart’s	own,	including	calls	for	
a	 lengthy	military	occupation,	complete	disarmament,	and	re-education.	Likewise,	
the	 Economist	 consistently	 criticised	Vansittart’s	 hostile	 rhetoric	 and	branded	 the	
Post-War	Policy	Group	a	band	of	appeasers,	calling	instead	for	a	‘moderate’	policy	



















of	 the	 ‘hard	 peace’	 ideas	 of	 Vansittart	 were	 bolstered	 even	 further.	 This	
memorandum	advocated	the	de-industrialisation	of	Germany,	a	hard-line	approach	
which	appeared	to	be	a	drastic	alteration	of	the	official	Anglo-American	position	on	
the	 postwar	 settlement.	 Churchill	 had	 accepted	 the	 plan	 primarily	 on	 economic	
grounds,	namely	in	order	to	secure	American	aid	and	with	the	prospect	of	procuring	
British	 economic	 supremacy	 in	 postwar	 Europe.226	 It	 was	 also	 a	 programme	
seemingly	in	line	with	the	growing	popular	support	for	anti-German	ideas	in	Britain	
and	 America.	 Yet	 the	 proposal	 invoked	 sharp	 criticism	 from	 within	 both	
administrations,	heavily	criticised	by	the	US	State	Department,	Department	of	War,	
and	senior	British	officials.	It	was	abruptly	abandoned,	albeit	not	before	the	Joints	
Chiefs	 of	 Staff	 had	 agreed	 to	 JCS	 1067,	 a	 military	 government	 handbook	 which	
echoed	Morgenthau’s	thinking	and	would	remain	in	place	until	1947.227	That	said,	
there	was	no	public	repudiation	of	the	Morgenthau	Plan	in	Britain,	nor	an	alternative	


















greatest	 mass	 murder	 in	 history	 was	 also	 a	 media	 event.230	 These	 first	 public	
confrontations	 with	 Nazi	 mass	 murder	 were	 a	 hugely	 significant	 juncture	 in	 the	
comprehension	of	the	‘German	Problem’	and	plans	for	the	postwar	settlement.	
Vansittart’s	 aptitude	 for	 incorporating	 current	 events	 in	 support	 of	 his	
overarching	thesis	was	never	clearer	than	when	these	crimes	were	first	exposed.	He	
had	 consistently	 maintained	 that	 the	 Germans	 were	 guilty	 of	 outrages	 and	 war	
crimes,	warning	as	early	as	October	1942	that	‘in	view	of	the	systematic	atrocities	








to	 peer	 through	 the	 cage	 wires	 and	 throw	 bits	 of	 offal	 to	 see	 the	 skeletons	
scramble.232	
There	was,	according	to	Vansittart,	only	one	conclusion	to	be	drawn:	‘every	single	
German	 throughout	 Germany	 is	 responsible’	 having	 willingly	 consented	 to	 the	
inhuman	 policies	 of	 the	 Third	 Reich.233	 The	 revelations	 seemed	 to	 vindicate	
Vansittart’s	thesis	of	the	‘German	Problem’	and	he	incorporated	these	crimes	into	
his	 long	history	of	Germany’s	 ‘black	 record’	 alongside	well-known	atrocity	 stories	























one.	 There’s	 really	 nothing	 new	 when	 you	 compare	 what’s	 happened	 now,	
what’s	 been	 revealed	 now,	 with	 what	 we	 already	 knew	 with	 regard	 to	 the	
atrocities	perpetrated	from	the	beginning	of	the	war.236	
The	revelations	of	the	camps,	above	all	Belsen,	amplified	the	popular	anti-German	
sentiment	 in	 Britain,	 building	 support	 for	 a	 ‘hard	 peace’.237	 The	 Win	 the	 Peace	
Movement	 did	 not	 hesitate	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 this	 trend,	 utilising	 Vansittart’s	
status	 to	expand	the	group’s	membership	through	a	series	of	prominent	publicity	
campaigns.238	

















For	 Victor	 Gollancz,	 these	 crimes	 were	 to	 be	 interpreted	 within	 a	 wholly	
different	 framework.	 In	 April	 1945,	 Gollancz	 published	 a	 new	 pamphlet,	 What	
Buchenwald	Really	Means,	in	which	he	emphasised	the	universality	of	these	crimes,	
characterised	as	the	consequence	of	environmental	influences	and	inherent	human	






are	vile	and	 that	 the	whole	German	people	 is	 "collectively	guilty",	proves	 the	
opposite	[…].	The	very	existence	of	this	hellish	apparatus	-	these	concentration	
camps,	 torture	 chambers,	Gestapo	prisons,	 spies,	 block	wardens	 and	 the	 rest	
with	 which	 Germany	 has	 been	 honeycombed	 -	 indicates	 the	 presence	 of	 an	
opposition,	actual	and	potential,	 far	more	extensive	than	can	be	measured	by	
the	mere	number	of	tortured	victims.240	













the	 ‘stupid	 soft-hearts	 [who]	 attempt	 to	 draw	 a	 distinction	 between	 the	 Nazi	
warmakers	and	torturers	and	the	German	people	as	a	whole’.243	In	much	of	the	mass	





Nazi	 atrocities	 was	 encapsulated	 by	 David	 Low’s	 cartoon	 in	 the	 London	 Evening	
Standard.246	 In	 it,	 a	 bowler-hatted	Englishman	 is	 shown	brandishing	 a	newspaper	
































being	 ‘committed	 in	 the	 name	 of	 the	 whole	 German	 people’;	 this	 guidance	 was	
















The	 intense	 debate	 over	 the	 ‘German	 Problem’	 which	 had	 emerged	 in	
wartime	 Britain	 helped	 to	 shape	 public	 and	 political	 conceptions	 of	 Germany,	
Nazism,	 and	 the	 forthcoming	 peace.	 Lord	Vansittart	 and	Victor	Gollancz	 stood	 as	
figureheads	of	two	fundamentally	opposed	interpretations	of	the	German	past.	But	




trajectory	 which	 had	 installed	 Vansittart	 and	 Gollancz	 as	 the	 leading	 British	
commentators	on	the	‘German	Problem’.	
When	the	war	came	to	an	end	in	May	1945,	leading	British	policymakers	had	
made	 very	 few	 public	 commitments	 regarding	 the	 treatment	 of	 their	 defeated	
enemy.250	 It	 was	 at	 the	 Potsdam	 Conference,	 in	 July	 –	 August	 1945,	 that	 an	
agreement	on	what	to	do	with	Germany	was	to	be	finally	realised.	The	programme	









antagonistic	 rhetoric.	 He	 could	 hardly	 have	 been	 disappointed	 at	 the	 way	 the	
‘German	Problem’	seemed	set	to	be	resolved.251		
That	 said,	 the	 precise	 influence	 of	 Vansittart	 upon	Allied	 policy	 remains	 a	




politicians	and	bureaucrats	were	not	 immune	 to	 the	climate	of	opinion	 regarding	
Germany	 that	 Vansittart	 had	 been	 so	 central	 in	 shaping.	 Moreover,	 the	 general	
trajectory	 of	 Britain’s	 leading	 policymakers	 towards	 a	 harsher	 peace,	 refusing	 to	
acknowledge	the	existence	of	an	‘Other	Germany’	but	rather	seeing	Germans	and	
Nazis	as	largely	indistinguishable,	is	unmistakeable.	If	Vansittart’s	impact	on	the	upon	
the	 final	 form	 of	 the	 Allied	 peace	 settlement	 for	 Germany	 remains	 difficult	 to	
determine,	it	would	be	erroneous	to	discount	his	influence	entirely.253	







social,	 and	 cultural	 characteristics	 of	 totalitarianism,	 Nazi	 racial	 policy,	 and	 the	
history	 of	 the	 Weimar	 Republic.	 The	 numerous	 books,	 pamphlets,	 songs,	 public	








meetings,	 parliamentary	 debates,	 and	 newspaper	 articles	 in	 which	 the	 ‘German	




But	most	 immediately,	 the	 debate	 had	 fashioned	 public	 expectations	 of	 a	
forthcoming	peace	settlement	anticipated	 to	 resolve	 the	 ‘German	Problem’	once-
and-for-all.	There	is	good	reason	to	question	D.	C.	Watt’s	assertion	that	Vansittart	
was	generally	regarded	as	‘non-British’	and	in	‘bad	taste’,	being	generally	‘worsted	
by	 his	 opponents.256	 Rather,	 Vansittart’s	 anti-German	message	 of	 collective	 guilt,	













































and	enacting,	 a	 European	peace	 settlement,	 seeking	 a	 resolution	 to	 the	 so-called	
‘German	Problem’.	Memories	of	the	failed	peace	of	1919	were	conspicuous	in	the	
minds	of	 citizens	and	policymakers	alike	and,	 as	one	 contemporary	 commentator	
pithily	remarked,	‘to	the	cant	of	“never	again”	succeed[ed]	the	cant	of	“not	like	last	
time”.’2	 Yet	 profound	 disagreements	 over	 the	 exact	 diagnosis	 of	 Germany’s	
supposed	malady,	be	 it	capitalism,	 imperialism,	Prussianism,	Nazism,	militarism	or	
some	other	‘ism’	entirely,	had	emerged	in	Britain	during	the	war.	This	debate	over	





first	 emerged.	 This	 study	 reflects	 upon	 the	 public	 and	 media	 responses	 to	 the	
Potsdam	Agreement	and	its	implementation,	charting	the	mediation	of	occupation	












the	 foreseeable	 future.	Yet	Victor	Gollancz	and	his	allies	 continued	 to	 lobby	 for	a	
more	humanitarian	and	reconciliatory	approach	to	the	peace.	Meanwhile,	in	the	face	
of	 mounting	 problems	 in	 the	 Zone	 of	 occupation	 and	 intensifying	 inter-Allied	
disagreements,	 British	 officials	 had	 grown	 increasingly	 mindful	 of	 the	 inherent	
shortcomings	of	the	Potsdam	Agreement.	In	the	midst	of	the	nascent	Cold	War,	an	
influx	of	refugees	expelled	from	eastern	Europe	had	aggravated	existing	shortages	of	
food	 and	 housing.	 Leading	 British	 policymakers,	 concerned	 at	 the	 burgeoning	
expenditure	required	to	offset	humanitarian	disaster	and	uneasy	over	the	intentions	
of	the	Soviet	Union,	sought	to	urgently	revise	their	approach	in	Germany.	In	time,	
Britain’s	 political	 and	 military	 leaders,	 alongside	 their	 American	 counterparts,	
surreptitiously	embraced	a	more	reconstructive	peace	settlement	that	ran	contrary	
to	the	ethos	of	Potsdam.	But,	as	the	final	section	reveals,	the	British	public	and	media	



















German	 reparations,	 agreed	 on	 a	 course	 of	 demilitarisation	 and	 denazification,	
resolved	some	of	the	territorial	disputes	over	the	future	of	Germany’s	borders4,	and	
established	the	machinery	of	a	military	occupation.	Churchill	and	Eden,	anxious	over	
America’s	 postwar	 commitment	 to	 Europe	 and	 the	 potential	 threat	 of	 the	 Soviet	
Union,	 also	 successfully	 lobbied	 for	 the	 inclusion	 of	 the	 French	 as	 an	 occupying	
power.5	This	followed	the	‘Percentages	Agreement’	of	October	1944,	when	Churchill	




with	 Truman	 replacing	 the	 recently	 deceased	 Roosevelt;	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	
conference,	 Churchill’s	 electoral	 defeat	 would	 see	 Clement	 Attlee	 sign	 the	 final	
agreement.	 Labour’s	 victory	 corresponded	 with	 the	 direction	 of	 British	 official	
thinking	about	Germany,	with	Attlee	a	long-standing	advocate	of	a	relatively	hard-
line	peace	settlement	and	fervent	believer	 in	the	 implementation	of	radical	social	














At	 the	 Cecilienhof	 Palace	 in	 the	 outskirts	 of	 Berlin,	 the	Allies	 finalised	 the	
structure	 of	 the	 occupation	 administration,	 establishing	 a	 four-power	 military	
government	with	a	centralised	Allied	Control	Council	in	the	German	capital.	The	ACC	
would	 work	 in	 conjunction	 with	 the	 newly-created	 Council	 of	 Foreign	 Ministers,	






























the	 soon-to-be	 26,000	members	 of	 the	 Control	 Commission	 for	 Germany	 (British	
Element).9	 In	 addition,	 the	 80,000	 men	 of	 the	 21st	 Army	 Group,	 who	 had	 taken	









(NSDAP)	and	 its	 laws,	 removing	committed	Nazis	 from	positions	of	authority,	and	
pursuing	war	crimes	prosecutions	against	 those	deemed	responsible	 for	 the	Third	








with	 a	 close	 focus	 on	 the	 elimination	 of	 the	 means	 of	 making	 war	 as	 well	 as	







regulations	 on	 industrial	 production	 more	 generally.	 This	 would	 involve	


















Army	of	 the	Rhine,	 proclaimed	 the	 four-power	 control	 of	Germany	 to	 be	 ‘one	of	
history’s	 boldest	 experiments’.12	 Yet	 the	 Potsdam	 Agreement	 was	 a	 flawed	
settlement,	as	many	British	and	American	officials	privately	recognised	even	as	 its	
terms	were	being	finalised.13	In	the	first	place,	the	war-ravaged	condition	of	Germany	
would	 prove	 a	 substantial	 impediment	 to	 the	 efficient	 fulfilment	 of	 Potsdam’s	
















each	 take	 a	 particular	 approach	 to	 the	 vague	 principles	 set	 out	 in	 1945,	 creating	













on	 the	 ‘home	 front’.	 Michael	 Balfour	 and	 Ian	 McLaine,	 amongst	 others,	 have	
established	the	Second	World	War	as	a	transformative	juncture	in	the	history	of	the	



















organisation’s	 officials	 intended	 to	 communicate	 all	 manner	 of	 messages	 to	 the	
























German	 people	 effectively,	 whether	 it	 be	 the	 evidence	 of	 Nazi	 crimes	 or	 basic	
information	 about	 the	 rules	 and	 regulations	 of	 the	 military	 government:	 public	












PR/ISC	 administrators	 resolved	 to	 control	 the	 output	 of	 the	 independent	
media,	 censoring	 unwelcome	 news	 while	 promoting	 a	 positive	 and	 constructive	
public	image	of	the	British	occupation	forces.	The	stated	objective	of	the	PR/ISC	was	
to	 encourage	 a	 ‘fair	 and	 accurate	 picture	 of	 military	 government	 operations’,	



































































film	 footage	 made	 them	 especially	 pliable	 to	 official	 control.	 As	 a	 result,	 PR/ISC	
officials	sought	to	exploit	the	cooperation	of	producers,	working	with	Pathé	News,	
Gaumont-British	News,	and	British	Movietone	News	to	publicise	the	work	of	the	CCG	
(BE).	 From	 the	 very	 beginning	 of	 the	 occupation,	 they	 facilitated	 the	 filming	 of	
material	in	the	British	Zone,	as	well	as	providing	their	own	footage.28		
But	it	was	the	newspapers,	given	their	soaring	popularity,	that	would	provide	




reporting.30	 The	 PR/ISC	 attempted	 to	 supply	 war	 correspondents,	 ‘as	 the	




















means	 of	 official	 control,	 curtailing	 the	 journalistic	 freedoms	 primarily	 on	 the	
grounds	 of	 military	 security.	 	 Journalists	 sent	 to	 the	 British	 Zone	 in	 the	 hope	 of	
‘finding	the	news’	were,	like	all	visitors,	required	to	follow	a	specific	tour	schedule	
arranged	by	PR/ISC	officials.	The	documentary	records	of	several	touring	parties	of	































The	 use	 of	 official	 controls	 and	 regulations	 over	 the	 mass	 media	 was,	 of	
course,	nothing	new:	the	war	itself	had	seen	a	great	deal	of	cooperation	between	the	
British	 government	 and	 the	 fourth	 estate,	 especially	 concerning	 the	 conduct	 of	
frontline	 reporters.	 The	 transition	 to	 peacetime	 reporting	 regulations	 was	 slow,	






British	 transport	 facilities	 and	 British	 occupation	 currency,	 even	 initially	 wearing	
British	uniform.’36	Given	the	power	dynamics	which	characterised	relations	between	
occupied	and	occupier,	visibly	belonging	to	one	of	the	victor	nations	and	depending	
on	 the	 support	 of	 the	 occupation	 forces	 severely	 constrained	 the	 professional	













independence	of	 journalists.37	Another	 hangover	 from	wartime	 regulations	which	
intruded	 upon	 the	 independence	 of	 the	 press	 was	 the	 risk	 of	 censorship.38	 The	









































ties	 between	 the	 ‘Big	 Three’	 had	 been	 strengthened	 yet	 further.43	 The	 Potsdam	
Agreement,	 as	Alan	Bullock	notes,	 perpetuated	 ‘in	 the	public	 if	 not	 in	 the	official	
mind,	the	belief	that	the	three	wartime	allies	would	continue	together	after	the	war	
was	 over’.44	 In	 this	 strictly	 mediated	 context,	 the	 various	 shortcomings	 of	 the	










noted,	 that	 ‘any	 settlement	 which	 we	 may	 impose	 on	 Germany	 is	 likely	 to	 win	











popular	 approval	 here	 provided	 it	 can	 be	 represented	 as	 “hard”’.47	 The	 Potsdam	
Agreement	was	conspicuously	branded	in	these	terms,	pronounced	as	an	effective	
means	 of	 punishing	 and	 radically	 reforming	 Britain’s	 vanquished	 enemy.	 Yet	 the	
unveiling	of	 a	 ‘hard	peace’	was	not	 lauded	 across	 the	board:	Victor	Gollancz	 and	
Labour	MP	Richard	 Crossman	were	 amongst	 those	who	 questioned	 the	 technical	
aspects	 of	 the	 agreement,	 the	 potential	 for	 effective	 enforcement,	 and	 the	
















set	 out	 with	 their	 own	 prejudices,	 aspirations,	 expectations,	 and	 methods.	 They	









prioritised,	 seemingly	above	all	 else,	 the	 re-education	of	 the	German	people	as	a	
means	to	bring	about	democracy	and	safeguard	the	peace.49	It	was	a	policy	imbued	
with	 Lord	 Vansittart’s	 conception	 of	 the	 ‘German	 Problem’,	 namely	 a	 historicist	
reading	of	Germany’s	culture	as	wholly	defunct.50	 	The	German	people,	alleged	to	
have	been	 conditioned	by	undemocratic,	 authoritarian,	militaristic,	 and	 ‘Prussian’	
ideas,	needed	reforming	–	and	what	a	better	model	than	Britain	itself,	the	home	of	
modern	democracy?	








out	 longer	 standing	 traditions	of	 authoritarianism,	militarism,	and	 ‘Prussianism’.52	
This	 was,	 as	 Nicholas	 Pronay	 has	 remarked,	 the	 most	 ambitious	 of	 propaganda	
projects,	 signifying	 a	 ‘high	 watermark	 of	 belief’	 in	 the	 power	 of	 censorship,	
government	media	production,	and	the	manipulation	of	information	provision.53	
British	occupiers,	many	of	whom	had	experience	as	part	of	the	Imperial	Staff,	
were	 to	 control	 and	manipulate	 the	 ‘media	 of	 opinion	 formation’.	 This	 included	
newspapers	and	cultural	productions	and	the	‘agencies	of	attitude	formation’,	most	
obviously	the	education	system	from	Kindergarten	through	to	Universität.54	The	CCG	










(BE)	 licenced	 and	 censored	 a	 new	 era	 of	 German	media,	 setting	 up	 publications	
including	the	now-famous	Der	Spiegel.	British	educationalists	and	civil	servants	were	
tasked	with	writing	politically	 suitable	 textbooks	and	curriculums.	 In	addition,	 the	
staff	of	schools,	colleges,	and	universities	were	to	be	thoroughly	vetted,	with	those	




The	 policy	 of	 re-education	 was	 ambitious,	 an	 attempt	 to	 ‘win	 the	 peace’	
through	 psychological	 means	 rather	 than	 exclusively	 the	 traditional	 territorial,	
financial,	 or	 military	 methods.56	 In	 the	 first	 months	 of	 the	 occupation	 it	 found	
widespread	support	across	Britain,	with	even	the	Manchester	Guardian	criticising	the	
decision	 of	 the	 newly-formed	 United	 Nations	 Educational,	 Scientific	 and	 Cultural	
Organisation	to	exclude	Germany	from	education	relief.57	‘That	Germany	should	be	
re-educated	 as	 soon	 as	 possible’	 was	 felt	 to	 be	 the	 only	 subject	 ‘on	 which	 Lord	
Vansittart	agreed	with	 the	pacifists	and	the	Russians	with	Mr.	Bevin’.	The	paper’s	
editorial	 from	 June	 1945	 highlighted	 the	 urgency	 of	 bringing	 about	 a	 democratic	
revival	 in	 Germany,	 describing	 this	 as	 a	 ‘gigantic	 task’	 in	 a	 ‘desert	 of	 political	
thought’.58	 In	 the	 Times,	 a	 letter	 from	Robert	Birley,	headmaster	of	Charterhouse	
School	and	famed	educationalist,	was	published	on	VE	Day,	expressing	his	optimism	
about	 the	 re-education	 of	 the	 German	 people.59	 This	 was,	 he	 suggested,	 an	
‘unavoidable	duty’	in	the	course	of	military	administration,	calling	on	the	occupiers	























‘simple	children’s	games	common	to	all	nations’.	 It	wasn’t	often	 in	history	 that	 ‘a	
conqueror	made	his	first	job	to	educate	the	children	of	the	conquered’,	but	this	was	








this	 ‘truly	 immense	 task’.	 ‘There	 is	 not	 much	 sign’,	 it	 was	 suggested,	 ‘that	 re-
education	is	being	appreciated	as	the	overwhelmingly	important	operation	it	is’,	with	










naïve	 faith	 being	 placed	 in	 the	 utility	 of	 British	 soldiers	 as	 beacons	 of	 peace	 and	
democracy:	
Meanwhile	 the	 fair-haired	 children	 still	 play	 in	 the	 sun,	 and	 sentimentalists,	
seeing	the	British	soldier	with	a	German	baby	on	his	knee,	can	assure	themselves	
that	that	is	all	that’s	needed.	The	soldier	is	Britain’s	best	ambassador,	he	will	re-
educate	 the	Germans	 in	his	 spare	 time,	 as	 a	 side-line.	 That’s	what	 they	were	
saying,	you	remember,	in	1919…	




























[it]	 is	a	 sensitive	and	delicate	 film,	which	deals	with	a	man	and	woman,	both	
married	to	other	persons.	They	had	a	brief	romance	without	adultery	and	then	
separated,	 although	 still	 loving	 one	 another,	 because	 they	 felt	 it	 would	 be	
dishonourable	 to	 break	 up	 their	 families.	 The	 film	 was	 recently	 shown	 to	
Germans	in	Germany.	It	was	received	with	derisive	boos	and	catcalls.	The	moral	






Gilbert	 Murray,	 Bertrand	 Russell,	 and	 others	 appeared	 in	 the	 upmarket	 press,	
suggesting	 that	 the	 imposition	of	democracy	and	 liberalism	 from	the	outside	was	
imprudent	and	ineffective.68	They	suggested	that	the	entire	ethos	of	this	policy	was	






deal	 of	 support	 in	 the	 mainstream	 media.	 Yet	 for	 those	 who	 had	 envisioned	 a	
radically	 different	peace	 settlement,	 centred	upon	 reconciliation	and	 cooperation	
with	‘Other	Germany’,	there	was	little	cause	for	celebration.	











Re-education	 was	 only	 one	 facet	 of	 an	 extensive	 programme	 of	
denazification,	 intended	 to	 root	 out	 the	 individuals	 and	 institutions	 who	 had	
maintained	 the	 Third	Reich	 across	 all	 the	 four	 Zones	of	 occupation.	 The	 range	of	
British	responses	to	denazification	demonstrate	the	ongoing	disagreements	over	the	
appropriate	response	to	the	‘German	Problem’.	The	grand	scale	of	the	procedures	to	
root	 out	 Nazism	 seemed	 to	 embody	 the	 notion	 of	 collective	 guilt	 that	 had	 been	
outlined	by	Lord	Vansittart	 in	Black	Record.	Consequently,	 for	much	of	 the	British	
press	 and	 public,	 this	 exacting	 process	 of	 recrimination	 and	 punishment	 was	
regarded	as	a	vital	cornerstone	of	the	peace	settlement.	Yet	for	those	whose	priority	
was	 the	 rehabilitation	 of	 ‘Other	 Germany’,	 denazification	 was	 regarded	 as	 an	
indefensible	indictment	of	Britain’s	regrettable	thirst	for	vengeance.	
The	 International	 Military	 Tribunal	 (IMT),	 held	 at	 Nuremberg	 between	
November	1945	and	September	1946,	exemplified	the	lengths	to	which	the	British	
and	their	wartime	Allies	were	going	in	order	to	identify	and	punish	the	Third	Reich’s	






The	 IMT	was	 covered	 in	 detail	 by	 the	world’s	media,	 with	 daily	 coverage	
celebrating	 these	 indictments	 in	 all	 the	 British	 newspapers.69	 The	 British	 public’s	












least,	 a	 passing	 interest	 in	 the	 trial	 –	 which	 was	 widely	 accepted	 as	 a	 valuable	
venture.72	For	one,	various	public	opinion	surveys	suggest	that	the	vast	majority	of	
interviewees	were	strongly	in	favour	of	the	arraignment	of	leading	Nazis.73	In	fact,	



































and,	most	 importantly,	 the	removal	and	disbarment	of	 those	deemed	to	be	Nazis	
from	positions	of	power	and	influence.	It	was	no	easy	task,	without	a	clear	definition	
of	exactly	what	 it	meant	 to	be	 ‘guilty’.	 It	was	generally	accepted	 that	 the	 leading	
members	of	the	Nazi	Party,	the	Gestapo,	and	the	SS	were	responsible	for	atrocities	
and	 war	 crimes	 and	 should	 be	 punished.	 But	 what	 about	 civil	 servants,	 political	





British	 occupiers,	 while	 somewhat	 less	 comprehensive	 in	 denazification	
efforts	 than	 their	American	 counterparts,	 approached	 the	 task	with	 an	 ambitious	
zeal.	 In	 the	 first	 place,	 the	 Royal	 Warrant	 trials	 were	 instigated	 alongside	 the	
international	 war	 crimes	 proceedings	 at	 Nuremberg.	 These	 hearings	 focused	 on	
substantive	crimes,	 including	those	of	the	Holocaust,	and	broadened	the	scope	of	
enquiry	beyond	the	elites	of	the	IMT.	The	Royal	Warrant	trials	implicated	some	of	






crimes	prosecutions	was	utilised	by	 the	British	authorities	 to	 further	demonstrate	
the	 judicial	 arm	of	 denazification	 at	work.	 In	 the	 first	months	 of	 the	 peace,	with	
memories	of	the	Holocaust	still	fresh	in	the	mind	of	the	British	public,	the	response	
was	enthusiastic.	In	August	1945,	a	Gaumont-British	newsreel	on	the	Bergen-Belsen	








the	 British	 and	 Americans	 to	 classify	 Germans	 in	 relation	 to	 their	 allegiance	 to	
Nazism,	exemplified	this	conviction.	In	the	British	Zone,	the	survey	was	completed	by	
millions	 of	 Germans,	who	were	 required	 to	 obtain	 a	 certificate	 of	 denazification,	
dubbed	the	Persilscheine	or	Persil	 ticket,	as	a	prerequisite	 for	 taking	up	work	 in	a	
large	variety	of	professions.	This	process	was	administered	through	Denazification	
Panels	and	Review	Boards,	whereby	those	under	investigation	could	be	classified	and	
penalised	 accordingly.	 Unsurprisingly,	 this	 programme	 caused	 friction	 between	
occupiers	 and	 occupied,	 who	 were	 increasingly	 incensed	 at	 bureaucratic	











inefficiencies	 and	 perceived	 injustices	 –	 a	 joke,	 common	 in	 the	 first	 years	 of	 the	
occupation,	was	that	the	1,000-year	Reich	consisted	of	12	years	of	Nazism	and	988	
years	of	denazification.79	
In	 the	 first	 weeks	 and	 months	 of	 the	 peace,	 much	 of	 the	 British	 press	
triumphantly	reported	on	the	work	of	the	BMG	to	remove	Nazi	laws,	dissolve	Nazi	




the	occupation	had	brought	 to	 light	 the	 true	extent	 to	which	 the	German	people	
were	 contaminated	 by	 the	 scourge	 of	 Nazism,	 further	 substantiating	 Vansittart’s	
‘black	record’	thesis.	In	May	1945,	the	Daily	Mirror	pointed	the	finger	at	a	‘Hun	Baron’	
who,	 given	 the	 chance,	 ‘will	 finance	 the	 next	 Fuehrer’	 and	 avoid	 repeating	 the	
mistakes	 of	 Hitler.82	 In	 early	 July,	 the	 Daily	 Express	 reported	 the	 concerns	 of	
Cologne’s	 new	mayor,	 one	 ‘Konrad	 Adenhauer	 [sic]’,	 that	 Nazis	 were	 once	 again	
‘openly	 heiling’.83	 In	 December,	 Edwin	 Tetlow	 wrote	 an	 article	 in	 the	Daily	Mail	


















Yet	 as	 the	 novelty	 of	 punishing	 Nazis	 wore	 off,	 the	 media’s	 interest	 in	









denazification	 procedures	 were	 a	 flawed	 means	 of	 ‘winning	 the	 peace’	 and	
symptomatic	of	the	misguided	approach	of	the	Allies	to	the	‘German	Problem’.	In	a	
series	of	newspaper	articles,	Gollancz	labelled	the	policy	as	an	unjust	and	impractical	
form	of	 ‘totalitarian	 democracy’,	 instilling	 crippling	 uncertainty	 amongst	 innocent	
people.87	In	1947,	he	would	outline	his	opposition	to	denazification	in	two	books,	In	
Darkest	Germany	 and	Germany	Revisited,	which	 recounted	his	 trips	 to	 the	British	
Zone.88	This	was,	he	alleged,	a	‘hideous	process’,	destroying	efficiency	and	poisoning	
the	moral	atmosphere	by	encouraging	subterfuge	and	bribery:	 in	short,	 ‘it	 fails	 to	
achieve	its	avowed	positions.	And	heaven	knows	how	long	the	horror	will	go	dragging	











on’.89	 It	 was,	 Gollancz	 continued,	 also	 proof	 of	 the	 troubling	 ways	 in	 which	
totalitarianism	had	seeped	into	the	decaying	political	culture	of	the	West.90	
In	his	opposition	to	denazification,	Gollancz	was	joined	by	several	long-term	
allies,	 including	 Lord	 Beveridge,	 who	 in	 his	 1946	 work	An	 Urgent	Message	 from	
Germany	 suggested	 that	 denazification	 was	 ‘generating	 hate’	 and	 ‘fit	 only	 for	 a	
totalitarian	state’.91	George	Bell,	Bishop	of	Chichester,	also	visited	the	British	Zone	in	
late	 1946,	 declaring	 in	 his	 report	 (written	 on	 behalf	 of	 a	 delegation	 of	 British	





a	 peaceful	 and	 reconciled	 Europe’	 while	 ‘this	 festering	 source	 of	 bitterness’	 was	






















In	 a	 series	 of	 characteristically	 cantankerous	 letters	 on	 the	 aims	 of	 the	
occupation,	Lord	Vansittart	suggested	there	was	agreement	across	the	political	fault	
lines	 for	 at	 least	 one	 thing:	 the	 total	 disarmament	 of	 Germany.93	 There	 had,	 of	
course,	been	abortive	attempts	to	stringently	reduce	the	size	of	Germany’s	armed	
forces	 in	 the	aftermath	of	 the	First	World	War.	And	 for	many	commentators,	 the	
failure	to	ensure	Germany’s	military	impotency	was	the	most	urgent	lesson	for	the	
post-1945	 peace.94	 The	 objective	 of	 transforming	 Germany	 into	 a	 peaceable	 and	
democratic	nation	was	to	be	founded	upon	the	wholesale	removal	of	the	country’s	





Germany’s	 naval	 and	 air	 power,	 disband	 the	Wehrmacht,	 and	 enforce	 ‘industrial	
disarmament’.95	The	officially-sourced	images	of	the	seemingly	irreparable	damage	





















inflicted	 upon	 the	 once-powerful	 German	 military	 were	 greeted	 with	 elation,	 as	
exemplified	by	Movietone’s	film	‘Hun	Prisoners:	How	the	Mighty	have	Fallen’.96	The	
film’s	 narration	 took	 a	 bombastic	 tone,	 emphasising	 that	 the	 Wehrmacht	 had	










once	 all-conquering	 German	 armed	 forces	 brought	 to	 their	 knees	 should	 not	 be	

























bombing	 campaign,	 was	 widely	 celebrated	 for,	 as	 a	 Gaumont-British	 newsreel	
proclaimed,	 effectively	 ‘drawing	 Germany’s	 teeth’.99	 The	 occupation	was	 seen	 to	












the	Daily	Mirror	enthusiastically	 reporting	 that	 ‘the	 land	 of	militarists’	was	 to	 be	
‘made	 a	 land	 of	 tillers	 of	 the	 soil’.100	 The	 Potsdam	Agreement	 had	 declared	 that	
Germany’s	war	potential	was	to	be	destroyed	and	that	the	German	people	should	
not	 maintain	 a	 standard	 of	 living	 higher	 than	 the	 European	 average.101	 This	
demanded	 the	 break-up	 of	 major	 industrial	 concerns,	 the	 removal	 of	 industrial	
machinery	and	expertise,	and	close	supervision	over	the	German	economy’s	strictly	




























Middle	 Ages’.104	 In	 fact,	 many	 of	 the	 first	 reports	 from	 postwar	 Germany	 were	
characterised	 by	 this	 sense	 of	 incredulity	 at	 the	 catastrophic	 state	 of	 the	 British	














The	 sense	 that	 Germany	 had	 been	 bombed	 into	 oblivion	 at	 the	 mercy	 of	 the	
victorious	Allies	came	from	more	official	sources	too.	Field	Marshal	Montgomery	was	
amongst	those	quick	to	point	out	that	their	erstwhile	enemy	had	been	convincingly	
vanquished,	 describing	 Germany	 as	 ‘a	 country	 that	 has	 been	 completely	





The	damage	was	not	easily	 fixed:	 the	ruins	of	 the	Ruhr	and	beyond	would	
remain	a	feature	of	the	German	landscape	for	some	time	to	come.	Edna	Wearmouth,	
despite	arriving	almost	two	years	after	the	end	of	the	war,	was	taken	aback	at	the	
level	 of	 damage	 she	witnessed	 in	 Cologne,	where	over	 60%	of	 the	 city	 had	been	
destroyed.108	Evidently	sensing	that	words	could	only	convey	so	much,	she	compiled	




In	 fact,	published	accounts	of	postwar	Germany	 that	appeared	 in	 the	 final	
year	of	the	occupation	continued	to	dwell	on	the	scale	of	destruction.	Ethel	Mannin,	















Essen	 as	 ‘a	 mass	 of	 twisted	 girders	 and	 piled-up	 masonry’.111	 There	 was,	 she	
suggested,	 still	a	 sense	of	 shock	 for	any	new	visitor	 to	Germany	upon	 their	 initial	
realisation	of	the	damage:	






















As	 a	 result,	 the	 notion	 that	 Germany	 had	 been	 thoroughly	 and	 perhaps	
irretrievably	 destroyed	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	 war	 took	 a	 fairly	 ubiquitous	 hold	 in	
postwar	Britain.	Germany’s	total	obliteration	was	a	powerful	and	enduring	image,	at	
once	 shocking	 and	 reassuring.	 The	 physical	 destruction	 of	 the	 country’s	








The	 PR/ISC’s	 endeavours	 to	 regulate	 the	 independent	 media,	 providing	 a	
positive	portrayal	of	the	Britain’s	efforts	to	implement	the	Potsdam	Agreement,	had	
evidently	met	with	 some	 success.	 The	work	 towards	 re-education,	 denazification,	
and	demilitarisation	had	 inspired	optimism	 that	 the	 ‘German	Problem’	was	being	
dealt	 with,	 even	 if	 press	 interest	 in	 the	 technicalities	 of	 occupation	 policy	 did	
gradually	dissipate.115	All	the	more	powerful	were	the	images	of	destruction,	which	
seemed	to	confirm	the	pacification	of	Germany	as	a	military	and	economic	threat	for	
years	 to	 come.	 Yet	 these	 reports	 came	with	 a	 consistent	 caveat:	 the	 attempt	 to	
reform	the	social,	cultural,	economic,	and	political	character	of	Germany	had	a	long	
way	 to	 go	 and	 the	 Allies	must	 not	 get	 complacent.	 That	 said,	 not	 everyone	was	
supportive	of	British	policy	in	Germany:	Victor	Gollancz	and	the	steadfast	‘soft	peace’	
lobby	had	voiced	their	concern	at	the	allegedly	vengeful	ethos	of	these	endeavours.	








Potsdam	 was,	 they	 argued,	 imbued	 with	 an	 anti-German	 sentiment	 which	 had	
precluded	Allied	 leaders	 from	 rational	 policymaking.	 For	Gollancz	 and	others,	 the	




The	 period	 from	 1945	 to	 1947	 saw	 the	 Labour	 administration	 reassess	 Britain’s	
foreign	obligations,	responding	to	a	series	of	crises	which	threatened	to	undermine	
the	 country’s	 economic,	 international,	 and	 imperial	 standing.117	 There	 were	











The	war	 had	 devastated	 the	 continent’s	 agricultural	 production	 and	 trade	
infrastructure,	leading	to	a	worldwide	food	shortage.	The	provision	of	food	became,	
as	one	member	of	the	British	occupation	staff	remarked,	‘almost	as	international	a	










means	 of	 understanding	 between	 the	 nations	 as	 music	 and	 the	 arts’.122	 For	 the	
people	 of	 Europe,	 victors	 and	 vanquished,	 victims	 and	 perpetrators,	 hunger	 (of	
varying	degrees)	was	an	inescapable	facet	of	life.	The	British	Zone	was	particularly	
vulnerable,	 an	 arbitrary	 area	 that	 was	 historically	 dependent	 on	 food	 imports,	
dominated	by	heavy	industry,	and	now	severely	impaired	by	months	of	British	and	
American	bombing	raids:	communication	lines,	infrastructure,	and	above	all	housing	




plan),	 transport,	 and	 food	 provision.	 This	 was	 a	 cyclical	 problem	 with	 no	 easy	
solution:	alarming	food	shortages	and	destitution	further	reduced	productivity	and	





to	 the	 German	 economy.124	 But	 the	 origins	 of	 Germany’s	 devastating	 levels	 of	
deprivation	 and	 food	 scarcity	 lay	 beyond	 the	 chaos	 of	 the	 British	 Zone.	 The	
ambiguous	 stipulations	 of	 Potsdam	 and	 growing	 inter-Allied	 hostility	 fashioned	 a	
crisis	that	seemingly	threatened	the	peace	and	would	ultimately	help	to	usher	in	the	
Cold	War.		











At	Potsdam,	 the	 requirement	 to	 treat	Germany	as	 a	 single	economic	unit,	
whereby	industrial	output	from	one	Zone	could	be	exchanged	for	food	from	another,	
had	been	made	paramount	by	British	negotiators.	Yet	there	was	no	clear	hierarchy	
of	 priorities	 amongst	 the	 various	 provisions	 of	 the	 Agreement,	 and	 the	 Soviets,	
whose	 wartime	 losses	 were	 unparalleled,	 took	 reparations	 payments	 to	 be	 the	
principal	concern.	They	demanded	an	allocation	of	$10	billion	worth	of	reparations-
in-kind	must	be	fulfilled	prior	to	any	domestic	trade	of	food	from	their	own,	largely	




catastrophe	 in	 the	 British	 Zone,	 where	 pervasive	 homelessness	 and	 hunger,	







































the	 four	 occupation	 Zones,	 yet	 the	 Soviets	 neglected	 their	 obligation	 to	 help.	
Likewise,	the	French	authorities	refused	to	acknowledge	the	provisions	of	Potsdam	
and	prohibited	the	migration	of	expellees	from	the	east	to	their	Zone.	As	a	result,	the	
British	 and	 American	 Zones	 absorbed	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 migrants,	 intensifying	
existing	shortages	of	shelter,	clothing,	and,	above	all,	food.	They	joined	the	millions	



















Germany	 increasingly	 dependent	 on	 food	 imports	 from	 North	 America	 just	 to	
maintain	a	meagre	ration	in	the	Zone.133	In	1946,	the	British	exchequer	predicted	the	
outlay	to	be	an	astonishing	£80,000,000,	but	even	this	proved	an	underestimate:	the	
bill	 reached	 £120,000,000	 for	 the	 year,	 an	 imposition	 that	 the	 Chancellor,	 Hugh	
Dalton,	 felt	 amounted	 to	 ‘paying	 reparations	 to	 Germany’.134	 The	 cost	 of	 these	
imports	consumed	Britain’s	dwindling	supply	of	dollar	reserves	and	even	impacted	
upon	British	consumption	at	home,	with	 the	 imposition	of	bread	 rationing	 in	 July	
1946.	 Yet	with	 growing	 concerns	 over	 Soviet	 expansionism,	 there	was	 a	 growing	




in	 Germany	 seemingly	 threatening	 the	 integrity	 of	 Britain’s	 position	 as	 a	 world	











power.136	 The	 Labour	 government	 recognised	 that	 only	 a	 balanced	 German	
economy,	legitimately	functioning	as	a	single	economic	unit,	could	minimise	Britain’s	
outlay.	 Yet	 as	 inter-Allied	 disagreements	 intensified	 this	 seemed	 increasingly	
implausible:	 attempts	 to	 draw-up	 a	 more	 satisfactory	 joint	 import/export	








The	proposed	 ‘Western	option’,	 outlined	by	 the	 staunchly	 anti-communist	
Bevin	at	a	cabinet	meeting	in	early	May	1946,	aimed	to	offset	the	cost	of	food	imports	
through	increasing	exports.140	It	proposed	a	more	rapid	transfer	of	power	back	to	the	
Germans	and	 the	 reconstruction	of	Germany’s	 severely	hamstrung	economy.	 The	
danger	 of	 Soviet	 expansionism,	 Bevin	 suggested,	 had	 become	 ‘as	 great	 as,	 and	
possibly	 even	 greater	 than,	 that	 of	 a	 revived	Germany’.141	 Yet	 anxieties	 over	 the	




















until	 the	 summer	 of	 1946	 that	 British	 policymakers	 would	 reach	 something	 of	 a	
consensus,	privately	accepting	the	need	for	a	new	approach	in	Germany.	In	July,	at	
the	 Paris	 Conference	 of	 Foreign	 Ministers,	 Bevin	 declared	 Britain’s	 intention	 to	
organise	their	Zone	‘in	such	a	manner	that	no	further	liability	shall	fall	on	the	British	
taxpayer’,	unless	four-power	cooperation	could	be	resumed.143	In	September,	it	was	
US	 Secretary	 of	 State	 James	 F.	 Byrnes	 who	 put	 forward	 a	 plan	 for	 the	 fusion	 of	
occupation	Zones,	readily	taken	up	by	the	British	authorities.	Byrnes’s	subsequent	





played	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 Cold	War,	 although	 this	 came	
primarily	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 weakness	 and	 growing	 dependence	 on	 American	
military	and	financial	support.	But	regardless	of	the	precise	permutations	of	these	
geopolitical	 exchanges,	 by	 the	 end	 of	 1946	 there	 can	 be	 no	 doubt	 that	 Anglo-
American	leaders	were	set	on	the	path	towards	a	‘Western	option’,	albeit	without	
any	public	rebuke	of	the	Potsdam	Agreement.		













In	 the	 British	 Zone,	 the	 CCG	 (BE)	 began	 to	 alter	 its	 occupation	 strategy	
radically:	 in	November	1946,	 control	over	 local	 government,	education,	elections,	
and	public	health	was	handed	back	to	the	Germans,	following	on	from	the	German-
run	denazification	panels	which	had	been	in	action	since	January.146	This	marked	a	
major	 shift	 away	 from	 intensive	 re-education	 and	 close	 control,	 towards	 a	more	








taken	place	away	 from	the	prying	eyes	of	 the	press	and	public.	 In	Britain,	 leading	
officials	were	worried	 that	 the	 rank-and-file	 of	 the	 Labour	 Party,	 not	 to	mention	
public	opinion	more	broadly,	remained	largely	sympathetic	to	the	Soviet	Union.148	
This	stemmed	from	wartime,	when	Soviet	heroism	in	the	fight	against	Nazism	had	
been	 extolled	 across	 the	mass	media.149	 It	 had	 continued	 into	 peacetime	 and,	 in	
March	1946,	Winston	Churchill’s	now-famous	‘Iron	Curtain’	speech	had	actually	met	
with	 considerable	 rebuke	 in	 much	 of	 the	 British	 press.150	 As	 a	 result,	 British	
policymakers	 were	 unprepared	 to	 countenance	 such	 an	 about-turn	 in	 the	 public	











contours	 of	 official	 policy.151	 In	 the	 coming	 years,	 they	 would	 maintain	 a	 public	
commitment	to	Potsdam,	seeking	to	ensure	that	the	Soviet	Union	was	ultimately	to	

















war	 found	 itself	 once	more	 at	 the	 centre	of	 the	public	 debate.153	 Victor	Gollancz	
would	write	 various	 newspaper	 articles	 as	well	 as	 another	 book,	Our	 Threatened	
Values,	in	which	he	insisted	that	the	German	refugees	were	victims	of	circumstance,	
defenceless	 against	 the	 totalitarian	 Nazi	 regime	 and	 now	 callously	 and	 unfairly	
expelled	 from	eastern	Europe.154	Gollancz	had	grown	 increasingly	 concerned	 that	










overseeing	 the	 continent’s	 moral	 regeneration,	 fostering	 moral	 virtue	 through	
actions	to	help	their	defeated	enemy.156	
In	September	1945,	Gollancz	made	a	public	appeal	to	the	British	government,	
sending	 a	 letter,	 co-signed	 by	 Bertrand	 Russell,	 George	 Bell,	 and	 Gilbert	 Murray	
amongst	 others,	 to	 a	 number	 of	 local	 and	 national	 newspapers.157	 It	 was,	 they	
argued,	‘not	in	accordance	with	the	traditions	of	this	country	to	allow	children	-	even	
the	children	of	ex-enemies	-	to	starve’,	suggesting	a	cut	to	British	rations	in	order	to	
‘save’	 Europe.158	 In	 the	 autumn,	 Gollancz	 set	 up	 the	 public	 pressure	 group	 Save	
Europe	 Now	 (SEN)	 to	 further	 his	 cause,	 organising	 a	 series	 of	 rallies	 and	 public	
campaigns	to	bring	pressure	on	the	government.	As	Matthew	Frank’s	work	on	SEN	
has	 shown,	 the	organisation	 sought	 to	 align	public	and	political	 opinion	behind	a	
more	proactive	response	to	the	problem	of	hunger	in	central	Europe.159		
SEN	 appealed	 to	 its	 supporters	 to	 send	 in	 postcards,	 illustrating	 their	
willingness	 to	 give	 up	 a	 share	 of	 their	 own	 rations	 and	 help	 the	 beleaguered	
Germans:	over	20,000	were	received	in	the	first	week,	60,000	by	late	December	and	
more	than	100,000	by	spring	1946.160	The	positive	reaction	prompted	Gollancz	and	
his	 associates	 to	 launch	 a	 second	 appeal,	 calling	 on	 the	 government	 to	 relax	
restrictions	on	the	passage	of	goods	to	Germany	and	arrange	for	a	voluntary	scheme	
of	ration	cuts.	It	was	hoped	that	clothes	and	food	could	be	donated	locally,	forwarded	















in	 London,	 inviting	 all	 Liberal	 and	 Labour	 MPs	 along	 with	 a	 number	 of	 leading	
Anglicans,	members	of	the	media,	and	various	other	dignitaries.162	The	forty-or-so	
Labour	 backbenchers,	 newspaper	 editors,	 bishops,	 and	 assorted	members	 of	 the	






refugees,	 and	 the	 release	 of	 Britain’s	 food	 reserves.163	 Yet	 SEN’s	 demands	 went	
beyond	the	refugee	crisis,	extending	to	include	a	call	for	increased	production	in	the	
Ruhr,	the	mobilisation	of	all	available	vehicles	to	break	the	transport	bottleneck,	and	
the	 creation	of	 a	 Supreme	Economic	Council	 to	oversee	 long-term	 reconstruction	


















parliamentary	 interest,	 not	only	 from	backbench	MPs	but	 also	 in	 a	well-attended	






Yet	SEN’s	 lobbying	efforts	 continued	 throughout	 the	1940s,	with	 the	organisation	
petitioning	both	the	public	and	the	government	to	support	the	cause	of	relief	and	
reconstruction	in	central	Europe	and,	in	particular,	occupied	Germany.	Gollancz	and	





including	D.	 C.	Watt	 and	 John	 Farquharson	have	 pointed	 to	 Save	 Europe	Now	as	
evidence	 of	 a	 shift	 in	 British	 feeling	 towards	 Germany.	 This	 lobby	 group,	 it	 is	
























campaign	 in	 the	 most	 liberal	 organs	 of	 the	 press,	 particularly	 the	 Manchester	
Guardian.175	But	by	far	the	most	common	response	to	the	humanitarian	crisis,	and	






relief	 for	 Germany	 was	 necessary	 was	 justified	 entirely	 in	 terms	 of	 British	 self-
interest.176	A	number	of	reports	in	the	Daily	Mail	suggested	it	would	be	impossible	
to	 ‘reform	 hearts’	 without	 ‘reasonably	 full’	 stomachs,	 anxious	 that	 a	 chasm	 of	
economic	ruin	and	famine	would	drag	down	the	rest	of	Europe.177	In	October	1945,	
Bernard	Buckham’s	Daily	Mirror	column,	entitled	‘Feed	the	Brutes?’,	implored	that	













at	the	same	time,	self-interest	necessitated	 limited	 intervention	along	the	 lines	of	
the	Potsdam	Agreement:	
It	is	not	any	feeling	of	compassion	which	prompts	us	to	emphasise	the	necessity	








number	 of	 contemporary	 commentators	 and	most	 skilfully	 synthesised	 in	 satirist	
David	 Low’s	 cartoon	 for	 the	 London	 Evening	 Standard	 in	 November	 1945.179	 The	
cartoon	showed	a	middle-aged,	middle-class	couple	sitting	down	at	breakfast,	 the	
husband	reading	a	newspaper	with	the	headline	‘Winter	in	Central	Europe’.	Ghostly,	
stooped,	 and	 neglected	 figures,	 representing	 Europe’s	 wandering	 millions,	
surrounding	them	at	the	table.	They	included	a	skeletal	figure	with	the	face	of	death	





suffer’.180	 Likewise,	 Lord	 Beveridge	 sought	 to	 bring	 the	 threat	 of	 humanitarian	
catastrophe	 to	 the	attention	of	his	apparently	 indifferent	 compatriots	 in	his	1946	








work	 An	 Urgent	 Message	 from	 Germany.181	 There	 was	 even	 official	
acknowledgement	of	widespread	ambivalence	and	cynicism	in	the	Pathé	News	film	
Germany’s	 Food	 –	 The	 Truth,	 made	 with	 the	 assistance	 of	 the	 occupation	











and	 regional	press,	were	by	no	means	always	approving	of	 the	group’s	work.	 For	
some,	it	was	a	practical	question:	there	was	uncertainty	as	to	whether	the	voluntary	


















has	 its	own	belt	 sharply	pulled	 in	at	 the	waistline,	 and	could	do	with	a	bit	of	
“saving”	itself.186	


































from	the	war	and	their	defeat’	and	were	now	pining	 for	 the	good	old	 times:	 ‘this	
incalculable	 people	 is	 already	mentally	 ready	 for	 another	war	 tomorrow’.	 Panton	












of	 the	 opposition	 Winston	 Churchill,	 sensing	 a	 chance	 to	 win	 one	 over	 on	 the	
government,	 described	 it	 as	 ‘one	of	 the	 gravest	 announcements	 that	 I	 have	 ever	
heard	made	in	the	House	in	the	time	of	peace’.191	In	the	Daily	Mail,	bread	rationing	
was	condemned	as	 ‘the	most	hated	measure	ever	 to	have	been	presented	to	 the	
people	 of	 this	 country.’192	 There	 were	 complaints	 from	 the	 British	 Housewives	
League	who,	in	a	Pathé	News	film,	proclaimed	to	be	in	‘outright	revolt’	against	the	



























In	 the	 summer	of	 1945,	 the	Potsdam	Agreement	had	outlined	 a	 relatively	
stringent	 peace	 settlement,	 grounded	 upon	 the	 prospect	 of	 ongoing	 cooperation	
between	 the	 ‘Big	 Three’.	 Yet	 within	 a	 year,	 inter-Allied	 hostility,	 coupled	 with	
unprecedented	 practical	 problems	 in	 postwar	 Europe,	 seemed	 to	 have	 rendered	
Potsdam	defunct.	For	Britain,	put	in	a	crippling	financial	situation	by	the	war	and	with	



























crisis	 first	 emerged.	 But	 Gollancz’s	 Save	 Europe	 Now	 pressure	 group	 has	 been	
misattributed	as	a	symbol	of	the	British	media	and	public’s	softening	stance	towards	
Germany.	As	Matthew	Frank	has	argued,	this	moral	crusade	was	as	much	about	self-
image	 as	 anything	 else:	 leading	 campaigners	 consistently	 invoked	 the	 ‘spirit	 of	
Dunkirk’	 and	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘British	 values’.197	 Their	 efforts	 to	 engage	 public	 and	
political	support	for	humanitarian	aid	had	allowed	campaigners	to	hold	a	mirror	up	
to	themselves	and,	on	the	whole,	 they	 liked	what	they	saw.198	 It	was,	however,	a	
relatively	marginal	campaign,	primarily	attracting	the	attention	of	Gollancz’s	 long-
standing	core	of	liberal	and	left-wing	supporters.		
































British	 occupiers	 went	 far	 beyond	 novelty.	 These	 war-weary	 soldiers,	 seasoned	
colonial	 administrators,	 and	 fresh-faced	 civil	 servants	 became	 representatives	 of	
Britain	on	the	world	stage,	expected	to	take	on	the	mantle	of	those	who	had	won	the	
war	 and	 uphold	 the	 country’s	 prestige.	 They	 were	 to	 interpret	 and	 enact	 the	





British	 occupiers	 in	 a	 glowing	 light,	 congratulating	 their	 hard	 work	 in	 aiding	 the	
reconstruction	of	western	Germany.	D.	C.	Watt	suggested	that	 the	well-organised	







for	 improvisation	 under	 stress’.3	 Likewise,	 Anthony	 Nicholls	 contended	 that	
‘common	 sense	 prevailed’,	with	 the	 British	 occupiers	 discarding	 old	myths	 about	
Germany	in	their	endeavours	to	rebuild	this	war-torn	nation.4	As	Jessica	Reinisch	has	
pointed	out,	these	sanguine	portrayals	of	the	occupation	staff	originated	from	the	
various	 memoirs	 and	 autobiographies	 penned	 by	 Control	 Commission	 veterans.5	
Field	Marshal	Montgomery,	for	instance,	wrote	of	the	‘single	minded	devotion’	and	
‘skill,	 good	 humour	 and	 common	 sense’	 of	 the	 Control	 Commission	 staff.6	 Noel	
Annan	 reflected	 in	 his	 memoir	 that	 the	 British	 occupiers,	 unlike	 their	 American	
counterparts,	had	found	it	no	trouble	to	follow	strict	non-fraternisation	orders	given	
their	 antipathy	 to	 the	German	people.7	 These	hagiographic	 interpretations	of	 the	




who	 suggested	 that	 the	 British	 press	 had	 ‘no	 words	 poor	 enough’	 for	 Control	
Commission	 personnel.9	 But	 the	 full	 extent	 of	 this	 unforgiving	 media	 and	 public	
scrutiny,	 as	 well	 as	 its	 profound	 implications	 for	 the	 occupation	 and	 the	 Anglo-
German	relationship,	is	still	to	be	explored.	















The	 following	 chapter	 reconstructs	 the	 public	 portrayals	 of	 Britain’s	
occupation	personnel	as	they	appeared	in	the	press,	newsreels,	contemporary	books	
and	pamphlets,	feature	films,	private	correspondence,	and	official	documentation.	It	
shows	 how,	with	 initial	 official	 attempts	 to	 control	 and	 regulate	media	 reporting	
found	increasingly	wanting,	a	picture	of	the	British	occupiers	as	corrupt	and	badly-
behaved	dilettantes	soon	entered	into	the	popular	consciousness.	The	lurid	tales	of	
sex,	 drunkenness,	 money-laundering,	 black-marketeering,	 and	 exuberant	 luxury	
were	 eye-catching	 and	 newsworthy.	 These	 scandalous	 claims	 prompted	 censure	
from	the	general	public,	church	leaders,	and	politicians,	with	one	MP	suggesting	that	
there	were	‘all	too	many	of	the	wrong	people,	whose	one	aim	in	their	life	in	Germany	
is	 to	 have	 as	 good	 a	 time	 as	 possible’.10	 Likewise,	 the	 mass-market	 press	 wrote	
exposés	and	incensed	editorials,	calling	into	question	the	effectiveness	of	the	work	







Britain,	 there	were	 clear	 limitations	 to	 their	 endeavours.	 For	one,	 the	attempt	 to	
maintain	close	control	over	news	content	became	more	and	more	unacceptable	to	
journalists	 and	 editors,	 ostensibly	 infringing	 upon	 what	 one	 CCG	 (BE)	 official	
described	as	the	inviolable	‘British	belief	in	“freedom	on	information”’.11	There	was	









a	 growing	 conviction	 amongst	members	 of	 the	 press	 corps	 that	 their	 journalistic	
freedoms	were	due	reinstatement	now	the	war	was	over.	Robert	Cooper,	a	Times	








the	 year,	 when	 several	 journalists	 publicly	 protested	 a	 regulation	 requiring	 the	
anonymity	of	all	quotations	from	Military	Government	officials.	This	stipulation	was	
a	relic	of	wartime,	when	military	security	had	necessitated	that,	even	when	giving	
























There	 were	 further	 complaints	 in	 the	 press,	 with	 the	 Manchester	 Guardian	
referencing	 an	 ‘extraordinary	 attempt	 by	 British	 officials	 to	 impose	 a	 kind	 of	
censorship	on	the	Allied	press’.17	In	the	Yorkshire	Post,	Joe	Illingworth	suggested	that	
the	 ‘perpetuation	of	 the	absurdity	by	which	all	British	 statements	on	events	here	
must	 be	 attributed	 to	 “senior	 British	 officials”’,	 amounting	 in	 his	 view	 to	 ‘an	
attempted	re-imposition	of	censorship	and	a	denial	of	the	rights	of	a	free	press’.18		
There	was	a	growing	acceptance	 in	 the	PR/ISC	 that	 some	modifications	 to	
their	media	management	strategy	were	unavoidable.	It	was	increasingly	clear	that	
such	strict	 regulations	were	not	merely	 ineffective	but	counterproductive,	 inciting	
critical	 reporting	 rather	 than	 impeding	 it.	 Brigadier	 Treadwell,	 the	 CCG	 (BE)’s	
Director-General	 of	 Public	 Relations,	 remarked	with	 some	 concern	 that	 a	 packed	




officers	 and	 senior	 officials	 being	 quoted	by	 name	only	 arises	when	 they	 say	 the	



















In	 addition,	 the	 efforts	 of	 the	 PR/ISC	 to	 control	media	 reports	were	 impeded	 by	
disgruntled	members	of	the	CCG	(BE)	and	BAOR,	who	repeatedly	contravened	rules	
prohibiting	the	provision	of	information	to	the	media.		


































While	 the	 planning	 for	 the	 postwar	 occupation	 had	 been	 engrossed	 with	
grand	ideas	–	re-education,	demilitarisation,	and	denazification,	to	name	but	a	few	–	
it	had	not	escaped	the	attention	of	British	officials	that	any	such	enterprise	would	









conduct	 of	 affairs	 vis-à-vis	 the	 civil	 population’	 in	 Germany	 would	 be	 ‘totally	
different’	 than	 in	 ‘liberated,	 friendly	 territories’.24	 The	 military	 government	





nation’	 and	 that	 occupiers	were	 to	 be	 ‘just	 but	 firm	 and	 aloof’.	 As	 British	 troops	














in	 concrete	 form	 the	notion	 that	 the	German	people	were	not	 to	be	 trusted	and	










all	 four	occupying	powers.29	 In	addition,	amid	 food	shortages	and	destitution,	 the	




















The	 four	 years	 of	 Allied	 occupation	 witnessed	 a	 whole	 range	 of	 intimate	
relationships	 between	 occupiers	 and	 occupied,	 from	 casual	 sex	 to	 lifelong	
commitments.	 This	 is	 abundantly	 clear	 in	 the	 personal	 memoirs	 and	 private	
correspondence	 of	 British	 personnel.31	 In	 her	 unpublished	 memoir,	 Edna	





























into	the	same	trap	as	 in	1919:	 ‘Enemy	Told:	This	 Is	Why	We	Ignore	You’	ran	their	
triumphant	 headline.33	 On	 23	 May	 1945,	 the	Manchester	 Guardian	 published	 a	
report	on	‘Hamburg’s	Divided	Beaches’,	detailing	how	the	shores	of	the	Außenalster	
had	 been	 split	 between	 British	 and	 Germans	 in	 accordance	 with	 ‘the	 non-
fraternisation	 principle’.34	 The	 German	 girls	 could	 ‘splash	 about	 happily’	 in	 their	
‘summer	frocks	and	bathing	dresses’,	while	the	British	soldiers	could	‘bathe	without	
distraction’.	A	British	colonel	remarked	that	the	Germans	would	save	themselves	a	
great	 deal	 of	 embarrassment	 if	 they	 were	 to	 stop	 trying	 to	 fraternise,	 for	 ‘no	
























long	 before	 the	 newspapers	 were	 hot	 on	 the	 heels	 of	 a	 good	 story.	 As	 Susan	
Carruthers	 notes	 in	 her	 study	 of	 the	 American	 Zone	 of	 occupation,	 ‘the	
“unspeakable”	was	also	highly	marketable’.37	In	other	words,	sex	sells:	to	domestic	

















while	 out	 walking.40	 The	 woman,	 aged	 twenty-three,	 allegedly	 spoke	 to	 him	 in	







The	 popular	 newspaper	 cartoonists	 were	 soon	 lambasting	 the	 apparent	
futility	of	the	non-fraternisation	policy.	In	the	Daily	Express,	it	was	joked	that	school	
















a	German	woman,	mocked	 by	 two	 passing	 Tommies	 for	 causing	 ‘casualties’,	was	
symptomatic	of	a	growing	fascination	in	the	mass-market	press	with	a	caricature	of	
the	foreign	female	form.42	









In	 addition,	 numerous	 photographs	 appeared	 in	 the	 mass-market	 press	
depicting	‘fratting’	in	action,	causing	yet	more	public	outrage.	Most	of	these	images	
were	relatively	modest,	such	as	the	Daily	Mail’s	photograph	of	British	soldiers	talking	






























photographs	 in	 the	 Press	 of	 British	 troops	 “fraternizing”	 with	 half-naked	 smiling	
German	 girls’	 were	 ‘somewhat	 astonishing’.46	 They	 stood	 in	 stark	 contrast,	 he	
suggested,	to	the	shaven	heads	of	those	women	adjudged	to	have	been	too	intimate	
with	 Germans	 in	 the	 liberated	 countries	 of	 Europe.	 These	 images,	 Maxwell	
concluded,	would	damage	any	attempt	to	‘promote	that	understanding	of	and	faith	
in	Britain	which	 is	 so	desperately	needful	 if	Europe	 is	 to	 rise	once	more	 from	the	
abyss’.	 In	January	1946,	the	Marchioness	of	Huntly	would	remark	in	the	Aberdeen	
Press	and	Journal	that	she	had	‘never	found	a	word	which	produced,	both	with	the	









in	 the	Daily	Mail	 about	how	 this	was	a	problem	shared	across	 all	 the	occupation	
Zones,	rather	than	anything	peculiar	to	British	troops	–	‘boys	will	be	boys’	was	the	
missive.48	She	 insinuated	that	 it	was	an	almost	 inevitable	outcome	of	the	peculiar	
situation	of	 postwar	 Europe,	where	 the	 average	Allied	 soldier,	 battle-scarred	 and	
homesick	‘for	his	mother,	his	girl,	and	for	the	children	he	never	found	time	to	raise’,	
was	 ‘the	 loneliest	 guy	 in	 the	 world’	 with	 ‘human	 reactions’.	 In	 the	Daily	Mirror,	
George	McCarthy	took	a	slightly	different	line,	emphasising	that	‘Tommy	is	curious’	
and	just	wants	to	‘to	discover	what	kind	of	people	they	are’	and	‘to	find	out,	if	they	
can,	 why	 these	 apparently	 sane	men	 and	women	 follower	 Hitler	 into	 doom	 and	






Members	 of	 the	 occupation	 army	 were	 also	 quick	 to	 defend	 themselves	
publicly,	contending	that	they	were	guilty	of	little	beyond	good-natured	friendliness	
or	that	complaints	from	the	public	were	‘narrow-minded’.51	In	the	Daily	Mirror,	an	











anonymous	 member	 of	 the	 British	 occupation	 forces	 wrote	 a	 lengthy	 article,	










the	 German	 civvies.	 This	 situation	 surely	 cannot	 keep	 up.	 How	 will	 these	
Germans	get	to	know	our	way	of	thinking	if	we	do	not	fraternise?52	
In	addition,	the	men	of	the	BAOR	and	CCG	(BE)	were	quick	to	lay	the	blame	
on	 German	 women	 for	 their	 allegedly	 flirtatious	 behaviour.	 This	 appealed	 to	
Germanophobic	 stereotypes	 and	 incorporated	 contemporary	 (and	 misogynist)	
understandings	of	sexuality.	But	 it	was	an	excuse	that	British	officials	were	all	too	





The	British	media	also	embraced	 the	notion	 that	German	women	were	 to	
blame,	with	Evadne	Price,	war	correspondent	for	The	People,	writing	a	stern	defence	
of	 the	non-fraternisation	policy	with	 the	 subheading	 ‘we	must	hate	–	or	 lose	 the	











cent	 behind	 Adolf	 Hitler’.	 They	 exuded	 ‘feminine	 appeal’,	 with	 their	 smiles,	 silk	
stockings,	short	skirts,	and	expensive	make-up,	and	were	now	attempting	to	fool	the	
Allied	 troops	 into	 a	 false	 sense	 of	 security.	 A	 few	months	 later,	 Price	 proclaimed	
herself	to	be	‘campaigning	against	the	German	woman’,	whose	hysterical	loyalty	to	
the	 Wehrmacht	 was	 said	 to	 be	 unremitting.56	 The	 notion	 that	 the	 Nazis,	 and	
especially	Adolf	Hitler	himself,	had	emanated	a	perverse	sexual	appeal	to	German	
women	was	an	increasingly	common	trope	of	British	reporting	in	this	period.	In	June	
1945,	 both	 the	 Daily	Mirror	 and	 the	Daily	Mail	 carried	 an	 article	 lambasting	 the	
‘women	auxiliaries	of	 the	Wehrmacht’	 for	being	 ‘red-hot	anti-British’.57	The	story,	
evidently	put	out	by	PR/ISC	officials,	claimed	that	while	British	troops	were	‘putting	
up	 “a	good	 show”	 in	observing	 the	ban’,	 the	 ‘scantily	 clothed’	German	girls	were	
‘carrying	out	an	organised	plan	to	break	it’.	
But	 this	 imbroglio	 could	 not	 be	 so	 easily	 cast	 off	 simply	 as	 the	 result	 of	
entrapment	 or	 naïveté.	 In	 the	 first	 place,	 many	 in	 Britain	 felt	 that	 any	 close	
association	with	 the	Germans	was	wholly	unacceptable.	 In	 the	Daily	Mail,	 satirist	
Maurice	 Lane	Norcott	 slyly	wondered	whether	 the	 silk	 stockings	 of	 your	 average	
Fräulein	 had	 been	 ‘imported	 from	 France,	 Holland,	 Belgium,	 Denmark,	 Norway,	
Poland,	Czechoslovakia,	Yugoslavia,	or	Greece’	while	under	Nazi	occupation.58	The	
Western	Daily	Press	quoted	a	 former	 inmate	at	Ravensbrück	concentration	camp,	





















revelations	 about	 fraternisation	 contrasted,	most	 obviously,	with	 the	 increasingly	
sacrosanct	memories	of	 the	war.	Tellingly,	 there	was	widespread	coverage	of	 the	
statement	provided	by	Divisional	Officer	J.	M.	Kelly,	leader	of	the	500	members	of	
the	National	Fire	Service	who	had	been	working	temporarily	alongside	British	troops	
in	Germany.61	 The	 firemen	were,	 he	 suggested,	 ‘in	 no	 humour	 to	 fraternise	with	
Germans’	 since	 they	had	all	 ‘done	duty	during	 the	blitz’.	 Likewise,	Monty	assured	




the	 memorials	 of	 Nazi	 “military”	 bombing	 […].	 We	 [should]	 refuse	 to	 even	
acknowledge	 the	 German	 as	 a	 human	 being,	 as	 is	 defined	 in	 any	 self-respecting	
dictionary!!’.63	 In	 July	 1945,	 the	 Liverpool	 Echo	 featured	 a	 letter	 from	 ‘Three	





















with	 their	 own	 wives’,	 she	 wrote,	 before	 emphatically	 signing	 her	 letter	
‘“WATCHING”,	 Preston’.	 The	 righteous	 indignation	 of	wives	 and	 girlfriends	would	
have	a	powerful	impact	upon	public	opinion,	playing	upon	popular	expectations	of	
domesticity	and	morality.67	In	late	July,	Bristol	resident	Miss	M.	Cutts	wrote	a	letter	
to	 the	 People,	 suggesting	 that	 the	men	 found	 guilty	 of	 such	misdeeds	 should	 be	
barred	from	ever	returning	to	England:		
I	am	not	affected	personally	by	the	question	[…],	[but]	it	made	me	see	red	when	
























































Gaumont-British	News.75	 Finally,	 on	 25	 September,	 in	 conjunction	with	 the	 other	
occupying	 powers,	 it	was	 agreed	 that	 the	 non-fraternisation	 rules	would	 be	 fully	
relaxed,	 other	 than	 maintaining	 the	 ban	 on	 billeting	 with	 Germans	 and	 inter-
marriage.	In	July	of	the	following	year,	the	restrictions	on	marriages	between	British	
servicemen	and	‘alien	women,	other	than	Japanese’	were	also	lifted,	momentarily	
reviving	 the	media’s	 interest	 in	 the	 topic.76	 Between	 1947	 and	 1950,	 even	while	
exacting	stipulations	including	a	medical	exam	for	German	women	remained,	there	
were	an	estimated	10,000	Anglo-German	marriages.77	
In	 the	 British	 press,	 these	 changes	 met	 with	 some	 approval,	 including	 a	
Manchester	Guardian	editorial	 suggesting	 that	upon	reflection	 the	 ‘defeat’	of	 this	
unworkable	 policy,	 which	 stood	 ‘as	 an	 example	 of	 how	 not	 to	 go	 about	 the	
occupation	of	a	conquered	country’,	was	for	the	best:78		























into	 celibate	missionaries	 […].	 To	 say	 that	 the	 Germans	 have	 won	 their	 first	






given	official	 sanction	 to	 ‘fratting’,	 as	 intimated	by	 the	 jubilant	 reaction	of	British	
personnel	in	Germany.	BAOR	soldiers,	the	Mirror,	Mail,	and	Telegraph	all	reported,	
‘threw	their	caps	in	the	air	and	behaved	just	as	though	their	favourite	football	team	




of	 the	policy	was	 indeed	a	positive	change.	 In	 July,	Lord	Vansittart	suggested	 in	a	






husband’s	 concerns	 that	 the	 new	 laws	 tended	 ‘to	 throw	 soldiers	 into	 the	wrong	














The	 scandal	 over	 non-fraternisation	 had	 left	 an	 indelible	 mark	 on	 the	
reputation	of	 the	British	 occupation	 forces.	 In	 the	 first	 instance,	 this	 scandal	 had	
demonstrated	a	level	of	ill-discipline	that	did	not	auger	well	for	the	ultimate	success	
of	the	occupation.	But	it	was	the	threat	to	Britain’s	national	prestige	and	collective	
identity	 as	 a	morally	 righteous	people	 that	 had	 awakened	 the	 greatest	 response.	
There	 were	 those	 who	 had	 sought	 to	 temper	 popular	 anxieties,	 criticising	 the	
impracticality	of	a	total	separation	between	occupiers	and	occupied.	Yet	for	many,	
the	carnal	 image	of	unruly	British	men	tempted	by	coquettish	foreign	women	ran	
contrary	 to	 expectations	 of	 a	 ‘hard	 peace’	 and	 shamelessly	 contravened	 Britain’s	
mid-century	sense	of	decency.	This	was	fortified	by	an	antagonistic	conception	of	the	
German	 people,	 and	 particularly	 German	 women,	 as	 unrepentant	 Nazis	 and	
inheritors	of	collective	guilt	–	fraternising	with	the	enemy	was	an	insult	to	the	war’s	
many	victims.	While	the	scandal	was	itself	relatively	short-lived,	with	media	interest	
quickly	 receding	 after	 1945,	 it	 had	 established	 an	 enduring	 association	 between	
occupation	and	fraternisation.82	
In	the	coming	years,	media	and	artistic	portrayals	of	the	occupation	would	
routinely	 refer	 to	 fraternisation	 and	 sexual	 liaisons	 in	 Germany.	 There	 was,	 for	
instance,	grave	concern	over	the	sexual	health	of	the	occupation	forces,	first	outlined	
in	a	Daily	Mail	article	of	July	1946	which	warned	that	the	‘old	enemy’	of	venereal	








Wilder’s	 1948	 black	 comedy	 starring	 Marlene	 Dietrich,	 emphasised	 the	
pervasiveness	 of	 ‘fratting’	 amongst	 Allied	 troops.84	 	 The	 film,	 released	 to	 much	
acclaim	in	the	UK,	follows	Congresswoman	Phoebe	Frost	as	she	investigates,	and	gets	
caught	up	in,	the	‘moral	malaria’	of	‘fratting’	afflicting	American	troops	in	Berlin.	
The	 lasting	 impact	 of	 fraternisation	 upon	 British	 conceptions	 of	 the	











Young	men	 training	 in	Germany	 too	 often	 associate	with	&	 frequently	marry	
German	prostitutes.	 The	women	do	 it	 to	 get	 food	and	other	 comforts.	 These	
same	men	bring	the	loose	women	to	the	British	Clubs	etc	and	positively	jostle	

























While	 the	 decision	 to	 relax	 non-fraternisation	 regulations	 had	 helped	 to	
alleviate	the	public	commotion,	there	was	a	growing	sense	amongst	British	officials	





the	 British	 case,	 the	 endeavour	 to	 bring	 over	 the	 families	 of	 service	 personnel	


















the	 relocation	of	British	 families	would	make	 the	occupation	more	of	 a	 desirable	
posting.	This,	 in	 turn,	would	encourage	conscientious,	hard-working	 individuals	 to	
join	the	BAOR	and	CCG	(BE)	and	prompt	those	already	in	Germany	to	stay	on.91	It	was	








American	 Zone,	 intended	 to	 domesticate	 the	 occupation	 and	 nullify	 perceived	






















letter	 to	 the	 Times	 that	 the	 future	 of	 Europe	 depended	 on	 the	 success	 of	 the	
occupation	‘and	to	that	[…]	the	British	families	may	contribute	a	very	great	deal.’96	
But	 in	 the	 first	months	of	 the	occupation	 concerns	over	 the	difficult	 living	




of	 government	 were	 held	 regarding	 the	 possibility	 of	 relocating	 British	 wives	 to	
Germany.98	 In	 August,	 after	 a	 number	 of	 false	 dawns	 due	 to	 shortages	 of	 basic	
supplies	 and	 adequate	 housing,	 ‘Operation	 Union’	 got	 under	 way.99	 ‘Married	
Families’	(the	official	designation,	which	also	included	betrothed	couples)	were	to	be	
given	passage	to	Germany.	They	would	be	fully	integrated	into	the	British	occupation	
administration,	 provided	 with	 furnished	 accommodation,	 rations,	 entertainment,	
and	much	more	besides.		






























we	 all	 believe’.102	 The	 women,	 sporting	 Union	 Jack	 lapel	 badges	 for	 purposes	 of	
identification,	were	 sent	 on	 their	 way	 via	 train	 or	 army	 car.103	 Captain	Matthew	
Evelyn	 Wood,	 tasked	 with	 ‘conducting’	 the	 British	 wives	 on	 their	 trip	 through	
Germany,	mused	that	he	must	be	‘the	ugliest	officer	in	BAOR’	-	much	to	the	delight	
of	the	Daily	Mail.104	
In	 the	 subsequent	 weeks	 and	 months,	 hundreds	 of	 women	 and	 children	
travelled	to	Germany	aboard	the	SS	Empire	Halladale	and	SS	Empire	Trooper	-	and	
















local	papers,	 there	was	perceptible	a	degree	of	pride	 that	 local	women	had	been	






















new	 toys	 for	 the	 children.109	 The	 sounds	 of	 ‘military	 bands	 on	 a	 flag-bedecked	
dockside’	greeted	families	upon	their	arrival	in	Cuxhaven,	before	they	continued	on	
to	 their	 final	 destinations	 by	 road	 and	 rail.	 These	 trains	 were	 also	 stocked	 with	
cigarettes,	 sweets,	 and	 magazines,	 while,	 in	 the	 midst	 of	 crippling	 transport	
shortages,	it	had	been	planned	for	everyone	to	have	a	corner	seat.		
This	red-carpet	treatment	was	well-documented	in	the	press,	with	the	Times	
also	 commending	 the	 ‘marvellous	 organization’	 of	 the	 British	 authorities.110	
Gaumont-British	 and	Movietone	 each	produced	 two	newsreels,	 evidently	 sourced	
from	the	same	officially-sanctioned	footage,	documenting	the	voyage	of	the	wives	
and	 children	 and	 their	 first	 week	 in	 Germany.111	 The	 thrilling	 moment	 of	 being	

















































Yet	 these	 British	 women	 and	 children,	 whether	 they	 liked	 it	 or	 not,	 had	
entered	an	extraordinary	social	milieu	as	representatives	of	a	conquering	army.	The	
distinctive	 power	 dynamics	 of	 military	 occupation,	 conveying	 social	 status	 and	
privileges	 to	 occupiers	 over	 their	 occupied	 subjects,	was	 particularly	 acute	 in	 the	
British	 Zone.	While	 the	 relationship	 between	 rulers	 and	 ruled	 was	 by	 no	 means	
straightforward	 or	 fixed,	 the	 British	 and	 the	 Germans	 inhabited	 very	 different	
spheres.	 This	 was	 as	 true	 in	 material	 terms	 as	 any	 other,	 with	 the	 more-than-
adequate	provisions	of	entertainment,	accommodation,	and,	above	all,	food	setting	





of	 walking	 through	 ‘utter	 desolation’	 into	 the	 ‘soft	 carpets,	 comfortable	 chairs,	
spacious	restaurants	and	luxurious	bedroom	fittings’	of	a	British-only	club	was	like	
‘passing	into	another	world’.114	






Hannover,	 and	 Brunswick.	 It	 exhibited	 these	 ‘comfortably-furnished	 and	 well-










heated’	 abodes,	 along	with	 the	 new	Navy,	 Army	 and	Air	 Force	 Institutes	 (NAAFI)	
stores,	 a	 Club	 in	 Brunswick	 that	 would	 provide	 ‘recreational,	 social	 and	 helpful	
amenities’,	and	the	writing	and	reading	rooms	of	the	Hotel	Lorenz,	‘where	Hitler	used	
to	 stay’.	 The	newsreel	went	on	 to	document	a	personal	experience	of	 ‘Operation	
Union’,	talking	with	Sergeant	Major	Putland,	stationed	in	Germany,	and	his	wife,	still	
in	Luton,	who	were	soon	to	be	reunited	in	Bad	Oeynhausen.	But	it	is	the	final	segment	




that	will	 also	be	 requisitioned.	The	young	mother	 stands	 shocked	and	distraught,	
comforting	her	perplexed	son	as	she	confronts	the	reality	of	 losing	her	house	and	
most	of	her	belongings	–	and	yet	the	narrator	simply	continues	to	explain	the	positive	
implications	 for	 British	 women	 expecting	 to	 move	 to	 Germany.	 The	 spectacle	
exhibited,	with	a	sense	of	satisfaction,	the	severe	and	stern	character	of	the	British	
occupation	at	work.	
The	CCG	 (BE)	and	BAOR	ensured	 that	 the	wives	and	 families	of	 the	British	
occupation	forces	would	be	shielded	as	much	as	possible	from	the	severe	shortages	
that	 confronted	 the	 German	 people.	 In	 the	 Daily	 Mirror,	 Marguerite	 Peacocke	
detailed	 the	 ‘undreamed-of	 luxury’	 that	would	be	 found	 ‘when	 the	 Joneses	go	 to	
Germany’.116	 ‘The	whole	 attitude	of	 the	Rhine	Army	HQ’,	 she	 reported,	 ‘is	 that	 a	
private’s	wife	should	have	as	good	a	time	as	a	colonel’s’.	Thus,	all	families	would	live	
in	 a	 newly-furnished	 house	 or	 self-contained	 flat,	 complete	 with	 kitchen	 and	
bathroom,	 food,	 fuel,	and	 laundry	 ‘for	 less	 than	£3	a	week’.	This	would	be	 ‘much	
greater	 comfort	 and	 at	 less	 cost	 than	 at	 home’,	 while	 additional	 household	







expenditure	would	 also	 be	 cheaper	 given	 the	 lack	 of	 any	 purchase	 tax,	 although	
wives	were	advised	to	bring	their	own	sheets	due	to	a	shortage	in	the	British	Zone.	
Moreover,	 in	 the	various	clubs	and	cinemas	 their	 ‘pocket	money’	would	go	much	
further	than	at	home,	while	the	military	would	provide	recreational	transport.	There	
were	 even	 plans	 for	 a	 cheap	 system	 of	 domestic	 service.	 In	 addition,	 their	 food	
provisions	would	be	more	 than	comfortable,	being	entitled	 to	Auxiliary	Territorial	
Service	rations,	100	cigarettes,	and	4	oz.	of	sweets	or	chocolate	per	week,	while	extra	












three	 articles	 over	 one	week	 in	 January	 1946,	 the	Daily	Mail	 had	 explained	 that	
British	women	would	likely	find	furnishings	in	German	private	homes	to	be	‘solid	and	
Victorian,	but	clumsy’	and	the	rooms	‘probably	dark	and	over-filled	with	furniture,	
pictures	 and	 dust-collecting	 objects’.117	On	 the	 street,	 they	would	 see	 ‘more	 and	








be	 faced	with	 ‘vast	 tracts	of	 the	most	appalling	devastation’	 that	 ‘can	scarcely	be	
called	pleasant’	and	would	likely	see	hunger	and	near-starvation	in	the	streets.	Flett	






































first	 and	we	 come	 second’.121	 This	 frustration	 at	 the	 elevated	 status	 of	 ‘Married	
Families’	even	inspired	a	group	of	CCG	(BE)	women	to	voice	their	protests	publicly,	
leading	 to	 the	publication	of	stories	 in	 the	Daily	Mirror	and	Manchester	Guardian	








































and	 form	 a	 decorative	 social	 background	 to	 life	 in	 Germany’.	 Rather,	 Illingworth	
suggested	 that	 these	 women	 were	 accomplishing	 important	 work,	 taking	 the	
example	 of	 York	 resident	 Mrs	 Hartley,	 a	 graduate	 of	 Leeds	 University,	 who	 was	
organising	the	educational	syllabus	for	British	children	in	the	Zone.		
There	were	also	a	growing	number	of	stories	condemning	the	CCG	(BE)	for	




generally	efficiently	organised	 journey	 from	England	 to	Germany’,	 they	were	now	
‘finding	that	the	administration	[…]	is	beginning	to	creak’.127	‘BAOR	wives	in	tears’,	
exclaimed	 the	Nottingham	 Evening	 Post,	 explaining	 that	 some	women	 had	 been	
‘ordered	 into	 “piggeries”’	without	 tables,	 carpets,	 or	mattresses.128	 By	December	
1946,	these	logistical	problems	were	severe	enough	to	instigate	a	reduction	in	the	
number	of	wives	permitted	to	relocate	to	Germany.129	That	month,	Cyril	Dunn	wrote	
















Yet	 the	 portrayal	 of	 these	 women	 as	 over-indulged	 and	 a	 blight	 on	 the	
country’s	international	reputation	had	become	firmly	entrenched	–	raising	the	ire	of	








requisitioning	 of	 German	 houses	 to	 accommodate	 British	 families	 was	 a	 ‘crime	
against	 humanity’	 and	 not	 befitting	 a	 Labour	 administration.132	 She	 quoted	
extensively	 from	 an	 letter	 which	 had	 appeared	 in	 the	 Manchester	 Guardian,	
suggesting	 the	 British	 were	 living	 surrounded	 by	 a	 ‘wall	 of	 quite	 unnecessary	




occupation	 would	 bring	 order	 and	 composure,	 helping	 to	 ward	 off	 endemic	
fraternisation	 and	 resurrecting	 the	 public	 image	 of	 their	 personnel.	 But	 instead,	
‘Operation	Union’	 had	 seemingly	 served	 to	 further	 defame	 the	 reputation	 of	 the	
British	 occupation	 forces.	 These	 ‘Married	 Families’,	 believed	 to	 be	 living	
extravagantly	people	back	home	struggled	by,	seemed	to	be	a	hindrance	to	Britain’s	
own	recovery	and	a	burden	in	the	battle	to	‘win	the	peace’.	












namely	 the	 appropriate	 treatment	 of	 the	 German	 people	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	
occupation.	In	the	case	of	‘fratting’,	official	policy	and	public	sentiment	in	favour	of	
a	harsh,	aloof	attitude	 towards	 the	Germans	had	come	up	against	 the	 realities	of	
everyday	life.	Likewise,	‘Operation	Union’	had	prompted	fierce	disagreements	over	
the	 appropriate	 conduct	 of	 the	 British	 wives	 and	 children	 vis-à-vis	 their	 new	
neighbours.	This	included	complaints	that	the	imperial	character	of	the	relationship	




War	Office,	 and	other	 interested	departments	 to	beg	you	 to	withdraw	 forces	
families	from	these	Zones	and	repatriate	them	[…].	Nazism	is	not	dead:	every	act	
of	arrogance	and	exploitation	revives	it;	and	the	war	is	lost.134		
His	anxieties	were	 far	 from	unique:	 in	October	1946,	 the	Times	 featured	a	

















British	wives’.	The	British	 families	 in	Germany,	 they	suggested,	had	been	supplied	
with	comforts	such	as	extra	rations,	special	shops,	and	‘special	transport	facilities	to	
save	 the	 British	 wife	 from	 sitting	 near	 a	 German’	 at	 the	 great	 cost	 to	 the	 local	
populace.	The	requisitioning	of	property	amid	high	infant	mortality,	hunger	oedema,	
tuberculosis,	and	general	human	suffering	was	a	humanitarian	tragedy.	These	acts,	
they	concluded,	would	only	 serve	 to	damage	 ‘British	popularity	and	prestige’	and	












The	 tales	of	 luxury,	 she	added,	had	been	overstated:	while	 there	might	be	cheap	
champagne	at	the	NAAFI,	this	was	merely	‘one	of	the	few	fruits	of	victory’	for	women	
who	were	 ‘examples	 of	 all	 that	 an	 ambassador	 should	be’.	Ruth	 Elford,	who	was	
intending	 to	 join	 her	 husband	 in	Germany	 in	 the	 near	 future,	 also	wrote	 a	 stern	
defence	 of	 the	 British	women	 in	Germany.138	 It	was,	 she	 thought,	 hypocritical	 to	
lambast	fraternisation	with	the	Germans	and	then	also	condemn	the	scheme	to	bring	












remained	 an	 unacceptable	 indulgence.	 For	 many,	 the	 requisitioning	 of	 German	
houses,	the	provision	of	German	servants,	and	the	self-imposed	detachment	of	the	
British	occupiers	and	their	families	was	felt	to	be	more	than	justified:	Britain	had	won	











These	distinctive	 conceptions	of	how	 the	occupation	 should	be	 conducted	
















‘British	 ghetto’	 in	 Hamburg.	 The	 ‘Hamburg	 Project’	 was	 an	 ultimately	 abortive	
attempt	 by	 the	 CCG	 (BE)	 to	 construct	 a	Military	 Government	 headquarters,	 with	
provisions	to	accommodate	British	personnel	and	their	families.	It	was	suggested	in	
some	organs	of	 the	press	 that	 the	 initiation	of	such	a	project,	while	 thousands	of	
Germans	had	no	beds	and	were	now	living	in	tents,	was	the	very	definition	of	‘asking	
for	 trouble’.140	 This,	 it	 turned	out,	was	 to	be	a	prophetic	warning,	with	 the	plans	
prompting	 an	 incensed	 reaction	 amongst	 resident	 Hamburgers	 and,	 in	 turn,	 the	
British	press.	
The	immense	scale	of	destruction	in	the	major	towns	and	cities	of	the	British	
Zone	 had	 left	 the	 CCG	 (BE)	 without	 an	 identifiable	 headquarters.	 Military	
government	offices	and	compounds	were	dotted	around	the	countryside	in	smaller	
towns	like	Minden,	Lübbecke,	Herford,	and	Detmold,	where	a	larger	supply	of	intact	
buildings	 had	 been	 available	 in	 the	 summer	 of	 1945.	 The	 ‘Hamburg	 Project’	was	




British	 planners	 masterminded	 a	 scheme	 that	 would	 see	 the	 repair	 and	
modification	of	the	existing	offices	in	the	Altstadt,	as	well	as	the	construction	on	the	
north-west	 banks	 of	 the	 Außenalster	 of	 numerous	 twelve-	 and	 eight-storey	








residential	 flats	 and	 various	 theatres,	 shops,	 hotels	 and	 clubs.142	 This	 ambitious	
building	 project	 was	 intended	 for	 completion	 in	 the	 autumn	 of	 1947	 and	 would	
employ	 over	 35,000	 German	 labourers.	 These	 plans	 would,	 however,	 come	 at	 a	
considerable	 cost	 to	 the	 local	 population,	originally	 estimated	 in	 late	1945	at	 the	
demolition	of	around	750	badly-needed	houses	and	the	requisitioning	of	many	more.	
The	 result	 would	 be	 the	 re-housing	 of	 over	 30,000	 people,	 necessitating	 a	
programme	 of	 repairs	 to	 damaged	 houses	 throughout	 the	 city,	 in	 order	 to	
accommodate	 as	 few	 as	 5,000	 British	 officers	 and	 their	 families.143	 The	 imperial	
overtones	of	the	project	were	unmissable:	one	secret	memorandum	even	described	
it	as	the	creation	of	a	‘British	colony’	in	Hamburg.144	
With	 internal	 objections	 regarding	 prospective	 problems	 of	 logistics	 and	
manpower	eventually	overcome,	these	plans	were	given	the	go-ahead	in	May	1946.	
In	mid-June,	a	press	release	was	issued	by	the	PR/ISC,	informing	the	British	media	of	




to	 say	 the	 least,	 muted,	 with	 little	 residual	 interest	 from	 the	 media	 in	 the	



























according	 to	 the	 Public	 Safety	 Branch	 of	 the	 CCG	 (BE)’s	 official	 report,	 became	
‘truculent’	 and	 teetered	 on	 the	 edge	 of	 outright	 insurrection.	 The	 incensed	
Hamburgers	chanted	and	made	a	few	half-hearted	attempts	to	force	entry	into	the	
town	hall,	where	a	delegation	of	six	women	were	meeting	with	Mayor	Petersen	and	




‘knocked	off	 a	 few	hats’,	 the	 atmosphere	 had	been,	 at	 least	 temporarily,	 calmed	
without	resort	to	violence.		
























Hamburg,	 ‘a	 new	 Fascist-youth	 organisation’,	 had	 circulated	 chain	 letters	 in	
preparation	for	the	protest,	condemning	the	Mayor	and	city	council	as	‘Jews,	and	the	
tools	of	Jews’.	The	newspapers	also	noted	with	some	disbelief	the	insults	levelled	at	




Those,	 including	much	 of	 the	mass-market	 press,	 who	 had	 embraced	 the	




in	 the	 summer	 of	 1946.	 In	 fact,	 many	 of	 those	 who	 harboured	 anti-German	















general	public,	are	still	 suffering	 from	the	propaganda	of	 the	war.	They	move	
from	"Vansittartism"	to	something	which	 is	equally	wrong	at	 the	moment,	an	
attitude	of	treating	Germans	as	a	potential	Colonial	people.149	
The	 ‘Hamburg	 Project’	 was	 regarded,	 as	 such,	 as	 a	 perfectly	 reasonable	
undertaking.	 It	would	centralise	 the	administration	and	 increase	efficiency,	not	 to	
mention	provide	housing	and	amenities	for	the	British	personnel	and	their	families,	
all	in	preparation	for	a	long-term	assignment.	In	turn,	the	outright	disobedience	of	
the	 local	 populace	 was	 considered	 to	 be	 a	 worrying	 indication	 of	 the	 German	








case	 of	 postwar	 Germany.	 For	 them,	 the	 ‘Hamburg	 Project’	 was	 controversial	
precisely	because	 it	seemed	to	embody	the	British	occupation’s	quasi-imperialism	
and	apparent	disregard	for	the	humanitarian	concerns	of	the	German	people.150	The	









anger	 expressed	 by	 the	 local	 population,	 rather	 than	 a	 symbol	 of	 resurgent	
nationalism,	was	regarded	as	a	righteous	response	to	a	scandalous	proposition.		
In	late	1946,	Lord	Beveridge,	condemned	the	situation	he	had	encountered	
on	 a	 visit	 to	 Germany,	 describing	 the	 ‘conditions	 of	 life’	 for	 Germans	 as	
‘intolerable’.151	The	failed	policies	of	the	British	administration	were,	he	felt,	partly	















to	 live	 but	 holes	 in	 the	 ground,	 and	 nothing	 in	 the	 shape	 of	 a	 prospect	 of	
industrial	development,	what?	A	great	big	gin	palace	in	the	middle	of	Hamburg?	
For	what?	For	what	I	call	the	Hamburg	Poona,	for	the	British	Raj?	


























The	 British	 authorities	 in	 Germany	 decided	 to	 shelve	 the	 plan,	 on	 the	
euphemistic	account	of	‘supply	issues’,	at	the	end	of	1946.155	But	the	furore	over	the	
‘Hamburg	Project’	had	already	added	fuel	to	the	fire	of	the	growing	public	and	media	
resentment	 towards	 the	 conduct	 of	 the	 British	 occupiers.	 For	 some	 the	 angry	
response	 of	 local	 residents	 invoked	 fears	 of	 renewed	 German	 nationalism,	 while	
others	 perceived	 this	 scheme	 as	 a	 symbol	 of	 the	 imperialist	 ethos	 and	 rank	
immorality	that	stood	as	the	unfortunate	underpinning	of	the	occupation.	It	was	a	
disagreement	 that	 symbolised	 the	 ongoing	 fractures	 characterising	 the	 British	
response	to	the	Allied	occupation	and	the	fate	of	postwar	Germany.	







allegations	 of	 systemic	 corruption	 and	 criminality	 that	 threatened	 to	 further	
undermine	their	public	reputation.	The	underworld	of	postwar	Europe	would	later	
be	immortalised	in	Carol	Reed’s	1949	film	noir	The	Third	Man,	in	which	Orson	Welles	




had	 sent	 letters	 to	 the	 Control	 Commission	 seeking	 investigation	 into	 serious	
allegations	of	 fraud	 and	 corruption	 in	Germany.157	 Scotland	 Yard	detectives	were	
engaged	in	assessing	the	veracity	of	these	claims	and	public	relations	officials	warned	
that	 ‘a	 steady	 of	 stream	 of	 these	 complaints’	 should	 be	 expected	 in	 the	 British	
media.158		
The	 apparent	malpractice	 of	 industrial	 representatives	working	within	 the	
CCG	(BE)’s	administration	was	an	area	of	particular	concern.	The	British	Intelligence	
Objectives	 Sub-Committee	 (BIOS)	 had	 been	 established	 in	 1945	 to	 oversee	 the	
acquisition	of	technical	and	scientific	data	from	the	British	Zone	–	from	documents	




















made	 up	 of	 representatives	 of	 the	 perfumery	 and	 cosmetic	 industries	 including	




business,	 the	 sixty-seven-year-old	Maria	Mühlens,	who	was	 currently	 undergoing	
medical	 treatment	at	her	 temporary	home	 (her	 family	home,	described	 in	official	
reports	as	a	castle,	had	been	requisitioned).161	The	men	of	BIOS	team	1972	called	on	
her	 and,	 according	 to	 Mühlens	 and	 a	 number	 of	 observers,	 turned	 increasingly	
hostile	 at	 the	 refusal	 to	 hand	 over	 the	 secret	 formula.162	 They	 suggested	 that	
Unilever,	represented	by	A.	W.	Adam,	would	set	up	a	new	company	in	England	to	
produce	Cologne	4711	and	that	Frau	Mühlens	would	receive	a	50%	share,	provided	
she	 handed	 over	 the	 formula.	 Growing	 frustrated,	 the	 BIOS	 team	 then	 allegedly	
threatened	 Mühlens	 with	 imprisonment	 and	 the	 closure	 of	 her	 firm’s	 Cologne	
factory.		
















In	 August,	 a	Daily	 Express	 reporter	 got	 wind	 of	 the	 story	 and	 threatened	
publication,	 seeking	 immediate	assurance	 from	Military	Government	officials	 that	
the	offending	personnel	were	to	be	suspended.	The	CCG	(BE)	authorities	successfully	
rebuffed	 the	 allegations,	 contending	 that	 the	 offending	 men	 had	 never	 been	
members	of	 their	 organisation.	 Yet	while	 this	was	 technically	 true,	 behind	 closed	
doors	officials	were	concerned	that	BIOS	Investigators	would	be	‘put	in	an	invidious	












and	MPs	 for	being	 ‘too	reticent’	about	 the	 ‘condition	of	 the	administration	 in	 the	
British	Zone’.	It	was	understandable	that	nobody	wanted	to	believe	‘the	evil	of	men	
doing	 a	 difficult	 job’,	 but	 here	 was	 clear	 proof	 of	 systemic	 corruption	 and	
‘maladministration’.	












official	 investigation.166	 The	 Board	 of	 Trade	 and	 CCG	 (BE)	 reached	 opposing	
conclusions,	with	the	former	concluding	that	it	was	‘proper	for	[the	BIOS	team]	to	
make	the	enquiries	upon	which	unfavourable	Press	comment	has	been	made’	while	
condemning	 Frau	 Mühlens’s	 ‘improper	 attitude’.167	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Gilmour	
Jenkins,	a	COGA	public	relations	official,	had	‘little	doubt	that	their	behaviour	at	the	
interview	with	Frau	Mühlens	was	irregular’.168	Yet	there	was,	he	felt,	no	means	of	

































put	 across	 to	 the	British	public’.170	He	 suggested	 that	 the	 ‘attacks	on	 the	Control	
Commission’	were	‘an	admission	of	a	guilty	conscience	on	the	part	of	many	different	
groups’,	including	the	Conservative	Party	and	their	supporters	in	the	press.	The	‘great	





Yet	 Erskine’s	 assessment	 of	 British	 public	 opinion	 had	 conveniently	
overlooked	the	mounting	scandals	that	were	overshadowing	the	occupation’s	public	
image.	The	growing	evidence	of	corruption,	extravagance,	and	misbehaviour	were	
not	 merely	 fabrications,	 but	 genuine	 problems	 undermining	 the	 integrity	 and	
effectiveness	of	the	British	forces	in	Germany.	The	glaring	inability	of	the	PR/ISC	to	
effectively	 control	 news	 coverage,	 coupled	 with	 the	 renaissance	 of	 a	 staunchly	
critical	press	corps,	meant	that	these	scandals	and	misdemeanours	would	repeatedly	
make	 their	 way	 into	 the	 newspapers.	 While	 much	 of	 the	 mass-market	 press,	
specifically	 the	 Daily	 Express	 and	 Daily	 Mail,	 were	 all	 too	 happy	 to	 publish	
sensationalist	stories	that	illuminated	government	ineptitude,	they	usually	derived	
from	factual	reporting.	As	one	leading	CCG	(BE)	official	would	lament	in	1948,	the	
organisation	had	become	an	 ‘Aunt	Sally’,	with	 its	work	 ‘always	 in	danger	of	being	











stream	of	dramatic	 tales	documenting	 the	profiteering	and	criminality	 seen	 to	be	
plaguing	 the	 British	 Zone.	 In	 the	 spring	 of	 1947,	 Chief	 Inspector	 Hayward	 and	
Detective	 Inspector	 Chadburn	 of	 Scotland	 Yard,	 tasked	with	 investigating	 alleged	





goods,	 including	cutlery	sets	and	bicycles,	 to	 the	unauthorised	allocation	of	3,500	
tons	 of	 steel	 to	 German	 manufacturers.	 Ryder’s	 trial	 commenced	 in	 June	 and	
encouraged	a	 substantial	amount	of	press	 interest,	with	 the	hearing	being	widely	
regarded	as	symptomatic	of	the	crooked	dealings	that	British	officials	were	habitually	
engaged	in.175		





















questions	 were	 raised	 within	 the	 Control	 Commission	 administration	 about	 the	
‘sensational’	presentation	of	the	case	 in	the	press.176	There	were	suggestions	that	
Deputy	Military	Governor,	Brian	Robertson,	should	publicly	‘counter	the	misleading	








found	guilty	of	 corruptly	 receiving	 items,	 including	diamonds,	 sapphires,	 firearms,	
cutlery,	bicycles,	and	a	silver	cigarette	case,	in	exchange	for	business	advantages.179	
While	 this	 verdict	 would	 also	 later	 be	 overturned	 upon	 appeal,	 with	 Ryder	
successfully	 claiming	 that	 these	 gifts	 were	 acquired	 in	 the	 ‘ordinary	 course	 of	






























over’.	 He	 led	 a	 gang,	 most	 of	 whom	 were	 said	 to	 come	 from	 a	 public-school	
background,	 and	 had	 seized	 upon	 the	 occupation	 forces	 through	 bribery	 and	
intimidation.	 It	 was	 believed	 that	 ‘high-ranking	 British	 officials’	 were	 involved,	
silenced	with	bribes	from	£50,000	to	£250,000,	while	others	were	threatened	with	
violence	through	the	trickster’s	so-called	‘insurance	department’.	The	gang’s	money	
trail	was	said	to	reach	around	the	globe,	much	of	 it	 laundered	through	 legitimate	
businesses	or	siphoned	off	into	off-shore	accounts	in	Bermuda.	The	man	in	question,	
whose	whereabouts	seem	to	have	ultimately	evaded	Scotland	Yard,	was	said	to	live	
a	 life	of	 luxury	 in	hotels	across	continental	Europe.	Whether	or	not	 the	story	was	
based	in	fact	or	fantasy,	its	apparent	plausibility	speaks	volumes	about	the	ubiquity	
of	corruption	in	this	period.	












and	 CCG	 (BE)	 were	 implicated	 in	 corruption	 and	 wrongdoing.	 In	 particular,	 the	
authorities	 felt	pressed	 to	 instigate	numerous	 inquiries	 into	 the	disappearance	of	
treasured	art,	furniture,	and	other	valuable	 items	from	the	estates	of	the	German	
aristocracy.	 In	 July	1947,	 the	Daily	Mail	 reported	on	an	 investigation	 into	 the	 lost	
treasures	 of	 Prince	 Ernst-Wolrad	 zu	 Schaumburg-Lippe’s	 requisitioned	 Schloss	
Bückeburg.183	 This	 case	 incriminated	 leading	 figures	 in	 the	military	 government’s	
administrative	hierarchy,	including	Sholto	Douglas,	Military	Governor	of	the	British	
Zone	 since	 May	 1946.	 It	 was	 alleged	 that	 various	 figures,	 including	 Air	 Officer	
Commanding	 Vice-Marshal	 Sir	 Arthur	 Coningham,	 Permanent	 Under-Secretary	 of	
State	 for	 the	 Foreign	 Office	 (German	 Section)	 William	 Strang,	 Chairman	 of	 the	
Economic	Control	Office	for	the	British	and	American	Zones	of	Germany	Sir	Gordon	
Macready,	 and	 Sholto	 Douglas’s	 wife,	 Lady	 Douglas,	 had	 taken	 huge	 amounts	 of	
furniture,	cutlery,	and	other	household	items	to	add	princely	charm	to	new	abodes	
across	 Germany,	 along	 with	 Coningham’s	 villa	 in	 Cannes.184	 The	 story	 irked	
representatives	of	both	the	press	and	British	administration,	helping	to	ensure	that	






















societal	 norms	 of	 law	 and	 order	 catalysed	 a	 ubiquitous	 shift	 towards	 the	 barter	
economy.	For	many	Germans,	there	were	few	means	of	survival	other	than	acquiring	
food	 and	 other	 basic	 resources	 through	 such	 trades.	 Yet	 for	 members	 of	 the	
occupation	forces,	the	trade	of	looted	goods,	knickknacks,	food,	alcohol,	and	much	
else	besides	was	altogether	more	opportunistic.	Scores	of	Allied	soldiers	and	civilian	
administrators	 seized	 their	 chance	 to	 enrich	 themselves	 during	 their	 time	 as	
occupiers.		
The	 British	 media	 and	 public	 showed	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 interest	 in	 postwar	
Germany’s	 black	 market,	 not	 least	 because	 of	 the	 shortages	 and	 rationing	 that	
remained	a	 feature	of	everyday	 life	 in	austerity	Britain.188	The	evidence	of	British	
personnel	 seeking	 personal	 gain	 and,	 in	 the	 process,	 potentially	 threatening	 the	
success	 of	 a	 hard-earned	 peace,	was	 bound	 to	 cause	 a	 stir.	 In	 August	 1945,	 The	
Sunderland	Daily	Echo	and	Shipping	Gazette	featured	an	article	by	Ferdinand	Tuohy	
condemning	 the	 ‘racketeering	 in	Germany’	as	a	 ‘flaw	of	 the	occupation’	 that	was	
damaging	the	‘prestige	and	self-respect’	of	the	occupiers.189	The	writer,	an	author	
and	former	Daily	Mail	correspondent,	suggested	that	too	much	 interest	had	been	


















established	 themselves	 as	 the	 currency	 du	 jour.190	 As	 Lieutenant-Colonel	 Byford-
Jones	wrote	in	his	Berlin	Twilight,	‘only	an	infinitesimal	proportion	of	cigarettes	were	
smoked’	in	occupied	Germany,	passed	instead	from	person	to	person	at	a	profit.191	
Allied	 occupiers	 of	 all	 nations	 suddenly	 found	 themselves	 in	 the	 advantageous	
position	of	being	de	facto	suppliers	of	capital	–	Germany’s	new	central	bank.192	They	
could,	and	did,	spend	their	expansive	supplies	of	Camels,	Lucky	Strikes,	and	Players	




arrived	 from	home	 (usually	avoiding	customs	duty).194	They	were	 in	a	particularly	
profitable	situation,	able	to	sell	their	vast	allocation	of	cigarettes	(or	other	goods)	to	
Germans	 in	 exchange	 for	Marks.	 Then,	 as	Germany’s	 otherwise	 defunct	 currency	
remained	legal	tender	at	the	British	Army’s	NAAFI	stores,	this	money	could	be	used	
































a	 sad	 proportion	 of	 the	 occupying	 armies	 are	 playing	 a	 shameful	 part	 in	
encouraging	 the	 rot.	 Too	 many	 are	 exploiting	 for	 financial	 gain	 the	 material	
needs	of	this	conquered	people.	Too	many	are	prostituting	their	women	and	girls	
by	giving	way	to	lust	and	easy	temptation.	Unless	it	pulls	itself	together,	Rhine	









Army,	 as	 well	 as	 other	 Britishers,	 will	 leave	 a	 shameful	 heritage	 behind	 in	
Germany	[…].	I	tell	you	that	it	is	a	Frankenstein	we	are	creating.198	

















of	 Commons.	 Labour	MP	 James	Hudson	was	 amongst	 those	who	 expressed	 their	
objections,	describing	this	‘merry	game’	as	‘utter	dishonesty	carried	on	at	the	public	
expense’.202	 In	 the	 first	 two	 years	 of	 the	 occupation,	 there	 were	 several	 heated	
debates	in	which	government	ministers	were	pressed	on	the	measures	being	taken	
to	halt	the	wanton	corruption.	Secretary	of	State	for	War	Frederick	Bellenger	was	












emerged	 in	 tandem	 with	 rising	 levels	 of	 venereal	 disease.203	 But	 while	 the	
government	 remained	 defensive,	 decrying	 attacks	 as	 ‘cheap	 political	 publicity’,	
officials	in	London	and	Germany	were	well	aware	that	things	had	to	change.204	In	the	
following	months,	official	announced	obligatory	‘Leadership	Courses’,	reduced	liquor	
supplies,	 ‘homelier	 messes’,	 the	 termination	 of	 600	 CCG	 (BE)	 contracts,	 and	 the	
establishment	of	a	Criminal	Investigation	Department	in	conjunction	with	Scotland	







August	 1946,	 for	 instance,	 five	 Control	 Commission	 officers	were	 found	 guilty	 of	


















martial	of	bartering	cigarettes,	 flour,	 sugar,	 tea,	 tobacco,	and	coffee	 for	marks.208	
Peter	Stainer,	described	in	the	Daily	Mail	as	a	‘wealthy	Briton’	and	‘Lord	of	3	manors’,	
was	sentenced	to	four	years	of	penal	servitude	and	a	£1,000	fine	in	July	1946	for	his	







































him	 in	German	when	he	could	only	provide	cigarettes.	 ‘I	was	 furious’,	he	claimed	
‘sometimes	 I	 have	 a	 temper	 which	 is	 very	 hasty	 and	 I	 stop	 at	 nothing’.	 Jones	
proceeded	to	shoot	the	defenceless	Lehman	in	her	back,	before	dragging	the	corpse	
through	 the	 wood,	 removing	 her	 wedding	 ring,	 and	 concealing	 the	 body	 under	
bracken.	 He	 then	 attempted	 to	 clear	 the	 blood	 trail	 and	 cover	 his	 tracks,	 before	
returning	to	the	cottage.	Jones	had	evaded	capture	by	returning	to	England,	waiting	
until	1949	to	decide	that	he	wanted	‘a	fresh	start	in	life’	and	ought	to	‘get	it	off	[his]	




Beyond	 outright	 criminality,	 many	 of	 the	 British	 occupiers,	 with	 newly-
acquired	reserves	of	money	and	 luxury	goods	alongside	sizeable	official	 rations	of	
food,	cigarettes,	and	alcohol,	came	to	exude	a	culture	of	excess	and	indulgence.	For	





























ice	 cream,	 all	 accompanied	 with	 brandy,	 wine,	 and	 coffee.216	 ‘THE	 FOOD?!!!	 It’s	
amazing!!’,	Edna	Wearmouth	exclaimed	in	one	letter	home	to	her	father,	‘in	England,	





of	 the	 magazine’s	 Berlin	 correspondent.	 This	 report	 focused	 on	 the	 exuberant	
festivities	of	the	British	occupation	staff,	who:		
after	a	Bacchanalian	feast	of	turkey	and	trimmings,	cooked	by	hungry	Germans	


























have-nots	characterised	 life	 in	postwar	Germany,	entrenched	 in	 imperial	attitudes	
and	 paternalism.	 Victor	 Gollancz	 was	 foremost	 amongst	 the	 critics	 of	 such	 an	
injurious	state	of	affairs,	furiously	condemning	the	‘Herrenvolk	atmosphere’	alleged	
to	 be	 pervading	 the	 British	 Zone.221	 For	 Gollancz,	 the	 stark	 contrast	 with	 the	
pervasive	hunger	and	near-starvation	of	the	German	people	was	acutely	problematic	
–	and	yet	further	proof	of	Britain’s	ongoing	moral	decay.		
Nor	 was	 it	 only	 the	 ‘soft	 peace’	 campaigners	 who	 took	 umbrage	 at	 the	
questionable	conduct	of	 the	British	occupiers.	Their	public	portrayal	as	racketeers	
and	‘spivs’,	living	extravagantly	and	actively	damaging	Britain’s	prestige	on	the	world	




report	 her	 distaste	 at	 stories	 she	 had	 heard	 from	 ‘a	well-informed	 person	 in	 the	
British	Zone’.222	The	occupying	forces,	she	alleged,	were	‘living	in	the	lap	of	luxury,	
food	and	wine’,	attending	parties	every	night	in	their	clubs,	driven	around	by	clueless	
ill-informed	 English	 chauffeurs,	 and	 all	 the	 while	 ‘British	 name	 and	 justice’	 were	
‘being	dragged	in	the	mud	[…]	no	wonder	the	German’s	[sic]	hate	us.’	




















issued	as	a	preventative	measure.223	 The	Treasury	estimated	 in	 July	1947	 that	an	
astonishing	 £59,000,000	 had	 been	 lost	 to	 this	 ‘illicit	 currency	 dealing’.224	 Yet	 the	
problems	 did	 not	 cease	 there,	 with	 the	 illegal	 trade	 in	 cigarettes	 continuing	 and	
British	 Zone	 petrol	 coupons	 being	 sold	 illicitly.225	 BAFSVs	 were	 themselves	




had	 become	 a	 major	 political	 issue,	 with	 growing	 concern	 that	 the	 military	
government	was	 simply	 too	expensive	 to	maintain	 in	 its	 current	 form.	The	 spring	
budget	 of	 1946	 had	 brought	 to	 light	 Britain’s	 growing	 financial	 commitment	 in	
Germany,	 with	 the	 announcement	 of	 an	 £80,000,000	 annual	 outlay	 generating	
widespread	criticism	in	the	press.227	The	reports	that	£10,000,000	had	already	been	














written	 off,	 with	 another	 £20,000,000	 potentially	 lost,	 were	 splashed	 across	
newspapers	and	condemned	as	‘paying	reparations	to	Germany’.		
The	 mass-market	 press,	 and	 particularly	 the	 Daily	 Mail,	 grew	 ever	 more	
critical	of	the	mounting	expenditure	being	levied	upon	the	British	taxpayer	in	order	
to	feed	the	German	people.228	In	late	1946,	it	was	announced	that	the	British	would	
















The	 British	 Zone	 of	 occupied	 Germany,	 as	 with	 all	 the	 Allied	 Zones,	 had	
witnessed	a	liberalisation	of	moral	norms	which	not	only	led	to	illicit	sexual	relations	
with	 the	 local	 populace,	 but	 also	 encouraged	 extravagance,	 revelry,	 and	
racketeering.	 British	 personnel	 and	 their	 families	 enjoyed	 relative	 luxury,	 well-









and	 fine	dining.	British	occupiers	 also	 sought	out	 their	own	 share	 in	 the	 spoils	of	




procurement	 of	 gold	 watches	 to	 the	 theft	 of	 royal	 jewels,	 the	 British	 Zone	 of	
occupation	soon	became	irretrievably	associated	with	corruption	and	intrigue.		
The	 assortment	 of	 adverse	 and	 contentious	 news	 that	 emerged	 from	 the	
British	Zone	of	occupied	Germany	had	helped	to	convey	the	image	of	an	unruly	and	
immoral	 force	 of	 occupiers	 who	 were	 damaging	 Britain’s	 prestige.	 They	 were,	
moreover,	 worsening	 Britain’s	 perilous	 financial	 situation,	 with	 their	 misdeeds	
costing	 the	 hard-pressed	 British	 taxpayer.	 These	 apparent	 shortcomings	







There	 was,	 in	 short,	 growing	 uncertainty	 amongst	 the	 British	 public	 and	
media	as	to	whether	Britain	was	indeed	‘winning	the	peace’.	By	1947,	the	CCG	(BE)	
















political	 figure,	whose	 overriding	 priority	was	 the	 reduction	 of	 costs	 in	Germany,	
starting	with	the	integration	of	the	London	end	of	the	administration	into	the	Foreign	




































the	 course	 of	 attempts	 to	 resolve	 the	 ‘German	 Problem’.	 ‘It	 is	 only	 too	 clear’,	
remarked	one	PR/ISC	official	in	May	1947,	‘that	no	one	in	England	knows	very	much	
about	what	is	going	on	in	Germany’.2	


























permitted	 to	 ‘tell	 its	 own	 story’	 through	 in-house	 media	 productions	 such	 as	
exhibitions,	 films,	 and	written	publications.	 It	was	 envisioned	 that	 these	publicity	
channels,	under	 the	editorial	 control	of	British	authorities,	would	 revise	 the	news	





approach.4	 This	 strategy	 corresponded	 with	 the	 Labour	 government’s	 growing	














commitment	 to	 public	 information	 dissemination,	 regarded	 as	 an	 important	 and	
under-utilised	tool	in	the	creation	of	a	better	society.5	It	also	aligned	with	the	PR/ISC’s	













the	 harsh	 realities	 of	 occupying	 a	 war-torn	 country:	 the	 mounting	 costs	 of	
maintaining	the	occupation	and	feeding	the	German	people	were	ripe	to	provoke	
criticism	 in	 Britain.	 In	 late	 1945,	 PR/ISC	 officials	were	 justifiably	 anxious	 that	 the	
government’s	April	budget,	which	would	publicise	the	extent	of	expenditure	for	the	
first	 time,	was	 likely	 to	give	the	public	 ‘a	shock’.6	At	 the	same	 juncture,	stories	of	



























Control	 in	 its	 Oxford	 Street	 venue,	 held	 in	 conjunction	 with	 the	 London	 Victory	
Celebrations	one	year	on	from	VE	Day.	A	‘Popular	Room’	held	the	main	attractions,	




British	 Zone	 live	 by	 teleprinter	 illustrated	 the	 ongoing	 work	 of	 the	 Control	


























The	 influence	 of	 the	 wartime	 debate	 was	 palpable,	 with	Germany	 Under	
Control	espousing	a	chiefly	historical	narrative.14	The	 full	 script	of	 the	exhibition’s	




















displays	 was	 over	 12,000	 words	 in	 length,	 beginning	 with	 a	 chronological	






the	 most	 unrestrained	 German	 reactionaries	 and	 militarists’.	 There	 was	 no	
concealing	 the	purported	depth	of	Nazi	 acculturation,	 the	popularity	of	 the	Third	
Reich,	or	‘the	inherent	autocratic	mind	of	the	German’.		
At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 exhibition	 sought	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 potential	
corrigibility	 of	 the	 German	 people,	 under	 the	 watchful	 supervision	 of	 the	 British	
occupiers.	In	fact,	the	general	theme	of	the	exhibition,	as	exemplified	on	its	poster,	





In	 accordance	 with	 the	 accompanying	 London	 Victory	 Celebrations,	 and	
perhaps	also	in	anticipation	of	the	public’s	predispositions,	the	Second	World	War	
took	 centre	 stage.	 The	 sacrifices	 and	 glories	 of	 wartime	 were	 deliberately	
appropriated	 to	 draw	 in	 crowds	 and	 challenge	 critical	 interpretations	 of	 the	
occupation.	 This	 included	 numerous	 exhibits	 somewhat	 peripheral	 to	 the	
overarching	theme	of	occupying	Germany,	such	as	the	Bronze	Eagle	from	the	Reich	
Chancellery,	Hitler’s	personal	standard,	and	a	full	range	of	German	medals	issued	by	











and	 his	 deputy	 Brian	 Robertson.16	Germany	 Under	 Control’s	 ambition	 to	 counter	
press	criticism,	challenge	misinformation,	and	publicly	legitimise	the	work	of	the	CCG	
(BE)	was	 abundantly	 clear	 in	 these	 addresses.	 Sholto	Douglas	 lamented	 that	 ‘the	
magnificent	 work	 that	 had	 already	 been	 done	 by	 the	 Control	 Commission	 is	 not	
always	properly	appreciated	at	home’,	even	though	it	was	‘an	achievement	of	which	





there	was	 ‘no	 precedent	 in	 human	 history’.	 These	 undertakings	were,	moreover,	
being	accomplished	with	‘no	less	credit	by	our	men	and	women	in	Germany	than	the	
military	 victory	 itself’.	 Hynd	 was	 also	 keen	 to	 stress	 that	 despite	 forthcoming	
challenges	there	could	be	no	repeat	of	the	Control	Commission	1919-30:		

























short	 of	 initial	 projections,	 partly	 due	 to	 organisational	 deficiencies	 which	 had	
restricted	the	number	of	visitors	that	could	be	safely	admitted,	it	was	regarded	within	
the	PR/ISC	as	something	of	a	triumph.19	In	addition,	press	coverage	augmented	the	
scope	of	 the	exhibition’s	 impact,	with	a	number	of	national	and	 local	newspapers	
reiterating	 information	 on	 display.	 Some	 reports	 even	 quoted	 lead	 organiser	
Brigadier	 Campbell’s	 outlandish	 remark	 that	 ‘the	 task	 undertaken	 by	 the	 Control	
Commission	was	the	greatest	enterprise	this	nation	had	ever	set	its	hand	to.’20		








































It	 was	 clear,	 moreover,	 that	 the	 exhibition	 had	 received	 notice	 from	








relations	 exercise,	 not	 least	 its	 relatively	 modest	 scale.	 A	 single	 exhibition	 could	
hardly	be	expected	to	compete	with	the	powerful	aggregate	influence	of	the	most	



























concerned	 that	visitors	 seemed	 to	be	 leaving	wondering	exactly	what	Britain	was	
gaining	from	the	occupation.26	 In	addition,	a	design	flaw	had	helped	to	endorse	a	
particularly	 damaging	 misconception.	 Displays	 comparing	 ration	 quotas	 were	
intended	to	reassure	visitors	that	British	austerity	rations	were	much	more	generous	
than	the	meagre	allowances	given	to	the	Germans.	Yet	due	to	an	ambiguity	in	the	
arrangement	 of	 the	 exhibit,	 many	 visitors	 left	 with	 the	 opposite	 impression	 and	
openly	questioned	why	they	were	paying	taxes	to	provide	their	defeated	foe	with	
such	generous	allowances.27		




































Movement	 and	 long-term	 contributor	 to	 CFU	 productions.	 He	 had	 gained	 a	
reputation	 as	 an	 expert	 filmmaker	 whose	 cinematic	 articulation	 of	 a	 heroic	 but	
reserved	patriotism	had	widespread	appeal.31	Jennings’s	oeuvre	included	iconic	films	























to	 the	 advantage	 of	 the	 CCG	 (BE).33	 This	 attempt	 to	 temper	 popular	 anxieties	
reiterated	 the	 unconditional	 defeat	 of	 Germany	 whilst	 advancing	 public	
understanding	of	the	work	of	the	Control	Commission	and	its	implications.34	








To	 these	 probing	 questions	 the	 stern	 voice	 of	 narrator	 William	 Hartnell	 speaks	
authoritatively:	‘Well,	a	lot	of	Germany	is	dead	[…].	At	the	finish,	life	in	Germany	just	
ran	down,	 like	 a	 clock’.	 This	 is	 accompanied	by	 images	demonstrating	Germany’s	
overwhelming	physical	and	social	destruction.	The	tone	is	set	at	once	and	given	even	
greater	dramatic	 emphasis	 through	Guy	Warrack’s	dramatic	musical	 composition:	
Germany	is	utterly	vanquished.35	

















British	were	 shown	 to	 be	 primarily	 concerned	with	 neutralising	 any	 potential	 for	
future	 military	 aggression	 and	 political	 extremism.36	 Their	 intervention	 was	
characterised	 as	 magnanimous,	 pragmatic,	 and	 self-interested:	 ‘our	 Military	










economic	 prowess.	 It	 amounted	 to	 a	 self-congratulatory	 reflection	 on	 the	
comprehensiveness	 of	 Britain’s	 victory.	 This	 was	 reflected	 in	 many	 of	 the	 film’s	
reviews,	with	the	Daily	Worker’s	critic	taken	aback	by	the	powerful	effect	of	its	visual	
representation	of	utter	devastation	and	longed	for	an	even	‘wider,	deeper	approach’	









and	crushed	aggressiveness,	of	a	country	so	 lost	 it	 is	ripe	for	anything’.40	The	Star	
commended	 the	 film	 for	 showing	 the	 ‘grim	panorama	of	destruction	and	 ruin,	 of	
shattered	 industries,	 of	 tattered	 people	 living	 in	 cellars	 and	 searching	 for	 lost	
relatives,	crowding	limited	transport	and	working	amid	incredible	conditions.’41		
A	 Defeated	 People	 is	 an	 impressive	 and	 artistically	 valuable	 film	 which	
exemplifies	the	PR/ISC’s	endeavour	to	engage	public	support	and	raise	awareness	of	
the	British	occupation.	Yet	much	like	Germany	Under	Control	it	can	hardly	be	said	to	


























The	 BBC,	 and	 specifically	 the	 network’s	 prolific	 and	 ubiquitous	 radio	
programming,	 offered	 another	 fruitful	means	 for	 broadcasting	 officially	 endorsed	
messages	to	a	large	audience.43	Producing	radio	shows	was	less	time-consuming	and	
costly	 than	 capturing	 and	 editing	 motion	 pictures,	 and	 the	 format	 remained	
incredibly	popular	across	Britain.	In	addition,	it	was	a	broadcast	medium	that	in	many	
ways	leant	itself	to	a	more	pedagogical,	informative	style	of	broadcast,	as	had	been	
achieved	 to	 great	 effect	 during	 the	war	 itself.	 But,	most	 importantly,	 as	 a	 public	
broadcaster,	the	BBC	was	amenable	to	close	editorial	oversight	from	state	officials	–	
especially	with	regards	to	Britain’s	foreign	affairs.44	The	PR/ISC	hoped	to	utilise	the	





























BBC	 show	World	Affairs,	 broadcast	 in	 January	 1947.	 This	 recording	 conveyed	 the	
message	that	the	overriding	goal	of	occupation	was	the	establishment	of	‘conditions	
for	 lasting	 peace	 in	 Europe’,	 primarily	 through	 demilitarisation	 and	
democratisation.46	It	was	important,	he	stressed,	that	‘we	all	need	to	be	very	level	
headed	 in	 our	 dealings	 with	 Germany	 and	 the	 Germans	 […].	 We	 must	 avoid	











while	 correcting	 distortions	 in	 the	 press.	 A	 few	 weeks	 after	 Sholto	 Douglas’s	
appearance	 on	 World	 Affairs,	 Brian	 Robertson,	 as	 Deputy	 Military	 Governor,	
recorded	another	talk	that	once	again	promoted	the	establishment	of	the	Bizone	as	
a	means	of	reducing	expenditure.47	Later	in	the	year,	Air-Vice	Marshal	Davidson	led	














emphasise	 the	 CCG	 (BE)’s	 successes	 and	 highlight	 the	 ‘50%	 cut	 in	 numbers	 and	
consequent	reduction	in	the	expense	which	the	British	taxpayer	has	to	bear’.48	In	late	
1947,	Major	General	 Bishop	was	 tasked	with	directly	 responding	 to	 claims	 in	 the	
press	that	the	work	of	Royal	Engineers	in	Germany	to	demolish	military	structures	
had	been	left	unfinished.49		





evolved	a	 reputation	as	an	organ	of	government	opinion	 regarding	 foreign	affairs	
and,	as	such,	there	was	bound	to	be	a	good	deal	of	scepticism	regarding	the	reliability	
of	these	claims	about	the	occupation.50	In	addition,	the	challenges	of	working	with	
an	 independent	 broadcaster	 (albeit	 a	 state-run	 one)	 could	 create	 significant	





















headaches.	 In	 the	 aftermath	 of	 a	 conflict	 in	 which	 propaganda	 had	 played	 an	
unprecedentedly	 prominent	 part,	 and	 in	 the	midst	 of	 a	 developing	war	 of	words	
between	East	and	West,	there	was	a	great	deal	of	uncertainty	over	the	legitimate	
role	of	peacetime	official	information	and	propaganda.		
While	 the	 BBC	 accommodated	 the	 CCG	 (BE)’s	 programming	 requests	 and	






permission	 to	 record	 the	broadcast	but,	 as	 ever,	 requested	 consultation	over	 the	
script.51	 Wilmott’s	 recording	 offered	 a	 personable	 insight	 into	 the	 Christmas	




when	 a	 test	 broadcast	 (recorded	 in	 case	 the	 live	 link	 failed)	 was	 provided	 for	
evaluation.	 It	noted	 that	 ‘Operation	Woodpecker’	had	 instigated	major	protest	 in	
Germany,	 where	 it	 was	 feared	 deforestation	would	 create	 a	 dust	 bowl,	 and	 had	
already	been	‘extensively	used	as	propaganda	against	us’	–	any	reawakening	of	the	











centred	on	 the	prospect	of	antagonising	Germans,	 it	was	also	apparent	 that	 their	
principal	source	of	concern	was	the	potential	damage	that	this	programme	could	do	
to	Anglo-Soviet	relations.	The	various	interviewees	had	made	‘attacks	by	innuendo	
on	 [the]	 administration	 of	 [the]	 USSR’,	 including	 the	 Latvian	 Valda	 Dreimanis’s	









dispute	 escalated,	 with	 officials	 at	 the	 Foreign	 Office	 (German	 Section)	






















corresponding	 with	 William	 Haley,	 Director	 General	 of	 the	 BBC.56	 The	 state	
broadcaster	was	forced	to	launch	an	internal	review	and,	despite	the	arguments	of	
Chester	 Wilmott	 that	 it	 was	 important	 to	 report	 the	 ‘truth’	 about	 tree-felling	






and	vaguely-defined	 relationship	 that	 the	CCG	 (BE),	and	other	official	bodies,	had	
with	the	state	broadcaster.	Reflecting	on	the	furore,	Col.	I.	C.	Edwards,	deputy	chief	
of	 PR/ISC,	wrote	 to	Eric	Underwood,	head	of	 Information	 Services	Division	 in	 the	
Foreign	Office,	 to	 recommend	 that	greater	powers	of	veto	were	 required.	59	 ‘This	
HQ’,	he	argued,	‘should	be	in	a	position	to	insist	on	deletion	of	any	portion	of	such	
items	which	are	not	 in	 complete	accord	with	 the	 current	policy	 in	Germany’.	But	
while	Underwood	agreed	in	principle,	he	emphasised	the	limitations	placed	upon	the	
PR/ISC	when	ceding	any	editorial	control:	

































were	 newspapers	 journalists	 or	 editors	 by	 trade.	 But	more	 pressingly,	 it	was	 the	
damaging	 critiques	 of	 the	 press	 that	 they	 so	 urgently	 seeking	 to	 counteract.	 In	
response,	 the	 PR/ISC	 established	 British	 Zone	 Review,	 an	 in-house	 magazine	




such	 a	 publication,	 combined	 with	 total	 editorial	 authority,	 offered	 a	 potentially	
powerful	 means	 of	 information	 dissemination.	 British	 Zone	 Review	 would	 be	











the	 magazine’s	 editorial	 board	 noted,	 it	 intended	 ‘to	 be	 a	 really	 re-educative	
publication.	By	 re-educative	 I	 do	not	only	mean	 for	 the	Germans,	but	also	of	 the	
British	attitude	towards	their	own	task	in	Germany.’62		
Military	Governor	Brian	Robertson	remarked	in	1949	that	BZR	had	become	
the	 CCG	 (BE)’s	 ‘shop	 window’,	 offering	 a	 ‘review	 of	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 Control	
Commission’	intended	to	emphasise	‘the	difficulties	of	CCG’s	job	and	illustrate	what	
the	 job	 is’.63	 	 The	 magazine	 featured	 an	 array	 of	 articles	 on	 all	 aspects	 of	 the	
occupation,	 some	 offering	 a	 light-hearted	 emphasis	 on	 social	 experiences	 while	
others	exhibited	a	more	plainly	political	tone.	In	addition,	there	were	a	number	of	
regular	 columns	 including	 items	 such	 as	 soldiers’	 letters,	 interviews	 with	 British	
journalists	stationed	in	the	Zone,	profiles	of	German	officials,	articles	by	commanding	
officers,	 photograph	 compendiums,	 and	 a	 padre’s	 page.	 In	 sum,	 it	 presented	 an	






























The	 BZR’s	 editorial	 board	 habitually	 discussed	 increasing	 the	 scope	 and	






























taking	a	 strong	political	 line	did	not	prevent	 the	magazine	 from	encountering	 the	
chagrin	of	other	branches	of	the	CCG	(BE).	In	fact,	by	1949	the	Political	Division	were	













that,	 with	 MPs,	 government	 officials,	 and,	 most	 importantly,	 newspaper	 editors	
receiving	copies	of	 the	publication,	 it	made	some	 imprint	upon	 the	public	debate	


























immorality,	 greed,	 and	 misconduct.	 With	 PR/ISC’s	 attempts	 to	 redirect	 media	
coverage	 and	 resurrect	 their	 organisation’s	 public	 image	 faltering,	 the	 British	
occupation	had	acquired	a	rotten	reputation.	This	was	only	worsened	by	the	news	of	
































were	 said	 to	 be	 blighting	 NAAFI	 and	 UNRRA	 stores,	 with	 which	 a	 ‘hopelessly	
understaffed’	British	police	force	battled.	Finally,	Blore’s	commentary	poured	scorn	
on	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 personnel	 hired	 by	 the	 Control	 Commission,	 who	 were	
antagonising	 the	 Germans	 rather	 than	 acting	 as	 representatives	 of	 British	














both	world	wars	 and	both	Control	Commissions,	warning	 that	 the	 same	mistakes	
were	 being	 repeated:	 the	 British	 were	 proceeding	 as	 the	 Nazis	 had	 done	 across	
Europe	rather	than	demonstrating	‘OUR	way	of	living’.	The	result,	he	believed,	was	




dump	 situated	 outside	 one’s	 house,	 upon	 which	 a	 family	 of	 beggars	 live	 at	 the	
homeowner’s	 expense.75	 The	 country	 was	 ‘one	 large	 malodorous	 rubbish	 heap’,	
costing	British	taxpayers	£80,000,000	a	year	and	soon	to	be	yet	more.	The	CCG	(BE),	
said	to	be	known	colloquially	as	‘Complete	Chaos,	Germany’,	was	an	‘unwieldy,	over-




often	 recognised	 as	 a	 hinge	 in	 the	 history	 of	 Britain’s	 twentieth	 century,	 saw	 a	
postwar	readjustment	of	 the	nation’s	overseas	commitments.76	British	obligations	
across	 the	 world	 were	 increasingly	 unsustainable,	 with	 the	 new	 US	 loan	 being	
consumed	 ‘at	 a	 reckless,	 and	 ever-accelerating	 speed’.77	 The	 anti-colonial	
insurgencies	 in	 India	 and	 Palestine,	 coupled	 with	 the	 worst	 winter	 since	 1881,	









of	commitments	around	the	globe,	 including	 in	Germany,	worsened	British	 labour	
shortages.79	 It	was	 a	 desperate	 predicament,	with	 the	 Labour	 government	 under	
sustained	domestic	pressure	to	reduce	currents	levels	of	spending.80	This	was	despite	
the	 growing	 threat	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 the	 ongoing	 uncertainty	 regarding	
America’s	long-term	commitment	to	Europe.81	
In	the	spring	of	1947,	British	policymakers	opted	to	withdraw	funding	from	
Greece	 and	 Turkey,	 an	 admission	 of	 weakness	 that	 provoked	 a	 response	 from	
American	 policymakers.82	 By	 the	 Moscow	 Council	 of	 Foreign	 Ministers	 in	 March	
1947,	the	US	domestic	political	scene	had	changed,	with	mid-term	elections	bringing	
an	 anti-Soviet	 Republican	majority	 to	 congress.83	 This,	 combined	with	 the	 power	
vacuum	left	in	Greece	and	Turkey,	prompted	President	Truman	to	ask	Congress	for	























when	 Bevin	 launched	 his	 anti-Soviet	 crusade	 in	 the	 House	 of	 Commons	 and,	
subsequently,	on	 the	BBC.87	This	delay	was	partly	a	product	of	ongoing	Cold	War	






as	 symbolised	 by	 the	 publication	 of	 the	 Keep	 Left	 pamphlet	 in	May	 1947	 which	
rejected	 Soviet	 and	 American	 domination	 and	 advocated	 a	 ‘third	 force’	 United	
Nations.91		
The	result	of	the	delay	in	publicising	the	British	government’s	new	Cold-War	
orientation	 was	 the	 perpetuation	 of	 an	 ever-more	 pronounced	 gulf	 between	
publicly-espoused	 official	 policy	 and	 actual	 diplomatic	 priorities.92	 There	 was,	 in	
other	words,	little	assurance	to	be	had	that	Britain’s	troubling	financial	predicament	
and	international	overstretch	was	in	the	process	of	being	resolved	through	American	
intervention.	 In	 August,	 when	 the	 temporary	 convertibility	 of	 pound	 sterling	
fashioned	Britain’s	second	balance	of	payments	crisis	since	the	end	of	the	war,	press	
scrutiny	 intensified.93	 The	 mass-market	 newspapers	 instigated	 a	 campaign	















dearly	without	effecting	any	 lasting	solution	to	 the	 ‘German	Problem’.	The	British	














ranking	 CCG	 (BE)	 officials	 who	 had	 given	 up	 their	 positions	 in	 frustration	 at	 the	
organisation’s	 incompetence.95	 The	 Control	 Commission,	 they	 lamented,	 had	 no	
clear	policy	and	an	administration	which	‘thwarted’	all	‘initiative	and	personal	zeal’.	
The	 following	week,	 the	paper’s	editorial	 suggested	that	Brian	Robertson’s	 recent	
admission	that	his	staff	had	encountered	complications	in	their	task	‘to	extend	the	
empire	 of	 true	 democracy,	 of	 peace	 and	 of	 decency’	 prompted	 ‘disquiet	 and	














increasingly	 critical	 of	 expenditure	 in	 Germany.	 In	 early	 August	 1947,	 the	 paper	
published	a	scathing	cartoon	showing	Attlee	as	a	mother	bird	feeding	dollars	to	the	
already	 vastly	 overfed	 ‘British	 Zone	 in	 Germany’	 cuckoo	 (whose	 bespectacled	







appearance	 seems	 to	be	a	 caricature	of	 Lord	Pakenham)	 in	 the	 ‘British	Economy’	
nest.98	The	invasive	bird	was	sapping	the	nation’s	resources,	depriving	the	fledgling	
chicks	 (labelled	 ‘import-export	 gap’,	 ‘food	 shortage’,	 and	 the	 nearly-lifeless	









Missing	 by	 the	 very	 method	 of	 its	 recruitment	 either	 the	 result-by-example	
integrity	 of	 the	 long-term	 Civil	 Servant	 or	 the	 practical	 efficiency	 of	 the	 new	
managerial	type,	Britain’s	Control	Commission	neither	administers	Germany	nor	
controls	 it.	While	 the	 dead	 hand	 of	 its	 amateur	 bureaucrats	 in	 their	 parallel	
administrations	lies	heavy	on	the	land,	the	nominal	passing	of	executive	power	
since	the	beginning	of	the	year	from	the	palsied	hand	in	the	velvet	glove	of	the	
British	 to	 the	 nerveless	 paws	 of	 the	 Germans	 has	 resulted	 in	 official	 and	
economic	activity	dissolving	in	a	sea	of	utter	corruption.	
A	 Vansittart-inspired	 interpretation	 of	 the	 ‘German	 Problem’	 remained,	 with	 an	



















officers’	 corps	 […],	 [who]	 offer	 their	 organising	 ability,	 their	 administrative	
efficiency,	and	their	talent	for	engrossing	discipline	in	the	midst	of	anarchy	[…].	
Many	people	may	recall	that	this	is	just	about	where	Hitler	came	in.	







A	 week	 later,	 on	 21	 August,	 another	 editorial	 in	 the	Mail	 intensified	 the	
pressure,	 decrying	 the	 British	 occupiers	 as	 a	 ‘Disgrace	 to	 Britain’.102	 The	 British	
occupation	of	Germany	was	‘one	problem	which	must	be	handled	now	with	speed	





beyond	 the	 powers	 of	 those	 we	 sent	 there	 to	 handle	 it.’	 The	 total	 cost	 of	 the	
occupation,	 including	administrative	overheads,	 the	upkeep	of	 the	BAOR	soldiers,	














































promise	 to	 get	 in	 touch	 ‘before	 launching	 out	 along	 those	 lines’	 and	 proposed	 a	





As	 a	matter	 of	 hard	 fact,	we	have	 evidence	 in	 this	 office	which,	 if	 published,	
would	result	in	a	number	of	high-ranking	officers	being	placed	under	immediate	






of	 the	 British	 Zone	 under	 the	 incendiary	 headline:	 ‘BRING	 HOME	 THESE	 MEN!	
CORRUPT,	LAZY,	THEY	DISCREDIT	OUR	RULE’.106	John	Deane	Potter’s	article	warned	
that	Germany,	far	from	a	democracy,	was	turning	toward	communism	and	fascism	–	



























panic	over	demobilisation,	maintaining	his	artificial	 standard	of	 living	 through	 the	
black	market	and	using	most	of	his	time	to	gallivant	around	the	German	countryside.	
























had	 featured	 prominently	 on	 Soviet-controlled	 Berlin	 Radio	 presented	 a	 further	
means	 of	 persuasion,	 with	 one	 Foreign	 Office	 official	 acerbically	 noting	 that	
Christiansen	‘may	derive	some	satisfaction	from	the	contribution	which	his	paper	has	
made	to	our	ally’s	propaganda	machine’.109	Yet	 in	 the	aftermath	of	Frank	Owen’s	




both	 tasked	 with	 penning	 ‘private’	 letters	 defending	 the	 CCG	 (BE)	 and	 BAOR,	
asserting	 that	 ‘the	 vast	majority	 […]	 tackle	 their	 Augean	 task’	 with	 ‘industry	 and	
conscientiousness’.111	The	official	 line	was	that	while	corruption	and	misbehaviour	










































































‘morality	memo’	was	 issued	 to	 all	members	 of	 the	 Control	 Commission,	warning	
them	 of	 the	 potentially	 disastrous	 consequences	 of	 ‘any	 departure	 from	 high	
standards’	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	 allegations	 circulating	 in	 the	 press.	 But	 the	
memorandum	angered	members	of	the	Commission,	who	felt	it	unduly	accusatory,	
and	 it	 was	 soon	 leaked	 to	 the	 British	 newspapers.118	 PR/ISC	 officials	 were	
exasperated,	 lamenting	 that	 ‘any	efforts	 to	uphold	 the	prestige	of	CCG	personnel	
must	 of	 course	 fail	 in	 their	 effect	 if	 they	 are	 torpedoed	 by	 such	 ill-advised	
















occupation	 administration	 which	 concluded	 that	 ‘the	 burden	 of	 supporting	 the	
German	in	peace	is	proving	as	irksome	as	the	burden	of	defeating	him	in	war’.121	The	
committee	 recommended	 urgent	 changes,	 including	 more	 emphasis	 on	 German	
recovery,	the	economic	reintegration	of	all	occupation	Zones,	a	definitive	policy	on	



























Yet	 in	 general,	 media	 interest	 in	 the	 occupation	 waned	 significantly	 after	 the	
animated	missives	published	during	the	summer	of	1947.	
As	 far	 as	 the	 Public	 Relations/Information	 Services	 Control	 Group	 were	
concerned,	 the	 ‘Get	 Out	 of	 Germany’	 campaign	 inspired	 a	 great	 degree	 of	 soul-
searching.	Their	attempts	to	regulate	and	counteract	the	 independent	media	had,	
quite	 obviously,	met	with	 little	 success.	 It	was	 acknowledged	 that	more	 ‘positive	
publicity	to	counteract	the	abuse	of	CCG	personnel’	was	needed,	yet	this	was	not	
easy	 to	 achieve	 in	 an	 ‘authentic	 form’	 –	 namely,	 ‘from	 the	 pens	 of	 journalists	
themselves’.123	 While	 every	 help	 was	 provided	 to	 encourage	 more	 constructive	
portrayals,	there	was	no	longer	a	‘news	peg’	upon	which	stories	could	be	hung:	‘the	








instruments	 towards	 the	 settlement	 of	 Europe’	 and	 that	 ‘their	 efforts	 are	 not	 as	




















films	 about	 occupied	 Germany.	 Yet,	 with	 the	 public	 contours	 of	 official	 policy	 in	
Europe	unchanged,	their	work	remained	closely	tied	to	a	Potsdam-era	interpretation	
of	the	occupation.	In	1947,	one	official	remarked	that	they	‘would	be	doing	a	very	ill	
service’	 if	 they	 did	 anything	 to	 encourage	 the	 British	 public	 to	 feel	 sorry	 for	 the	
Germans.127	In	August,	a	proposed	film	on	living	conditions	in	Germany	was	rejected	
because	 it	was	 felt	 that	 it	would	 arouse	 sympathy	without	 being	 relevant	 to	 the	
worries	of	the	British	taxpayer.128	Likewise,	in	March	1948	discussions	over	a	film	on	
the	work	of	voluntary	associations	 in	Germany	were	cut	short	when	a	COI	official	






















stated	 tersely	 that	 ‘charity	 and	 compassion	 are	 not	 at	 the	 moment	 a	 suitable	
foundation	for	a	government-sponsored	film.’129	
It	was	eventually	 agreed	 that	 the	PR/ISC’s	 forthcoming	documentary	 films	
should	revisit	the	central	themes	addressed	in	A	Defeated	People	and	the	Germany	
Under	 Control	 exhibition,	 which	 emphasised	 the	 important	 work	 being	 done	 to	
resolve	 the	 ‘German	Problem’.	The	 first	of	 these	documented	the	work	of	a	Kreis	
Resident	Officer,	 the	Control	Commission’s	 ‘man	on	the	ground’.	Graham	Wallace	
once	again	took	directorial	duties,	albeit	with	the	assistance	of	a	German	production	




K.R.O.	 –	Germany	 1947	 surveyed	 the	work	 that	 the	 British	were	 doing	 ‘in	
order	that	the	German	people	may	learn	how	best	to	help	themselves’,	following	the	
daily	 activities	 of	 a	 noble	 and	 considerate,	 but	 above	 all	 effective,	 British	
administrator	(who	also	acted	as	the	film’s	narrator).	In	the	midst	of	unprecedented	
turmoil	 in	Germany,	 this	was	 the	story	of	 the	CCG	 (BE)	undertaking	a	 fruitful	and	
essential	mission	that	needed	to	be	seen	through	to	the	end.	The	KRO	is	a	figure	of	
authority,	efficiently	going	about	his	task	and	ensuring	orders	for	‘making	Germany	
work	 again’	 were	 carried	 out,	 whilst	 keeping	 unreliable	 Germans	 in	 check.	 The	
German	people	are	portrayed	foremost	as	weak,	destitute,	and	dependent	on	the	
paternal	figure	of	the	KRO	as	they	encounter	food	and	housing	shortages,	an	influx	



















also	 directed	 by	 Graham	 Wallace	 and	 likewise	 unable	 to	 find	 a	 theatrical	
distributor.132	The	film	focused	on	the	importance	of	the	work	being	undertaken	by	
British	 education	 officers	 in	 Germany,	 where	 the	 job	 was	 said	 to	 be	 ‘far	 from	
finished’.	It	emphasised	the	increased	efficiency	of	the	British	authorities,	noting	that	
‘a	staff	of	under	200’	was	tasked	with	‘the	enormous	job	of	controlling	all	education	
activities	 in	 the	British	Zone’.	A	School	 in	Cologne	also	exhibited	a	more	distinctly	
empathetic	 and	 emotive	 outlook	 towards	 the	 Germans,	 clear	 in	 both	 the	
camerawork,	which	 included	 panning	 shots	 of	 children’s	 feet	without	 shoes,	 and	
commentary,	 partly	 delivered	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 one	 of	 the	 German	
schoolchildren.	 This	 generation	 of	German	 children,	who	 had	 ‘never	 been	 taught	
what	is	right	or	wrong’,	were	the	future	of	Germany.	Their	struggles	to	learn	without	


























and	 a	 greater	 sense	 of	 optimism.	 Trained	 to	 Serve	 contrasted	 the	 history	 of	 the	
German	policing	 under	Nazism,	when	 the	 totalitarian	 character	 of	 the	 police	 and	
arbitrary	arrests	of	the	Gestapo	were	universally	feared,	with	the	change	that	had	
arisen	 under	 the	 supervision	 of	 the	 Public	 Safety	 Branch	 (PSB)	 of	 the	 Control	

















Commission.	 The	 police	were	 commended	 for	 becoming	 ‘servants	 of	 the	 people’	
rather	than	their	masters.		
Meanwhile,	 the	 PR/ISC’s	magazine,	 the	British	 Zone	 Review,	had	 failed	 to	
garner	any	more	interest	amongst	the	British	public	and	measly	sales	figures,	coupled	
with	ongoing	paper	shortages,	came	to	threaten	the	future	of	the	publication.	W.	H.	
Smith	 &	 Son	 soon	 reduced	 their	 allocation	 by	 half,	 to	 only	 1,000	 copies,	 before	
turning	 to	 an	 ‘order	 on	 demand’	 quantity,	 beginning	 with	 a	miserable	 forty-four	
copies.138	PR/ISC	officials	disagreed	over	the	root	of	this	failure,	with	some	suggesting	
that	 the	BZR	 had	not	been	given	adequate	publicity	 in	official	 publications,	while	





































significantly.	 In	 the	 first	 place,	 behind	 the	 veneer	 of	 an	 ongoing	 commitment	 to	
Potsdam,	 British	 policy	 had	 radically	 shifted,	 rendering	 much	 of	 the	 CCG	 (BE)’s	
messaging	about	Germany	or	 the	task	of	British	occupiers	obsolete.	Britain’s	Cold	
War	posturing	also	had	a	significant	impact	upon	the	government’s	public	relations	
strategy,	which	 from	1948	 turned	more	 readily	 toward	anti-Soviet	propaganda.141	
The	 Central	 Office	 of	 Information,	 along	 with	 the	 British	 Council	 and	 the	 covert	
methods	of	 the	 Information	Research	Department,	were	 increasingly	bound	up	 in	
these	endeavours	–	with	less	interest	in	the	mediation	of	news	from	Germany.142		
In	 addition,	 the	 PR/ISC	 was	 hit	 hard	 by	 cuts	 and	 found	 itself	 increasingly	
unable	to	acquire	adequate	funding	for	its	endeavours.143	In	late	1947,	at	the	height	






















why	 the	costs	of	 the	occupation	were	escalating	was	shelved	after	 it	 thought	 too	
complex	 to	 fit	 onto	 a	 single	 reel,	while	 a	 longer	 film	would	have	been	 financially	
impossible.144	In	the	case	of	British	Zone	Review,	the	magazine’s	editor	John	Moffat	
insisted	 as	 late	 as	 1949	 that	 the	 magazine	 should	 be	 maintained	 in	 spite	 of	 its	
mounting	financial	losses	due	to	the	fact	that	‘publicity	is	an	essential	factor	–	even	
for	popular	governments!’.145	Yet	to	many	of	Moffat’s	colleagues,	the	production	of	






British	 Zone	 Correspondents’	 Association,	 Military	 Governor	 Sholto	 Douglas	

























His	 audience	 of	 journalists	 appreciated	 the	 sentiment	 and,	 in	 fact,	 repeatedly	
referred	to	their	own	task	as	one	of	telling	‘the	world’s	most	important	story’.	Such	
statements	 were	 not	 entirely	 hollow	 grandiloquence:	 the	 effective	 telling	 of	 the	
‘German	story’	came	to	be	regarded	as	an	integral	facet	of	‘winning	the	peace’.		
The	 Public	 Relations/Information	 Services	 Control	 Group	 orchestrated	 an	
expansive	public	 relations	 campaign,	 including	 the	 creation	of	a	public	exhibition,	
numerous	documentary	films,	and	an	in-house	magazine	as	well	as	instigating	a	close	
relationship	with	 the	BBC.	 Their	 efforts	 attempted	 to	propagate	 the	virtue	of	 the	
British	 occupiers	 and	 engage	 the	 support	 of	 the	 public	 at	 home.	 At	 its	 core,	 the	
inherent	 aim	 of	 the	 PR/ISC’s	 work	was	 to	 curtail	 the	 escalating	 criticism	 of	 their	
organisation	 in	 the	 British	 press.	 Officials	 ambitiously	 hoped	 a	 more	
straightforwardly	optimistic	interpretation	of	events	in	Germany	would	emerge	in	its	








the	British	occupation	as	a	 failure,	 the	PR/ISC	had	 few	means	 to	put	 forward	any	
adequate	rejoinder.		












had,	 of	 course,	 already	 opted	 to	 uphold	 their	 obligations	 in	 Germany	 while	
attempting	 to	 limit	 their	 financial	 outlay.	 The	 Anglo-American	 transition	 toward	
economic	and	political	restoration	of	the	western	Zones,	a	rapid	transfer	of	power	to	
German	authorities,	and	a	winding-up	of	Allied	administrative	responsibilities	was,	
therefore,	 already	 well	 underway	 by	 the	 August	 of	 1947.	 Yet	 this	 transformed	
outlook	remained	distinct	from	Britain’s	declaratory	policy,	meaning	there	was	no	
ground	 for	 any	 substantial	 revision	 of	 the	 official	 messaging	 about	 the	 ‘German	
Problem’	or	the	British	occupation.	
This	 gulf	 between	 the	 public	 and	 de	 facto	 iterations	 of	 British	 policy	 for	
Germany	 had	 allowed	 the	 ‘Get	 Out	 of	 Germany’	 campaign	 to	 emerge,	 further	
reinforcing	public	and	media	perceptions	of	the	occupation	as	a	deplorable	failure.	
The	apparent	shortcomings	of	the	British	occupation	authorities	had	come	to	define	
their	public	 image,	 something	 illustrated	by	 the	 increasingly	defensive	 reaction	of	
CCG	(BE)	and	BAOR	personnel	 in	 their	personal	correspondence.148	Mary	Bouman	
and	 Edna	 Wearmouth	 were	 both	 mindful	 in	 letters	 to	 friends	 and	 family	 to	


















the	occupation	 forces	 in	Britain,	who	were	 lampooned	as	bumbling	 incompetents	
out	for	a	good	time.	The	assortment	of	nicknames	coined	for	the	Control	Commission	
in	 the	 popular	 press,	 from	 Charlie	 Chaplain’s	 Grenadiers	 to	 Complete	 Chaos	
Guaranteed	 (By	Experts),	 underscores	 the	media’s	disdain	 for	 the	organisation.150	
This	unfavourable,	if	at	times	humorous,	image	of	the	occupation	forces	was	distilled	
in	the	1949	comedy	film	It’s	Not	Cricket,	which	starred	famed	comic	duo	Basil	Radford	
















stops	 at	 nothing’.	 It’s	 Not	 Cricket	 depicts	 the	 occupation	 forces	 in	 a	 strikingly	
unflattering	light:	the	amiable	fools	Bright	and	Early	are	busy	completing	their	pools	
coupon	prior	 to	going	on	 leave	when	news	of	an	escaped	Nazi	war	criminal,	Otto	
Fisch,	 is	 announced.	 Next,	 the	 two	 officers,	 waiting	 for	 their	 batman	 to	 arrive,	
presume	‘he’s	probably	doing	a	spot	of	fraternising’.	In	fact,	he	has	been	attacked	by	
the	 aforementioned	 Fisch,	 who	 then	 himself	 arrives	 in	 the	 guise	 of	 a	 batman	



















Following	 this,	 the	 pair	 decide	 to	 start	 a	 detective	 agency	 in	 London,	








The	diamond	 is	 recovered,	but	 the	buffoonery	 is	not	quite	complete	–	Bright	and	
Early	unsuspectingly	hire	a	newly-disguised	Fisch	as	their	office	assistant.	











the	 country’s	 prestige	 and	 international	 standing.	 The	 future	of	Germany	was	 far	
from	clear,	with	enduring	anxieties	over	the	potential	re-emergence	of	nationalism	

































their	 Zones.4	 This	 would	 end	 the	 Allied	 occupation	 and	 see	 the	 Anglo-German	
relationship	enter	an	era	of	rapprochement.	
In	 the	 spring	of	1948,	 the	 two	Western	Allies	 laid	 the	groundwork	 for	 the	
establishment	of	a	West	German	federal	state	by	creating	a	central	administration	in	
the	Bizone	under	 the	 Frankfurt	 Charter.5	 The	 London	 Six-Power	Conference,	 held	
between	 23	 February	 and	 6	March,	 saw	 steps	 towards	 France’s	 adoption	 of	 the	

















be	 a	 fusion	 of	 the	 US,	 British,	 and	 French	 Zones	 into	 a	 sovereign	 state,	 with	 a	
constituent	assembly	to	be	established	by	1	September	1948.	The	Western	Powers	
would,	 however,	 maintain	 supervision	 over	 the	 Ruhr,	 complete	 work	 towards	
demilitarisation	 and	 disarmament,	 and	 retain	 a	 military	 force	 within	 the	 Federal	
Republic	 of	 Germany.8	 In	 June,	 fiscal	 reforms	 saw	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 stable	
currency,	 the	 Deutsche	 Mark,	 and	 paved	 the	 way	 towards	 German	 economic	
autonomy.9	 The	 Soviets	 responded	 with	 a	 currency	 reform	 in	 their	 own	 Zone,	
demanding	 the	 new	 East	 German	 Mark	 be	 recognised	 as	 the	 legal	 tender	 for	
quadripartite	 Berlin.	 On	 16	 June,	 with	 tensions	 gradually	 escalating,	 the	 Soviet	
representative	walked	out	of	the	city’s	governing	body,	the	Allied	Kommandatura.10	
Later	 that	 month,	 with	 inter-Allied	 disagreements	 over	 currency	 reform	 still	
unresolved,	the	Soviet	authorities	stepped	up	their	obstruction	of	Allied	traffic	into	
the	 German	 capital.	 It	 was	 the	 beginning	 of	 what	 became	 known	 as	 the	 Berlin	
Blockade,	a	momentous	juncture	in	the	history	of	the	Allied	occupation.	
The	Western	Allies	opted	to	supply	their	Zones	of	Berlin	through	an	airlift,	an	
arrangement	 that	would	 last	until	May	1949.11	 It	was	perhaps	 the	most	 symbolic	


















CDU	 seeing	 Konrad	 Adenauer	 confirmed	 as	 the	 new	 state’s	 first	 Chancellor.	 In	
September,	 the	 Allied	Military	 Governors	 were	 replaced	 by	 High	 Commissioners,	
which	 marked	 the	 de	 facto	 end	 of	 the	 postwar	 occupation	 even	 if	 the	Western	
Powers	retained	the	supervisory	authority	enshrined	in	the	Occupation	Statute.13	By	








step.	 In	 the	 coming	 years,	 French	 policymakers,	 concerned	 with	 the	 threat	 of	 a	
renewed	Germany	but	increasingly	amenable	to	the	Anglo-American	stance,	sought	
economic	 cooperation.	 This	 saw	 the	 founding	 of	 the	 European	 Coal	 and	 Steel	









Community	 (ECSC)	 and,	 ultimately,	 led	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 European	 Union.15	
Britain’s	political	leadership,	eschewing	the	ECSC,	were	left	with	their	own	anxieties,	















identified	 a	 ‘surge	 of	 admiration	 and	 sympathy	 for	 the	 courage	 with	 which	 the	
inhabitants	of	Berlin	stood	up	to	the	Soviet	threat’.18	This	was,	he	argued,	the	first	
time	in	a	generation	that	images	of	Germans	behaving	in	a	morally	acceptable	way	















that	 the	steps	towards	West	German	statehood	 ‘ran	 into	no	particular	opposition	





human	 beings’.21	 These	 sentiments	 can,	 to	 some	 degree,	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	
contemporary	climate	of	the	Cold	War,	with	the	Berlin	Airlift	quickly	venerated	as	a	
heroic	and	magnanimous	act	in	the	name	of	freedom.	








In	other	words,	policymakers	were	duty-bound	 to	 take	an	ostensibly	 rational	 and	
coherent	 approach,	 one	 in	 which	 the	 Cold	 War	 signalled	 reconciliation	 with	
Germany.	This	was	much	less	of	a	prerogative	for	opinion-formers	in	the	media	and	
beyond,	whose	exchanges	and	perceptions	followed	their	own	rules	and	rationales.23		













with	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 varying	 responses	 to	 the	 rapid	 revival	 of	 Germany’s	
economic	 power	 and	 the	 controversy	 surrounding	 the	 decision	 to	 continue	
dismantling	factories	in	the	British	Zone.	The	chapter	then	turns	to	West	Germany’s	
political	 renewal	 and	 the	 end	 of	 the	military	 government,	 considering	 the	 British	
reaction	 to	 the	 election	 of	 Konrad	 Adenauer	 and	 the	 perceived	 prospects	 of	
establishing	 a	 stable	 and	 peaceful	 democracy.	 The	 last	 section	 considers	 British	
perceptions	of	 the	 final	 act	of	 the	Allied	occupation,	 the	war	 crimes	 trial	 of	 Field	
Marshal	Manstein	held	in	December	1949.		
As	we	will	see,	much	of	the	British	mass-market	media	remained	distinctly	
cool,	 and	 at	 time	 openly	 antagonistic,	 towards	 Germany,	 warning	 their	 sizeable	
working-	 and	 lower	 middle-class	 readership	 of	 the	 dangers	 still	 posed	 by	 the	
unresolved	 ‘German	 Problem’.	 Even	 now,	 the	 pervasive	 culture	 war	 between	
‘Vansittartists’	 and	 the	 ‘soft	 peace’	 liberals	 remained	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 British	
perceptions	 of	 Germany.	 The	 powerful	 ties	 of	 memory,	 the	 enduring	 appeal	 of	
Vansittart’s	arguments,	 and	 the	 increasingly	pervasive	notion	 that	 the	occupation	
had	been	a	failure	all	coalesced	to	tarnish	public	portrayals	of	West	Germany’s	path	
towards	statehood.	There	was	a	growing	sense	 that	Britain	had	 failed	 to	 ‘win	 the	




In	August	1947,	a	Manchester	Guardian	 editorial	 suggested	 that	 ‘the	plain	
economic	facts	dictated	that	we	should	be	prodding	Germany	into	life’,	rejecting	the	














and	manufacturers	 for	 allowing	 allegedly	 ‘unfair’	 trade	methods	 to	 persist	 in	 the	





























grow	 tenfold	 by	 1952,	 was	 not	 simply	 the	 upshot	 of	 cheap	 labour,	 the	 paper’s	
editorial	insisted,	but	rather	was	a	question	of	superior	productivity.32	This	same	self-
critical	analysis	was	 reiterated	 in	 the	Times,	where	 the	portent	of	growing	export	
competition	 from	 Germany	 was	 linked	 to	 Britain’s	 own	 inefficiencies,	 outdated	
manufacturing	 techniques,	 and	 ineffectual	 management	 practices.33	 The	 Daily	
Mirror’s	editorial	on	the	issue	criticised	business	leaders	for	wanting	‘everything	the	
easy	 way’	 but	 accepted	 the	 concerns	 of	 trade	 unionists	 regarding	 wage	
differentials.34	 The	 Daily	 Telegraph	 was,	 perhaps	 unsurprisingly,	 more	 inclined	
towards	sympathy	for	the	concerns	of	industrialists,	suggesting	that	German	export	
trade	was	being	unfairly	driven	by	wages	60%	lower	than	those	in	Britain.35		




For	more	 than	 3.5	 years	 Britain	 has	 had	 a	 good	 run	 as	 the	 leading	 industrial	
nation	outside	the	United	States.	Germany	and	Japan,	her	two	biggest	pre-war	
trade	competitors,	were	down	and	out	 […].	But	now	 the	horizon	 is	no	 longer	











clear.	 Another	 sun	 is	 rising	 –	 or	 re-rising,	 Germany,	 our	 formidable	 former	
enemy,	is	beginning	to	emerge	again	as	a	no	less	formidable	trade	competitor.37	
The	editorial	went	on	 to	question	whether	Germany’s	 revitalised	economy	would	




Western	 Allies	 should	 keep	 a	 wary	 eye	 on	 Germany	 –	 remembering	 that	
forewarned	is	forearmed.	
These	anxieties	were	not	eased	in	the	coming	months,	as	further	evidence	of	




highlighted	 Hamburg’s	 trade	 fair	 as	 proof	 that	 ‘German	 industry	 has	 almost	
completed	its	comeback’.39	It	was	suggested	that	‘Germany’s	varied	products	today	
challenge	British	goods	all	over	the	world’,	with	the	two	countries	clashing	‘head	on’	
in	 their	 export	 trade.	 The	 example	 of	 optical	 lenses	 and	 cameras	 was	 used	 to	




















and	whisky.40	 In	April,	 the	Daily	Mail	reported	that	singers	 in	the	 ‘smart	Hamburg	
restaurant	where	no	Briton	can	afford	to	eat’	had	a	new	twist	on	an	old	classic:	‘Don’t	










In	 June,	 the	 experiences	 of	 the	Daily	 Express’s	 science	 reporter,	 Chapman	
Pincher,	 received	mention	 in	 the	paper’s	editorial.42	Upon	his	arrival	 in	Munich,	a	
banking	error	had	enforced	him	to	live	‘as	a	German’	and	use	local	currency	rather	
than	service	vouchers.	Chapman,	preparing	to	‘rough	it’,	was	astonished	to	find	‘a	
menu	 15	 inches	 deep,	 with	 a	 choice	 of	 93	 separate	 dishes’	 in	 the	 crowded	
Humplmayr’s	 restaurant.	 It	 included	 twenty-one	meat	 courses,	 such	 as	 a	 gigantic	
























loaded	 with	 Havana	 cigars	 and	 cigarettes,	 as	 much	 butter	 as	 you	 pleased	 –	 the	
options	were	apparently	endless:	
[the]	Germans	that	 I	saw	are	eating	well.	The	food	 is	 there	for	them	–	 if	 they	
work.	 And	 the	 factories	 are	 open	 from	 7am	 till	 6pm.	 They’re	 working	 like	
beavers.	The	shops	have	chocolate,	 sweets,	 cream	cakes	and	other	 luxuries.	 I	
even	saw	nylons.	In	my	1,350-mile	tour	I	found	post-war	Germany	flowing	with	
milk	and	honey.	













America	and	elsewhere	 in	 the	preceding	years,	decided	 to	stamp	all	 international	
letters	 with	 ‘Thank	 You	 for	 Food	 Gifts’.	 This	 included,	 it	 turned	 out,	 letters	 to	
Germany,	much	to	the	indignation	of	John	Boyd-Carpenter	MP,	who	remarked	in	a	
parliamentary	debate	that:	










The	 mounting	 anxieties	 in	 the	 British	 press	 about	 Germany’s	 economic	
recovery,	and	its	repercussions	for	the	integrity	of	the	European	peace,	came	to	a	













criticism	 from	 the	 country’s	 emerging	 political	 leaders	 and	 prompting	 strikes	 at	






























out	 in	 the	British	Zone	before	1948.51	Yet	despite	 the	 shift	of	Allied	policymakers	
toward	economic	reconstruction	in	the	western	Zones,	official	support	for	the	policy	
of	dismantling	continued	largely	unabated	through	until	1949.	This	was	primarily	the	




sinister	 plot	 to	 impede	 German	 competition,	 leading	 to	 the	 cancellation	 of	 his	
impending	visit	to	London.54	For	the	teams	of	dismantlers,	both	British	and	German,	
obstruction,	 verbal	 abuse,	 and	 physical	 attacks	 became	 something	 of	 a	 regular	
occurrence,	necessitating	the	provision	of	armed	troops	to	oversee	operations.55		The	
occupation	authorities	 grew	 increasingly	uneasy,	publicly	warning	 that	 ‘resistance	
against	 dismantling	 workers	 is	 resistance	 against	 a	 military	 government	 order’.56	
They	threatened	wholesale	factory	closures	and	a	number	of	German	workers	were	
hauled	off	to	British	military	courts	after	refusing	to	complete	their	allotted	tasks.	
In	 the	 summer	 of	 1949,	 as	 the	 election	 campaign	 for	 the	 first	 federal	
government	 got	 underway,	 the	 dismantling	 controversy	 became	 increasingly	
politicised,	 with	 all	 the	mainstream	 parties	 exploiting	 popular	 anger	 towards	 the	




















suggested	 that	 it	was	an	 invitation	 for	Germans	 to	 re-embrace	 ‘the	worst	kind	of	
nationalism’.	Adenauer	wrote	 to	 the	Foreign	Ministers	of	Britain,	 France,	and	 the	
United	States	to	warn	against	the	great	damage	being	done	to	German	morale.58	In	
November	1949,	the	Western	Powers	agreed	to	reduce	the	scope	of	the	programme,	
although	 the	 notion	 that	 small-scale	 dismantling	would	 continue	 (ultimately	 until	
1951)	provoked	Kurt	Schumacher	to	lambast	Adenauer	as	‘Federal	Chancellor	of	the	
Allies’.59	
These	 events	 met	 with	 a	 heated	 response	 in	 Britain	 and	 the	 issue	 of	
dismantling	became	a	medium	through	which	uncertainties	and	anxieties	about	the	
occupation	and	 the	 future	of	Germany	could	be	exercised.	There	was	 criticism	of	
dismantling	from	high-profile	politicians	in	both	major	parties,	including	Labour	MP	
Richard	Crossman	and	Winston	Churchill	 as	 the	 leader	of	 the	opposition.60	 In	 the	
House	of	Commons,	Churchill’s	condemnation	of	dismantling	earned	a	rebuke	from	





















German	 workers	 who	 didn’t	 disobey	 orders	 were	 being	 branded	 ‘traitors	 of	 the	
Reich’	and	‘British	lackeys’.62	The	issue,	according	to	an	editorial	in	the	Times,	had	
opened	 up	 the	 Germans	 to	 ‘irresponsible	 demagogy’.63	 By	 June	 1949,	 even	 the	
Manchester	 Guardian	 saw	 cause	 for	 concern,	 with	 an	 editorial	 suggesting	 that	
German	opposition	to	a	policy	earnestly	endeavouring	to	safeguard	Europe	stemmed	
from	political	manipulation	of	renascent	nationalism.64		
In	 the	 letter	pages	of	 the	Times,	 Stuart	R	de	 la	Mahotiere	 contended	 that	
dismantling	must	be	maintained	at	all	costs.65	The	Germans,	he	argued,	were	‘clever	
propagandists’	 with	 ‘insidious’	 arguments,	 attempting	 to	 ‘befog	 our	 reason	 with	
sentiment,	 as	 they	did	after	 the	First	World	War’.	 The	German	people’s	 agitation	
against	 dismantling	 was	 only	 the	 first	 stage	 on	 a	 path	 to	 another	 attempt	 at	
conquering	Europe.	It	was	rhetoric	unambiguously	redolent	of	Black	Record	and	even	
incited	a	response	from	Vansittart’s	long-standing	interlocutor,	Victor	Gollancz.	He,	
along	 with	 his	 old	 ally	 Richard	 Stokes,	 intimated	 that	 the	 dismantling	 was	 a	
contemptible	 attempt	 by	 the	 British	 government	 merely	 to	 impede	 German	















































German	 hostility	 to	 the	 occupiers	 stemmed	 entirely	 from	 dismantling	 was	










The	 assumption	 that	 ending	 dismantling	 would	 end	 their	 remonstrations	 was,	
Mahotiere	concluded,	‘to	attribute	to	the	German	mind	notions	of	justice	and	fair	
play	which	it	does	not	possess’.	




schools	would	 put	 forth	 their	 opinions	 on	 the	 protests	 and	 their	 implications	 for	
Germany’s	ongoing	political	revival.70	The	major	fault	lines	of	the	debate	had	hardly	
changed	since	the	early	1940s,	with	disagreements	over	the	nature	of	the	‘German	
Problem’	 underpinning	 varying	 assessments	 of	 dismantling	 and	 the	 prudence	 of	
Anglo-German	reconciliation.	For	Gollancz	and	his	allies,	this	policy	stood	for	all	that	
















Manchester	Guardian	 to	 suggest	 that	 it	was	clear	 to	Christians,	who	 ‘believe	 that	
there	 is	 always	 hope	 in	 a	 policy	 of	 reconciliation	 if	 it	 is	 founded	 upon	 real	 well-
wishing’,	 that	 dismantling	 should	 come	 to	 an	 end.71	 There	 was,	 he	 contended,	
uncertainty	as	to	‘whether	Britain	shall	[…]	follow	a	counsel	of	hope	or	one	of	despair’	






























Christ	was	 too	wise	 to	enjoin	pardon	without	 repentance,	of	which	 two	wars	
brought	 none	 to	 Germany.	 I	 might	 then	 claim	 a	 similar	 monopoly	 of	 Divine	





exception	 to	 Gollancz’s	 interjection,	 accusing	 both	 men	 of	 betraying	 their	 own	
countrymen:	
I	 doubt	whether	 Christ	 should	 be	 brought	 into	 the	 technical	 details	 of	 policy	
towards	Germany,	such	as	dismantling,	because	I	do	not	pretend	to	know	what	
His	views	would	have	been	on	the	issue.	The	Canon	and	Mr	Gollancz	seemingly	
think	 that	 they	 do,	 and	 that	 it	 would	 have	 been	 the	 German	 view.	 I	 should	
personally	 have	 thought	 that	 He	 would	 have	 had	 sympathy	 for	 those	 –	
unmentioned	 by	 the	 Canon	 and	 Mr	 Gollancz	 –	 who,	 having	 twice	 suffered	
















others	 certainly	 chimed	with	 the	bearing	of	 official	 policymakers,	 it	was	 the	 anti-
German	analysis	of	Mahotiere	and	Vansittart	which	continued	to	find	favour	in	the	
country’s	most	widely-read	newspapers.	The	notion	of	the	Germans	as	unrepentant	
and	 inherently	wicked	conformed	 to	existing	prejudices	of	 the	middle-	and	mass-
market	newspapers,	who	had	by-and-large	maintained	a	consistently	anti-German	
outlook	 since	1945.	They	 interpreted	 the	disobedience	and	protests	of	perturbed	








civilised	 or	 controlled?	 So	 far	 the	 answer	 has	 always	 been	 “no”	 […].	 German	
nationalism,	that	terrible	thing	which	has	brought	fire,	slaughter,	and	uncounted	
suffering	 to	 Europe,	 is	 again	 resurgent.	 German	 bellies	 are	 full,	 so	 German	
bullying	begins.	Two	British	Control	Commission	officials	are	beaten	up	by	200	





























                                                
76	William	Connor,	‘These	Germans…William	Connor	Flew	to	the	Ruhr	to	Write	the	Story	
Behind…	The	Picture	That	Shocked	Britain’,	Daily	Mirror,	7	September	1949;	‘Briton	Beaten	
P a g e 2 T H E D A I L Y MIRROR Wednesday, September 7, 1949 
LLIAM CONNOR flew to the Ruhr to write 
story b e h i n d . . . . THE PICTURE THAT 
SHOCKED BRITAIN 
" J U D A S ! " screams the great wri t ten letters 
daubed on the wall, " THERE'S A PLACE ON THE 
GALLOWS FOR YOU I " 
Which Wall? 
The one tha t surrounds the great Ruhr-Chemie 
synthetic oil factory at Oberhausen in Germany. 
Which Judas ? 
Any of the ninety German workers who were 
escorted into the plant to begin dismantl ing 
under the orders of His Majesty's Government. 
Thus flames and smoulders the anger and bitter-
ness of Germany against her conquerors. 
without a spring—or rather, a gun without a 
trigger. 
And • Germany, unwound or unloaded, is a 
State unbearable to the industrious, patriotic 
and martial Hun 
^ 
•' V O U British." 1 was told by one of the Ruhr 
-*- industi-ialists (not a gloomy defeated 
Individual, but a cheerful sharp-witted character 
jf evei- there was one) "are more like the Ger-
mans than any other race. Like us, you are 
hard-working, solid and technically well 
advanced. But also, like us. vou happen to be 
on the spot." 
" Which spot ? said 1. 
'HE Ruhr .Valley is the greatest 
industrial^ centre in Europe. It 
is more richly endowed than our 
own Black Country and far mOre 
concentrated. 
Five years ago this area was under the 
flail oX Allied bombers. Remember the 
names?—Essen, Dusseldorf, Gelsenkirchen, 
Bochum, Dulsburg, Wuppertal, Dortmund ? 
Great havoc crashed flown upon these towns 
and famous works like Krupps at Essen were 
practically wiped out. 
But not all were destroyed, nothing like it. 
For one thing, you can't flatten a coal-mine 
from the air—not yet. 
If you di-ive, as I have just done, through this 
not unpleasant land, you will be astonished to 
"The identical spot that we ate on. We can-
not exist without you, and we know that if the 
Allies get out o( Europe, Russia will walk in and 
the Kuhr will be lost for ever. That's clear, isn't it ?" 
I said that I thought it was. 
" But you British cannot exist without America. That's 
clear, isn't it ? " 
I said T thought it 
was. 
" Well then, we depend 
cci you. you depend on 
America. And America, 
if she is not going to 
throw away the fruits 
of her victory, the whole 
of her post-war foreign 
policy and the Marshall 
Plan, depends on both 
of us. Therefore, we 
are all on the same 
spot." 
Quite clever stuff, but 
a bit too specious. Too much of a sleeb fit into 
the great anti-dismantling campaign now being 
waged by all the industrialists of the Ruhr. 
and what they did to him 
Picture shows a British dis-
mantling officer in his car 
after it had been overturned 
by German worjcers in the 
Ruhr last weeJc. 
ot the German worlters—great though It un-
doubtedly is—do I remember the German slave 
labour plan ! 
I do. 
And'l recall that hundreds of thousands of 
men and women were foreihiy deported from 
their homes in other countries to work in these 
same steel \vorks and coal mines. 
I remember, too, the horrible callous brutality 
towards foreign workers without number who 
wei'e treated as slaves and forced to labour till 
they dropped. ^ 
^ 
see what, and how much, is left. Furthermor , 'VV^° are these men who are determined to 
li- you study the monthly reports of the Control ! ' , prevent the Allies from dismantlmg their 
• - - - steel and chemical works? Who are these 
plausible and intellig'ent industrialists who are 
campaigning so carefully to have what they 
hold ? 
Well you can take your choice for there are 
Commission you will see that steel and iron pro-
duction, solid fuel gas, and machinery output 
have rocketed up during the last twelve months, 
Steel and iron alone have climbed by nearly 
100 per cent, in the past year. 
The trutij is that Germany is alive and stir-
ring again, and nowhere more than in the iron 
guts of the Ru&r. There her heart heats 
Strongly, the clump! thump! clump! of the 
knocbed-out gladiator getting ready to climb 
back into the arena again. 
Germany without the Ruhr is like a clock 
plenty of them. 
Pellenz and Hertzog of the Thyssen Works 
(remember the name ?) Geldmacher of the, 
VIEWPOINl -
Bochum Steel Corporation. Maxrath and 
Spolders of Ruhr i Steel. And Kersting and 
Muller and Wenzel and Elshoff and Hagenbiick 
and a score of others, 
They publish manifestos—and not very apolo-
getic ones at that. 
They cry out "T'le task noio is to save Ger-
man economy and the German workers from a 
still greater misery lohicli would be of absolutely 
no economical advantage to any other country 
in the loorld., May our warninq not fall on deaf 
ears I " 
Deaf ears ! 1 seem to remember some deaf 
ears during the seven deadly years from 1932 to 
1939 when the German Ruhr worked night and 
day to re-arm Germany for 
the most atrocious war In 
history. And as for the misery 
JT may oe that these Goidmachers. these Spolders and these Wenzels ure ail certified 
as being free from the Nazi taint. But whatever 
our de-Nazification court.'i declare, the record of 
the German race as a whole shows that they do 
not care very much for people of other lands. 
Look at the map of Germany. Who first 
swarmed across Into Austria ? Who occupied 
Czechoslovakia ? Who invaded Poland ? Who 
leapt into Denmark and Norway ? Who burst 
across their frontiers into Holland, Belgium, 
Prance. Russia and later-—Italy ? Which nation 
crossed EVERY frontier on its perimeter save 
one—Switzerland ? Deutschland !—the great 
Deutfichland that was armed to the teeth bv 
these same sieelmasters and their unruly workers 
in the Ruhr A 
N ATIONALISM is ailame again m r.tie midst of this immensely formidable nation which 
cannot be cut out of the heart of Europe. Some-
now we have qot to live with these aagressive 
and unrepentant people. But nowhere^ did I 
hear expressions of regret or much conciliation 
from the Germans, 
I heard plenty Ol criticism o( the French, the 
Americans and the British—in that order, and 
only towards the Russians had they a different 
sentiment—sheer t'^rror. 
Dismantling inflames their anger, stokes their 
frustration and burns away the last hopes of 
reconciliation, This job should have been done 
three years ago, and it should have been com-
pleted while defeat was frcah upon fchem. As it 
is, any old excuse will do to defame the Allies-
including the one that we intend to fight Ru.ssla 
from West of the Rhine and that we are now 
hauling the stuff to safety away from the imme-
diate battle area. 
r don't know about that, 
But what is certain i.s that Jerry (like Annie) 
still wants to get his gun, 
In my view, his past record dot^n not entitle 
him to hold a lieenre 
At least—not yet. 
AJvci-^iser's Ani 
THE Essence of Coffee and Chicory made by 
lyana of (Sadby Hall 
Evs \r 
BONUS FOR HEALTH 
J SHOULD like to suggest an improvement - in 
the Health Service, Why 
not give a small no-claim 
bonus at the end of each 
year ? It would help to 
prevent malingering, be-
sides acting as <i sweetener 
to those who keep on pay-
ing without making any ^y^jng the piist sirweciis; 
A S - I S S ' " ^ ' ' - ^ ' ' ' ' ' Every day I have come 
Aooas, uorset ^ jj^^^^ ^^ ̂ ^ ^ ^^ smiling face 
HOLIDAYS to greet me, the kettle boil-
WE have returned from ins and dozens of odd iohs 
a holiday in France, t"V^u *l"t ^""^t *^^„/«.l? 
and we cannot agree with ho'e had been turned OUt, 
any Of the statements made another day the shelves 
by Richard Cardigan in his ?"^ cupboards cleaned, and 
article. Everywhere we had •"••• ''••''"'"'"»' trinmnh was 
DAUGHTER 
SINCE my husband died I have had to go out to 
work, and until the school 
holidays .just o V er my 
daughter — fourteen — took 
no interest in the house— 
going out with the gang 
was her sole ambition. 
But oh the difference 
marvellous meals—includ-
ing beef steaks, pork chops 
and ham—at 3s. to 4s, The 
only restaurant where we 
were overcharged was one 
run by an Eng;lishman.— 
Holid ymakers. Ispwich. 
WHILE in France I thought that if more 
English holidaymakers paid 
more attention to behaving 
with quiet good manners, 
and dropped the superior 
race attitude, they would 




THE £14 referred to by the part-time fireman 
who wrote to Viewpoint is 
only his retaining fee. For 
answering the siren he gets 
Ifls. for the turn-out and 
3s. for every hour after the 
first two. This r^nlunera-
tion is in addition to the 
income from his normal 
employment.—A. Mitchell, 
Wilbury - crescent. South-
ampton. 
her crowning triumph was 
the day when she greeted 
me with, " Look, Mum ! 1 
have dyed the curtains! " 
1 am truly sorry these 
school holidays are over. 
— (Mrs.) Marv Taylor 
Vallev-road Bromb roueh 
Cheshire 
NUMBERS 
/•^OOD luck to the post 
^ ^ Office workers in their 
demand for numbers on 
all houses. A further ad-
vance would be to have 
numbers put on gates in-
stead of on house doors,— 
D. Kerry, Rhodes-avpnuG. 
Newhold, Chesterfield 
SUGAR 
ON the recommendation of a babies' welfare 
clinic 1 bought Demerara 
sugar for my baby's food. 1 
have never bought a pound 
of it without finding: wood, 
hairs, sacking and dirt in 
it. Surely this sugar should 
be cleaned and boxed as 
other sugar is.—(Mrs.) K.. 







‘against	 her	 conquerors’.	 His	 article	 painted	 a	 troubling	 picture,	 highlighting	 the	
threat	posed	by	Germany’s	economic	and	political	revival.		
In	 the	 first	 place,	 Connor	 informed	 his	 readers	 that	 the	 Ruhr,	 Europe’s	









without	 the	Ruhr	 is	 like	a	 clock	without	a	 spring	–	or	 rather,	a	gun	without	a	
trigger.	 And	 Germany,	 unwound	 or	 unloaded,	 is	 a	 State	 unbearable	 to	 the	
industrious,	patriotic	and	martial	Hun.	
Connor	 railed	 against	 the	 attempts	 of	 German	 industrialists	 to	 prevent	
further	 dismantling,	 alleging	 they	were	 unabashed	militarists	 tainted	 by	 collusion	







for	 the	most	 atrocious	war	 in	 history	 […].	 It	may	be	 that	 these	Geldmachers,	
these	Spolders	and	these	Wenzels	are	all	certified	as	being	free	from	the	Nazi	










Nationalism	 is	aflame	again	 in	the	midst	of	 this	 immensely	 formidable	nation,	
which	cannot	be	cut	out	of	the	heart	of	Europe.	Somehow,	we	have	got	to	live	
with	 these	 aggressive	 and	 unrepentant	 people.	 But	 nowhere	 did	 I	 hear	
expressions	of	regret	or	much	conciliation	from	the	Germans	[…].	Dismantling	
inflames	their	anger,	stokes	their	frustration	and	burns	away	the	last	hopes	of	




William	 Connor’s	 rhetoric	 was	 an	 extreme	 iteration	 of	 the	 residual	
Germanophobia	that	had	been	sustained,	and	in	some	instances	even	augmented,	
since	 1945.	 His	 anxiety-laden	 analysis	 ran	 contrary	 to	 the	 prescriptions	 of	 Anglo-
American	policy,	instead	revitalising	a	Vansittart-infused	reading	of	the	situation.	It	
stands	 as	 a	 prime	 example	 of	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 controversy	 surrounding	
dismantling	had	become	a	vehicle	for	the	articulation	of	retrospective	accounts	of	






British	 press.	 In	 March	 1947,	 William	 Connor’s	 regular	 Cassandra	 column	 in	 the	
Mirror	had	 taken	 up	 the	 theme	 of	 responsibility,	 specifically	 that	 of	 the	 German	
people	for	the	‘two	World	Wars	and	one	European	War	in	the	past	seventy	years’.77	






‘absolution	 for	 the	Reich’,	 finding	a	very	willing	audience	 in	 today’s	Germany	and	
leading	 to	 searching	 questions	 about	 the	 future:	 ‘will	 there	 be	 a	 third	 Teutonic	
Phoenix	 arising	 from	 the	 flames?’.	 Later	 that	 year,	 a	Pathé	newsreel	 detailed	 the	
destruction	and	dislocation	 that	characterised	postwar	Berlin,	a	 ‘broken	city’,	and	
wondered	 whether	 ‘some	 new	 world-shaking	 warmonger’	 might	 ‘arise	 from	 the	
rubble’.78	 	 In	the	same	month,	William	Barkley’s	column	in	the	Express	 featured	a	
choice	headline:	‘Watch	Out,	They’ll	Cheat	Us	Yet!’.79	Barkley,	writing	on	Armistice	




























the	 threat	 of	 the	 German	 socialists,	 now	 proudly	 beating	 a	 nationalist	 drum,	
encouraging	‘anti-British	agitation’,	and	commemorating	German	soldiers:	
We	do	not	blame	the	Germans	for	being	true	to	their	nature.	But	we	do	blame	






restoration	 of	 German	 statehood.	 Yet	 in	 July	 1948	 he	 wrote	 to	 the	Manchester	
Guardian,	remarking	that	he	was	left	‘feeling	sick	at	heart	in	the	very	hour	[we]	are	
being	 fulfilled’.82	 For	 Gollancz,	 taking	 a	 more	 ‘sentimental’	 attitude	 towards	 the	
German	 people	 was	 foremost	 a	 moral	 choice,	 rather	 than	 a	 political	 one.	 The	
Realpolitik	displayed	by	Allied	leaders	was	simply	further	proof	of	the	West’s	decay:	
Is	 it	 because	 it	 is	 right	 to	be	decent	 to	human	beings	 as	 such	 that	 a	wave	of	
sentimental	pro-Germanism	[…]	is	now	swelling?	No:	it	is	because	in	the	changed	
circumstances	 the	Russians	are	more	dangerous	 to	us	 than	the	Germans,	and	
therefore	it	is	the	Germans	we	must	woo	as	potential	allies	in	a	dreaded	conflict	
[…].	 In	 three	 short	 years	 the	 pariah	 nation,	 held	 criminally	 responsible,	 as	 a	
whole,	for	Auschwitz	and	Buchenwald,	has	become,	as	a	whole,	‘Christian	and	
civilised’	–	with	Auschwitz	and	Buchenwald	forgotten.	In	1945,	they	were	to	be	




‘appealing	 to	 nationalistic	 sentiments’	 that	 ‘three	 years	 of	 re-education	 could	
scarcely	be	expected	to	kill’.83	The	Germans,	it	was	concluded,	were	proving	unequal	
to	their	new	responsibilities.		













Connell	 suggested,	 the	 Allies	 had	 failed	 to	 effect	 ‘any	 significant	 change	 in	 the	
German	social	structure’	and	nationalism	was	blooming	once	again.	At	what	stage	










The	 Germans	 accuse	 us	 of	 a	 determination	 to	 keep	 them	 in	 a	 position	 of	
permanent	 helotry:	 we,	 who	 only	 recently	 were	 patting	 their	 backs	 of	 their	
conduct	 in	 Berlin,	 accuse	 them	 of	 arrogance,	 unreasonableness,	 resurgent	
nationalism,	and	 ‘gross	 impropriety’	 in	 their	attitude	 to	 the	occupying	Power.	
They	play	with	the	idea	of	non-cooperation:	whereupon	we	remind	them	of	their	
past	 sins	 and	 their	 potentiality	 for	 future	 evil	 […].	 Once	 again	 the	 chance	 of	
reconciliation	 is	 being	 lost,	 and	another	nail	 is	 being	driven	 into	 the	 coffin	of	
European	peace.	86	








Tellingly,	 his	 concerns	 met	 with	 complaint	 from	 Ian	 R.	 Christie,	 a	 historian	 at	
University	 College	 London,	 who	 reaffirmed	 a	 Black	 Record-style	 conception	 of	
Germany’s	past:	
Mr.	Gollancz	bases	his	thesis	on	an	 interpretation	of	the	German	character	to	
which	 I	 cannot	 subscribe.	He	assumes	 that	Germans	will	behave	 ‘reasonably’,	




men	 as	 Schopenhauer,	 Nietzsche,	 Fichte,	 and	 Treitschke	 were,	 and	 still	 are,	
representative	 of	 the	 German	 mental	 outlook;	 and	 that	 Bismarck	 and	 the	




There	 was	 evidently	 little	 enthusiasm	 for	 the	 prospect	 of	 West	 German	
statehood	in	the	pages	of	the	British	newspapers.	Even	the	upmarket	broadsheets,	






















election	 loomed	 closer,	 British	 journalists,	 politicians,	 diplomats,	 civilians,	 and	















work	 […].	 [T]here	 are	 many	 snags	 and	 dangers	 in	 the	 developments	 which	
Western	Germany	is	now	undergoing.	With	its	still	largely	apathetic	political	life	

































in	 the	upmarket	newspapers,	especially	 the	Manchester	Guardian.97	This	 included	


















Germany’s	 future.98	 In	 early	 August,	 the	 exploits	 of	Otto	 Strasser	 to	 re-enter	 the	
political	fray	also	inspired	a	Manchester	Guardian	article,	under	the	headline	‘Seeds	




























into	the	German	media	raised	fears	 that	a	 ‘pro-Nazi	press’	was	reviving.101	 In	 late	
August,	 British	Military	 Governor	 Sir	 Brian	 Robertson	 felt	 compelled	 to	warn	 the	
Germans	 to	 curb	 the	 revival	 of	Nazism	 and	 ‘protect	Democratic	 institutions	 from	
attack’,	 drawing	 yet	more	 attention	 to	 the	 appointment	 of	 Nazi-era	 editors	 at	 a	
number	of	 right-wing	publications.102	The	Mirror’s	 subsequent	editorial	 cautioned	
against	sentimentality	or	any	erroneous	belief	in	short	cuts	to	democracy,	calling	for	





Union	 (and	 Christian	 Social	 Union)	 (CDU/CSU)	 ushered	 in	 a	 centre-right	 coalition	
between	 the	 CDU/CSU,	 the	 Free	 Democratic	 Party	 (FDP),	 and	 the	 German	 Party	
(DP).104	 On	 15	 September	 1949,	 Konrad	 Adenauer	 was	 nominated	 as	 the	 first	
Chancellor	of	the	Federal	Republic	of	Germany,	a	position	that	he	would	hold	until	
1963.	 It	 signalled	 the	 first	 steps	 towards	 sovereignty,	 heralding	 a	 new	 era	 in	 the	
history	of	Germany	and	in	the	course	of	Anglo-German	diplomatic	relations.105	But	
Adenauer’s	electoral	success	was	met	with	a	flurry	of	invective	and	trepidation	from	




























ask	 what	 form	 of	 nationalism	 we	 are	 to	 expect,	 whether	 the	 new	 form	 of	
democracy	will	go	the	way	of	the	Weimar	form,	and	whether,	 in	 fact,	what	 is	
emerging	in	Germany	is	a	democracy	without	democrats.107	








during	 the	 election	 campaign	 to	 attack	 the	 occupying	 powers	 for	 purely	
demagogic	purposes,	they	will	certainly	find	themselves	outbidden	by	the	self-
appointed	heirs	of	Hitler	and	Goebbels.	
















a	 right-wing	 party,	 with	 its	 editorial	 demonstrating	 an	 uncharacteristic	 degree	 of	
sympathy	towards	the	challenges	that	faced	the	new	German	government.111		The	












The	 following	 week,	 the	 Mail’s	 Germany	 correspondent	 Brian	 Connell	
interviewed	Adenauer	himself,	who	utilised	the	platform	to	laud	the	democratic	faith	
of	the	German	people	and	his	government’s	intention	to	put	a	halt	to	both	right-wing	
radicalism	 and	 unfair	 economic	 competition.112	 Yet	 the	 Daily	 Mail’s	 politically-
orientated	change	of	heart	had	 its	 limits:	 the	same	week,	a	Kenneth	Ames	article	






















At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 year,	 Duff	 Cooper’s	 end-of-year	 review	 in	 the	 Mail	










that	 the	 Germans	 still	 venerate	 the	 name	 of	 Hitler,	 who	 has	 never	 been	
denounced	by	any	of	their	present	leaders.	So	they	have	ideological	as	well	as	
economic	reasons	for	war.	












attempts	 to	 seek	 representation	 at	 the	 Assembly	 of	 Europe	 were	 greeted	 with	
opposition	in	the	Daily	Mirror,	which	ran	the	headline	‘The	Same	Old	Hun	–	Germans	






afternoon	 […].	 The	 limousine’s	 elderly	 passenger	 was	 73-year-old	 Dr	 Konrad	





It	 was	 alleged	 that	 Adenauer	 held	 anti-British	 prejudices,	 dating	 back	 to	 his	
opposition	 to	 the	 first	 British	 Army	 of	 the	 Rhine	 in	 1919	 and	 augmented	 by	 his	


















In	 September,	 Sefton	Delmer’s	Express	 column,	 ‘Can	Germany	Harm	Us?’,	



















name	 of	 patriotism	 the	 Government	 and	 the	 German	 public	 will	 once	 more	







enact	 a	 wholesale	 examination	 of	 German	 society	 and	 pursue	 war	 crimes	





prosecutions	 had	 quickly	 diminished.121	 In	 January	 1948,	 the	 British	 authorities	
quietly	 declared	 denazification	 to	 be	 complete.122	 There	was,	 as	Donald	 Bloxham	
describes,	 a	 ‘gradual	 dismantling	 of	 the	 legal	 machinery’	 relating	 to	 war	 crimes,	
coinciding	 with	 a	 series	 of	 quantum	 shifts	 in	 official	 policy	 regarding	 postwar	
Germany.123	Yet	 in	 the	British	Zone	the	process	dragged	on	until	December	1949,	
when	 Field	Marshal	 Erich	 von	Manstein,	 a	 leading	 figure	 in	 the	Wehrmacht	 High	
Command	during	the	Second	World	War,	was	the	defendant	in	the	last	British	war	







the	 nascent	 Cold	 War	 having	 inspired	 the	 rapid	 rehabilitation	 of	 Germany	 from	
pariah	state	to	important	ally.	As	a	result,	these	public	and	media	responses	provide	
acute	 insight	 into	 the	 character	of	British	public	perceptions	of	Germany	vis-à-vis	
official	policy	at	the	end	of	the	1940s.	
Scholars	 have,	 until	 now,	 typically	 engaged	 with	 the	 Manstein	 trial	 as	 a	
touchstone	of	Britain’s	postwar	international	relations	outlook	regarding	Germany	














and	the	balance	of	power	 in	Europe.124	 In	 this	 reading	we	see	how	the	realpolitik	






As	part	of	 this	analysis,	British	domestic	opposition	 to	Manstein’s	 trial	has	
been	highlighted	as	a	vindication	and	prime	example	of	an	apparent	public	consensus	
in	support	of	Cold	War	realpolitik.	We	are	shown	how	the	Manstein	case	 inspired	
prominent	 political	 figures,	 including	 Winston	 Churchill,	 to	 make	 parliamentary	
speeches	denouncing	the	prospect	of	a	trial.	In	addition,	Labour	MP	Reginald	Paget	
worked	pro	bono	to	defend	Manstein	in	court,	an	emissary	for	those	who	rejected	
the	 prosecution	 as	 an	 injustice.125	 Moreover,	 critical	 letter-writing	 campaigns	
condemning	 the	 trial	 regularly	 featured	 in	 the	 national	 press.	 Donald	 Bloxham	
characterises	reaction	to	the	trial	as	an	‘unprecedented	hail	of	criticism’,	even	while	
acknowledging	 that	 orchestrated	 opposition	 ‘never	 achieved	 anything	 like	 mass	
























of	 a	 ‘shift	 in	 British	 public	 opinion	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 German	 generals’.128	 David	
Cesarani	has	also	argued	that	the	British	public	were	generally	hostile	to	the	trial,	
stating	 that	 ‘by	 the	 time	 of	 the	 trial	 of	 senior	 German	 generals,	 including	 von	
Manstein,	in	1948-49,	there	was	actually	a	popular	reaction	against	“dragging	out”	
the	process	of	retribution’.129		
We	 are	 led	 to	 believe,	 in	 other	 words,	 that	 the	 emergence	 of	 public	
opposition	 to	 war	 crimes	 proceedings	 in	 Britain	 was	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 changed	
political	context	of	the	Cold	War.130	The	apparent	hostility	to	Manstein’s	prosecution	
is	 taken	 to	 be	 symptomatic	 of	 the	 evolving	 character	 of	 postwar	 Anglo-German	
popular	 relations,	 in	 which	 British	 wartime	 hostility	 towards	 Germany	 rapidly	
diminished	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	 escalating	 conflict	 with	 the	 Soviet	 Union.131	 The	
occupation,	then,	had	overseen	not	only	Germany’s	political	rehabilitation,	but	also	
allowed	for	reconciliation	between	Britain	and	Germany	more	generally.	





























































poor	 conditions	 these	 elderly	 and	 purportedly	 honourable	 men	 faced.137	 In	 the	
following	 months,	 numerous	 editorials	 and	 correspondents	 followed	 suit	 and	
invoked	 the	 trial’s	 repercussions	 for	 national	 identity,	 alleging	 that	 this	 apparent	
unseemliness	threatened	‘British	values’,	had	‘a	Nazi	rather	than	a	British	flavour’,	
and	was	repugnant	to	a	distinctively	British	sense	of	justice.138		





















The	 implication	 of	 an	 all-embracing	 patriotic	 humanitarianism	 encouraged	
the	momentary	censure	of	politicians	and	public	figures	from	wide	range	of	political	
outlooks.	Avowedly	liberal	or	left-wing	voices	such	as	George	Bell,	Michael	Foot,	and	
J.	 B.	 Priestley	 aligned	with	 right-wing	 political	 and	military	 establishment	 figures,	
including	 Lord	 Hankey	 and	 the	 British	Military	 Government	 in	 Germany.139	 Their	
opposition	 to	 the	 trials,	ostensibly	grounded	 in	ethical	concerns	 that	 included	the	
untimeliness	of	a	prosecution	taking	place	four	years	after	the	end	of	the	war,	was	




called	 for	 this	 remaining	 trial	 to	 be	 abandoned,	 while	 others	 merely	 sought	 to	




























guarantee	 scrupulous	 procedural	 fairness	 and	 the	 upholding	 of	 ‘British	 fair	 play’	










repeated	 numerous	 times	 over	 the	 next	 year,	 is	 unclear,	 although	 its	 initial	
concurrence	with	the	War	Office’s	statement	and	ubiquity	suggests	it	may	have	been	






























and	 the	 Manchester	 Guardian	 that	 acknowledged	 improved	 conditions	 of	
imprisonment	and	 including	 thanks	 from	Manstein	himself.145	Over	 the	next	year,	
prior	to	the	commencement	of	the	trial	in	August	1949,	such	disclosures	ensured	that	
the	moderate	and	principled	strands	of	humanitarian	and	political	opposition	largely	










an	 anonymous	 ‘disabled	 ex-WAAF’	 sardonically	 asked	 whether,	 in	 light	 of	 a	
subscription	set	up	to	support	Manstein,	someone	might	care	to	start	a	fund	for	her	
upcoming	Pensions	Appeals	Tribunal.146	The	apparent	persistence	of	public	hostility	



















actively	 advocating	 for	 the	 necessity	 of	 Manstein’s	 prosecution.	 For	 example,	
Cassandra	 in	 the	 Mirror	 unequivocally	 backed	 the	 government’s	 decision	 to	
prosecute,	primarily	out	of	a	duty	to	Nazism’s	millions	of	victims.148	Such	forthright	
support	 was	 also	 evident	 in	 several	 local	 publications,	 such	 as	Milton	 Shulman’s	
Nottingham	 Evening	 Post	 article	 challenging	 the	 notion	 that	 the	 trial	 was	 ‘un-
British’.149	This	argument,	he	suggested,	was	simply	a	convenient	cover	for	those	who	
had	imprudently	rejected	the	whole	concept	of	war	crimes	trials	from	their	outset.		
There	 are	 even	 indications	 that	 the	 upmarket	 press	 was	 far	 from	 wholly	
supportive	 of	 the	 critical	 opinions	 that	 had	 intermittently	 appeared	 in	 its	
correspondence	pages.	A	Times	editorial	 in	August	1948	argued	that	 if	 these	men	
had	‘committed	acts	against	the	recognised	laws	of	war	they	should	be	punished’.150	
In	 addition,	 the	 paper	 also	 published	 two	 full-length	 opinion	 pieces,	 alongside	 a	
sympathetic	 editorial,	 on	 the	 topic	 of	 ‘The	 German	 Officers’	 Corps’	 which	
emphatically	 reinforced	 the	 perceived	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 British	 government’s	
decision.151	Their	author,	Brigadier-General	John	Hartman	Morgan,	was	a	veteran	of	


















democratic	officers’	 corps.	He	claimed	 that	 these	 soldiers	were	 fashioning	a	 ‘new	
stab-in-the-back	 myth’,	 blaming	 Hitler	 for	 the	 defeat	 of	 an	 otherwise	 victorious	






















Manstein’s	 trial	 opened	 on	 23	 August	 1949,	 with	 the	 court	 deliberating	
seventeen	 charges	 alleging	 the	 authorisation	 of	 mass	 atrocities	 against	 tens	 of	
thousands	 of	 prisoners	 and	 civilians	 during	military	 campaigns	 in	 Poland	 and	 the	








for	 his	 negligence	 in	 protecting	 civilians	 and	 POWs,	 and	 sentencing	 him	 to	 an	
eighteen-year	prison	term.	
















himself	 incognizant	 of	 atrocities,	 tried	 by	 a	 court	 that	 had	 neither	 the	 adequate	
expertise	nor	legal	right	to	make	this	a	fair	hearing.	Paget	labelled	war	crimes	trials	
as	‘fundamentally	totalitarian’	and	disparaged	the	Nuremberg	Principles	as	the	work	




levelled	 against	 denazification	 since	 the	 very	 start	 of	 the	 occupation.	 The	
belligerence	of	Paget’s	 rhetoric	provoked	 the	official	 Polish	observer	 to	walk	out,	
criticising	 the	 ‘poisonous	 fascist,	 pro-Nazi,	 anti-Soviet,	 anti-democratic	 defence’.	
Paget	 also	 earned	 the	 repeated	 rebuke	 of	 the	 Judge	 Advocate	 Charles	 Arthur	
Collingwood	for	seeking	to	make	the	trial	a	political	event.158		





















trial.	 However,	 on	 occasion,	 editors	 and	 columnists	 provided	 a	 more	 partisan	
interpretation	of	proceedings.	It	is	remarkable,	considering	the	controversies	evident	
in	 the	 pre-trial	 period,	 that	 hostile	 voices	 were	 almost	 entirely	 absent	 from	 this	
discourse.	 In	their	place,	mass-market	newspapers	such	as	the	Daily	Express	were	




explicit	 in	 the	numerous	accompanying	editorials	 and	 columns,	 as	 in	 a	Daily	Mail	
opinion	piece	 from	29	November.	 This	 article,	 in	 reviewing	 the	 legal	 and	political	
issues	 surrounding	 the	 Manstein	 case,	 reflected	 the	 emergent	 approval	 for	 the	
indictment:	‘as	at	Nuremberg,	you	cannot	listen	long	without	becoming	convinced	
that	 this	 is,	 after	 all,	 a	 serious	 search	 for	 truth.	 It	 is	 an	 attempt	 to	 extend	 the	
prevailing	 principles	 of	 justice	 to	 cover	 a	 new	 type	 of	 crime’.160	 Paget	 himself,	













of	 a	 legal	 process	 which	 had	 set	 out	 in	 1945	 to	 comprehensively	 punish	 those	
responsible	 for	 the	 crimes	 of	 the	 Third	 Reich.162	 Numerous	 articles	 extolled	 the	
virtues	of	 prosecuting	 those	 from	 lower	 ranks	who	had	 committed	atrocities	 and	
thereby,	as	a	Yorkshire	Post	editorial	remarked,	avoiding	the	purportedly	intolerable	
situation	whereby	Hitler’s	suicide	would	have	left	‘all	the	brutes	guilty	of	outrages	




Manstein	 trial	was	 particularly	 palpable,	 before	 imploring	 that	 not	 only	must	 the	
Germans	be	mindful	of	these	lessons	but	neither	‘should	we	ever	permit	ourselves	
to	forget	[them]’.		
Alongside	 this	 moderate	 advocacy	 for	 the	 trial	 there	 were	 more	 radical	




























because	 retribution	has	at	 last	 caught	up	with	a	man	who	plied	his	grim	 trade	of	
death	 and	 destruction	 with	 such	 ruthlessness’.	 	 The	 paper	 went	 on	 to	 deride	
opponents	 of	 the	 prosecution	 for	 fashioning	 ‘misplaced	 sentiment’	 that	 had	
encouraged	the	‘present	tender	handling’	of	the	newly	sovereign	Federal	Republic	of	
Germany.166	
But	 the	 most	 popular	 national	 newspapers	 also	 offered	 a	 sensational	
response	to	the	trial’s	verdict.	 In	the	Daily	Express,	 foreign	correspondent	Charles	
Wighton	described	Manstein	as	 ‘an	ordinary	murderer	whose	crimes	would	make	
the	 Old	 Bailey	 quake’	 and	 a	 duplicitous	 ‘thin-lipped	 Prussian	 disciplinarian’	 who	
inspired	 the	 loyalty	 of	 on-looking	 ‘jack-booted	 and	 duel-scarred	 German	 ex-
officers’.167	 The	 paper	 had	 previously	 quoted	 an	 unnamed	 British	 politician	 who	
wagered	 that,	 if	 acquitted,	 Manstein	 would	 be	 German	 president	 in	 ten	 years,	
illustrating	the	enduring	vibrancy	of	fears	over	the	resurgence	of	German	militarism	
and	 dictatorship.168	 Cassandra,	 writing	 in	 the	Daily	Mirror,	 struck	 a	 similar	 tone,	

















roaring	 and	 raging	 behind	 their	 Mansteins…only	 five	 years	 ago’;	 ‘had	 they	
reformed?’,	wondered	the	columnist,	‘I’M	NOT	SO	SURE’	was	his	fretful	response.169	








in	 detail	 the	 history	 of	 Nazi	 atrocities,	Wehrmacht	 criminality,	 and	 long-standing	
Anglo-German	 antagonisms.	 This	 included	 the	 publication	 of	 vitriolic	 and	
stereotypical	 images	 of	 an	 apparently	 instinctive	 militarism	 or	 Prussianism,	
dovetailing	with	compelling	anxieties	about	Germany’s	resurgence.	In	turn,	the	trial	
had	inspired	a	number	of	passionately	apprehensive	responses	regarding	the	future	
of	Germany,	 lamenting	 the	apparent	 failure	of	 the	Allied	occupation.	These	 ideas	
were	 clearly	 distinct	 from,	 and	 in	 many	 instances	 entirely	 contradictory	 to,	 the	
outlook	of	British	policymakers	towards	Germany.	
It	 is	 apparent	 that	 most	 contemporary	 observers	 did	 not	 perceive	 the	
Manstein	trial	within	the	narrative	of	the	Cold	War,	nor	as	a	‘British	embarrassment’	
or	 a	 relic	 of	 a	 nearly	 ‘forgotten	 era	 of	 history’.171	 Rather,	 the	 impassioned	 and	
predominantly	supportive	discourse	that	accompanied	the	trial	and	its	verdict	signals	












Vansittart’s	 virulent	 anti-Germanism.	 These	 findings	 reiterate	 the	 conclusion	 that	
substantial	 sections	 of	 the	 British	 media	 (and,	 it	 may	 be	 inferred,	 a	 substantial	
proportion	 of	 their	mass	 readership)	 remained	 sceptical	 towards	 the	 prospect	 of	
Anglo-German	 reconciliation.	 It	 is	 apparent	 that	 concerns	 regarding	 German	








of	 the	 Anglo-American	 shift	 towards	 a	 more	 reconciliatory,	 reconstructive	 policy	
towards	Germany,	 something	 that	had	been	underway	 since	1946.	Yet	 the	public	
contours	of	this	change	had	not	become	clear	until	1948,	when	the	Berlin	Blockade	
brought	Cold	War	posturing	into	the	open.	This	momentous	event	helped	to	usher	
in	 an	 anti-Soviet	 consensus	 amongst	 the	 British	 public	 and	 their	 political	 leaders	
which	reached	across	ideological	lines.	But	historians	have	mistakenly	presumed	that	
this	shift	in	attitudes	towards	the	Soviet	Union	came	about	alongside	a	concurrent	
change	 in	 British	 perceptions	 of	 Germany.	 There	 is,	 however,	 little	 evidence	 to	
suggest	 that	 this	 period	 saw	a	 rapid	 repositioning	of	 popular	 opinion	 in	 line	with	
official	thinking.	






Daily	 Mirror,	 the	 prospect	 of	 Germany’s	 revival	 was	 regarded	 as	 a	 threat	 and	
perceived	more	readily	within	the	framework	of	Vansittart’s	Black	Record	than	that	
of	 the	 nascent	 Cold	 War.	 As	 evidence	 of	 Germany’s	 burgeoning	 economy	 and	




to	 emphasise	 the	 apparent	 danger	 of	 resurgent	 nationalism	 and	 militarism	 –	
sometimes	with	a	rhetorical	flourish	reminiscent	of	Vansittart	himself.	Yet	they	were	
not	 alone:	 the	Manchester	 Guardian,	 Times,	 and	 Telegraph	 also	 succumbed	 to	
Germanophobic	 anxieties	when	 reporting	 on	Adenauer’s	 election.	 	 The	 impact	 of	
these	reports	upon	public	appraisals	of	the	new	German	state	was	unquestionably	
profound,	 especially	 amongst	 the	predominantly	 lower	middle-class	 and	working-
class	readership	of	the	Express,	Mail,	and	Mirror.	
At	 the	 root	 of	 these	 anxieties	 stood	 the	 problematic	 legacy	 of	 the	 Allied	
occupation,	 which	 came	 under	 scrutiny	 as	 it	 reached	 its	 denouement.	 By	 1949,	





















antagonism	 to	 alliance.	 Yet,	 as	 this	 thesis	 has	 demonstrated,	 the	 period	 of	 the	
occupation	 saw	 prevailing	 public	 and	 media	 attitudes	 towards	 Britain’s	 former	
enemy	take	a	starkly	different	path.	The	apparent	failings	of	the	Control	Commission	
for	 Germany	 (British	 Element)	 came	 to	 dominate	 popular	 portrayals	 of	 postwar	
Germany,	 inviting	 disparaging	 assessments	 of	 Britain’s	 standing	 as	 a	 national	 in	
decline.	It	became	widely	accepted	across	much	of	the	mass-market	press	that	the	
occupation	had	been	a	humiliating	failure.	This,	coupled	with	a	powerful	Feindbild	of	
Germany,	 aided	 the	 maintenance	 of	 anti-German	 hostility.	 By	 1949,	 the	 discord	







so-called	 ‘German	 Problem’	 and	 its	 projected	 resolution	 emerged	 across	 British	








At	 the	 forefront	 stood	 two	 bitter	 adversaries,	 Lord	 Vansittart	 and	 Victor	
Gollancz,	 whose	 clashing	 diatribes	 developed	 into	 something	 of	 a	 culture	 war.	
Vansittart	 and	 his	 many	 followers	 were	 resolutely	 hostile	 to	 Germany,	 whose	
supposed	‘black	record’	of	authoritarianism	and	war	had,	they	argued,	culminated	in	
the	Third	Reich.	 It	was	a	view	 that	 found	backing	 from	much	of	 the	mass-market	
press,	as	well	as	a	growing	proportion	of	leading	British	politicians.	Vansittart’s	Black	
Record	 had	 successfully	 revivified	 the	anti-German	 stereotypes	of	 the	First	World	




Vansittart’s	 primary	 opponents	 were	 an	 assortment	 of	 liberals,	 socialists,	
Anglicans,	 and	 humanitarians	 who,	 first	 and	 foremost,	 sought	 recognition	 of	 the	
‘Other	Germany’.	The	Third	Reich,	they	argued,	was	a	totalitarian	terror	state,	alien	














how,	 in	 turn,	 it	 should	 be	 resolved	 would	 have	 a	 significant	 influence	 upon	
subsequent	 assessments	 of	 the	 apparent	 success	 or	 otherwise	 of	 the	 Allied	




British	 approaches	 to	 Nazism	 after	 1949,	 at	 least	 at	 a	 popular	 level,	 would	 be	
refracted.1		
In	 the	 late	 summer	 of	 1945,	 the	 Potsdam	 Agreement	 enshrined	 a	 peace	
settlement	in	Germany	much	more	closely	aligned	to	Vansittart’s	analysis	than	that	
of	his	opponents.	The	four-power	occupation	encapsulated	the	prevailing	zeitgeist	
of	 Britain’s	 political	 and	 public	 sentiment,	 focused	 on	 the	 potential	 threat	 of	
recidivism	 and	 anxieties	 over	 the	 depth	 of	 Nazi	 acculturation.	 But	 it	 was	 an	
ambiguous	and	inherently	flawed	compromise,	stipulating	an	unprecedentedly	wide-
ranging	but	imprecise	course	of	treatment.	This	included	including	a	comprehensive	
military	 occupation	 of	 an	 undetermined	 length,	 as	 well	 as	 denazification,	 re-
education,	demilitarisation,	and	strict	economic	controls.	
In	 Britain,	 the	 Potsdam	 Agreement	 was	 greeted	 with	 a	 degree	 of	 relief,	
although	the	interest	of	the	media	and	public	media	in	the	resolution	of	the	‘German	
Problem’	gradually	subsided.	There	was	nevertheless	 intermittent	coverage	of	the	
Allied	 occupation,	much	 of	 which	 lauded	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 British	 attempts	 in	
rooting	out	Nazism	and	militarism	from	Germany.	This	was,	in	part,	the	result	of	an	
expansive	 public	 relations	 campaigns	 undertaken	 by	 the	 British	 occupation	
authorities,	who	sought	to	maintain	popular	support	for	their	work.	Public	opinion	











policymakers,	 who	 found	 themselves	 increasingly	 at	 odds	 with	 their	 Soviet	




ratified	 at	 Potsdam	 was	 covertly	 disavowed,	 with	 British	 and	 American	 leaders	
tending	 towards	 a	 more	 reconstructive	 approach.	 But	 in	 Britain,	 with	 the	
transformed	 political	 outlook	 of	 the	 Western	 Allies	 hidden	 from	 view,	 the	 crisis	
elicited	a	different	 response.	Victor	Gollancz	and	George	Bell	 led	 calls	 for	a	more	




public	 portrayals	 of	 the	 occupation,	 but	 rather	 the	 British	 occupiers	 tasked	 with	










continue	 to	 feature	 a	 constant	 stream	 of	 stories	 about	 corruption,	 fraud,	




of	moral	 virtue	 in	 the	postwar	world,	while	many	of	 the	 ‘hard	peace’	 lobby	were	
expressly	in	favour	of	such	a	stern,	anti-German	ethos.	But	there	was	condemnation	
across	 the	 board	 at	 the	 apparent	 incompetence,	 greed,	 and	misbehaviour	 of	 the	
British	in	Germany.	Their	shortcomings	were	widely	regarded	to	be	damaging	British	
prestige	on	the	world	stage	and	risking	the	hard-fought	victories	of	the	war,	with	the	
mass-market	 press	 espousing	 self-critical	 assessments	 of	 Britain	 as	 a	 nation	 in	
decline.	 The	 costs	 of	 maintaining	 the	 occupation	 were,	 moreover,	 seen	 to	 be	
spiralling	out	of	control,	with	complaints	from	politicians	and	newspaper	editors	alike	
that	Britain	was	effectively	paying	reparations	to	their	defeated	foe.		






criticism	 of	 the	 occupation	 came	 to	 a	 head.	 The	 Daily	 Mail	 and	 Daily	 Express	
instigated	a	campaign	calling	for	Britain	to	‘Get	Out	of	Germany’.	Their	contention	








the	 on-looking	 media	 and	 public,	 that	 the	 occupation	 was	 failing	 and	 further	
amplified	a	self-effacing	analysis	of	Britain’s	standing	on	the	world	stage.	It	was,	in	
many	 ways,	 an	 isolationist	 response	 to	 the	 nation’s	 postwar	 predicament,	
demanding	a	retreat	from	Europe	even	at	the	potential	risk	of	allowing	a	Nazi	revival	
in	Germany.		
Meanwhile,	 British	 political	 and	military	 leaders	 had	 continued,	 alongside	
their	American	counterparts,	 to	pursue	a	path	 towards	a	more	 reconciliatory	and	
reconstructive	 policy	 in	 Germany.	 While	 there	 was	 no	 sense	 amongst	 decision	









anti-Soviet	 position.	 But	 while	 the	 abrupt	 readjustment	 of	 media	 and	 public	
sentiment	towards	the	Soviet	Union	was	relatively	straightforward,	this	was	far	from	
true	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Germany.	 The	 long-standing	 antagonism	 and	 bitter	 collective	
memories	of	two	world	wars	stood	in	the	way	of	any	rapid	public	reconciliation	or	
rehabilitation	 of	 Britain’s	 new	 ally.	 The	 revival	 of	 the	German	 economy,	 protests	
















and	 extravagances	 of	 the	 much-maligned	 British	 occupiers.	 This,	 coupled	 with	
growing	concerns	over	Britain’s	weakness	as	a	world	power,	had	helped	to	preserve,	
perhaps	even	augment,	antagonistic	ideas	about	Germany	and	Nazism.	The	notion	








is	 despite	 various	 official	 and	 unofficial	 attempts	 in	 the	 1950s	 and	 beyond	 to	
characterise	the	Allied	occupation	as	a	‘miracle’,	a	vital	juncture	in	the	fight	against	
Soviet	Communism	and	 creation	of	 a	peaceful	Germany.2	 In	 June	1996,	 following	
England’s	 defeat	 by	 Germany	 in	 the	 semi-finals	 of	 Euro	 96,	 Niall	 Ferguson	 even	
sought	to	proclaim	a	moral	victory	on	the	football	field:	












legitimate	 accomplishments	 of	 the	 Allied	 occupation	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 stable	
modern	 democracy	 in	 Germany	 are	 now	 well-documented	 by	 historians.	 The	
diminution	of	Britain’s	role	in	the	occupation	to	little	more	than	a	footnote	in	public	
memory	is,	then,	perhaps	further	proof	of	the	perceived	failure	of	this	endeavour	to	
contemporaries.	 This	 was	 no	 liberation	 of	 ‘Other	 Germany’	 from	 totalitarian	
oppression,	nor	a	wholly	successful	and	magnanimous	rehabilitation	of	the	German	
people.	 It	 wasn’t	 even	 perceived	 as	 the	 concluding	 chapter	 in	 a	 heroic	 narrative	
about	Britain’s	success	in	two	wars	against	Germany.		
Rather,	 Britain’s	 confrontation	 with	 Nazism	 between	 1945-49	 saw	 a	
significant	section	the	British	media	and	public	draw	a	radically	different	conclusion	
from	their	political	leaders.	Bevin,	Attlee,	and	others	oversaw	the	transformation	of	
Britain’s	 relationship	 with	 Germany.	 In	 line	 with	 America’s	 Cold	 War	 posturing,	
Britain	embraced	West	Germany	as	an	ally	against	a	new	totalitarian	threat.	But	for	
much	of	the	British	press	and	public,	there	was	no	such	easy	reappraisal	of	Germany:	
it	 remained,	 in	 the	 minds	 of	 many,	 a	 font	 of	 latent	 militarism,	 antagonism,	 and	
authoritarianism.	The	British	occupiers,	mismanaged	and	distracted	by	the	bounty	of		
	 	







occupation	 of	 Germany	 had	 seemingly	 exposed	 Britain’s	 various	 shortcomings,	
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